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INTRODUCTION 
Heidegger and the Genealogy of Time 
 
 This dissertation is an attempt to come to grips with a claim Heidegger makes in 
the second part of the Introduction to Being and Time.  While discussing the ordinary 
concept of time, Heidegger claims that the history of this ordinary concept is Aristotelian.  
He says: “This ordinary way of understanding it has become explicit in an interpretation 
precipitated in the traditional concept of time, which has persisted from Aristotle to 
Bergson and even later.”1  What he means by this is the following.  Aristotle’s theory of 
time is the dominant theory in the tradition.  It is dominant because every other theory in 
the tradition, from Aristotle himself to Bergson is informed by what is central in 
Aristotle’s account.  And what is central in Aristotle’s account is the concept of the 
“now.”2  This tradition, which emphasizes the “now” has covered over or otherwise 
obscured the question concerning Being, since the ordinary way of understanding time 
gives us (Dasein) only a certain kind of derivative time.  True temporality, which 
Heidegger also sometimes calls primordial, original or authentic temporality, will get 
behind this ordinary concept of time.  In doing so, both the roots of the ordinary concept, 
and Dasein’s fundamental existence as a temporal being oriented towards the future will 
be revealed to Dasein.3  This will clear the way for understanding Being itself in a 
general kind of way.4 
 The first thing I find puzzling about this claim is that even a cursory look at the 
history of the concept of time, as that concept has been thought in Western philosophy, 
shows that the history of the concept of time is not Aristotelian.  Surely people in the 
                                                 
1 Heidegger, Being and Time, 39[18]. 
2 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 246. 
3 Heidegger, Being and Time, 29-40 [9-19] 
4 Ibid., 29-40 [8-19]. 
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ancient world were familiar with Aristotle’s work on that subject.  However, neo-Platonic 
theories of time are much more dominant.  In fact, I will argue in Chapter 1 of this 
dissertation that it was Augustine’s neo-Platonic theory of time that became the dominant 
theory in the tradition.  It is Augustine’s theory that lies at the heart of classical 
mechanics and Kant’s theory of time.  This is because Augustine’s theory is a 
quantitative theory of time, whereas Aristotle’s is a qualitative theory.5 
 So why does Heidegger claim that the history of the concept of time is 
Aristotelian?  Was Heidegger unaware of Augustine?  No, in fact Heidegger believed 
Augustine’s theory of time to be one of the two major influential ancient treatises on the 
subject.  In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, he pairs Augustine and Aristotle 
together as the two main ancient thinkers, saying: “The two ancient interpretations of 
time which thereafter became standard – Augustine’s…and the first great treatise on time 
by Aristotle – are also by far the most extensive and truly thematic investigations of the 
time phenomenon itself.  Augustine agrees with Aristotle also on a series of essential 
determinations.”6  He even claims Augustine had some particular insights into the 
problem of time, saying later on in the same work: “Of the two, Aristotle’s investigations 
are conceptually more rigorous and stronger while Augustine sees some dimensions of 
the time phenomenon more originally.”7 What he seems to be saying here is that 
Augustine had something very interesting to say about time that Aristotle had not said, 
                                                 
5 I label theories of time quantitative when they regard time as an homogenous medium where time is the 
number which counts.  I label theories qualitative where time is not a homogenous medium, but has 
something to do with the motions of different kinds of things when those motions are experienced by 
conscious beings.  This distinction is similar to the distinction Bergson draws in Time and Free Will 
between spatial theories of time and his own theory of duration.  The claim that Aristotle’s theory of time is 
a qualitative theory similar to (and, in fact, quite influential for) Bergson’s theory of duration will be drawn 
out in Chapters 2 and 3. 
6 Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 231. 
7 Ibid., 232. 
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even though, at heart, Augustine’s theory is primarily in agreement with Aristotle’s, and 
hence, Aristotelian.  Heidegger never says what this original contribution by Augustine 
was, though, nor does he ever undertake a systematic exposition of Augustine’s theory in 
either Being and Time or The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. 
 Both Heidegger’s critics and defenders will admit that he sometimes takes 
liberties with the history of philosophy, even though he is often said to be involved in 
some kind of engagement with this history.  Some of these critics, such as Derrida, even 
claim that Heidegger’s whole early project is little more than another version of the very 
metaphysics he is claiming to subvert.8 Yet, as far as I have been able to tell, no one has 
seriously challenged Heidegger’s claim concerning the genealogy of the history of the 
concept of time itself.  That is, none of Heidegger’s critics have taken issue with his 
labeling the genealogy of the concept of time Aristotelian, when it is clearly not 
Aristotelian.  If he did mislabel this history, though, then Heidegger must have had a 
reason.  I believe one of the primary factors that led Heidegger to misleadingly label the 
history of the concept of time Aristotelian is Heidegger’s engagement with Henri 
Bergson. 
 Heidegger refers to Bergson in a number of places in his early works.  And he 
puts Bergson at the other end of the genealogy that starts with Aristotle.  Yet remarkably 
little has been said about the relationship between Bergson and Heidegger.  It is my 
contention that this is a serious gap in both Bergson and Heidegger scholarship – a gap 
which I propose to fill in somewhat in the following chapters.  I think this is important 
because, if it is the case that Heidegger mislabels the history of the concept of time, and 
                                                 
8 See Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Gramme,” in Margins of Philosophy for a detailed argument concerning 
Heidegger’s practicing the very metaphysics he claims to be destroying. 
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in doing so he connects Bergson with Aristotle, then Bergson’s theory of time could have 
something to do with Heidegger’s theory of authentic or original temporality.  That is, if 
Bergson is the penultimate figure in the history of the concept of time, as Heidegger’s 
genealogy suggests Heidegger believes he is, and Heidegger believes his theory of 
original temporality both uncovers the ontological roots of the ordinary concept of time 
and gives Dasein access to its own being and even Being itself, then there must be 
something in Bergson’s philosophy that Heidegger is reacting against. 
 It is this reading of Heidegger as a reaction to Bergson that I will develop in this 
dissertation.  The history of the concept of time is actually Augustinian, not Aristotelian.  
Aristotle’s theory of time is better understood as a qualitative theory of time, rather than a 
quantitative theory.  Furthermore, Aristotle’s theory was quite influential on Bergson’s 
theory of duration (his version of true or original temporality, in Heideggerian terms).  
All of which points to the likely possibility that Heidegger’s theory of true or original or 
authentic temporality actually arose, at least in part, as a reaction to Bergson’s theory of 
duration.  Therefore, rather than subverting the history of metaphysics or anything like 
that, when it comes to thinking on the concept of time, Heidegger’s theory actually falls 
firmly back into that tradition.  By drawing the genealogy of the concept from Aristotle to 
Bergson, he was able to confuse the issue enough, it seems, to escape serious critical 
notice on this point.  Nevertheless, the resurgence in Bergsonian scholarship has made it 
possible to bring the connection between Bergson and Heidegger out.  And in doing this, 
Heidegger’s critics will have a new set of tools with which to work, since, on Bergson’s 
account, Heidegger’s theory of true or original temporality is actually a quantitative or 
spatial theory. 
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 To accomplish this task, I will divide this dissertation into four chapters.  In 
Chapter 1, I will demonstrate that the history of the concept of time is Augustinian, rather 
than Aristotelian.  Aristotle’s theory of time contains no absolute presence.  For Aristotle, 
time is something that concerns the motion of individual bodies.  This was incompatible 
with the theological concerns of most medieval philosophers, including Aquinas.  Nor 
does Aristotle’s theory consider time as an homogenous medium, which makes it 
incompatible with classical mechanics.  This is because, for Aristotle, time is the number 
that is counted, not the number that counts.  Finally, although Aristotle’s theory of time 
requires a perceiving soul, the perceiving soul does not provide time as an homogenous 
medium, as is the case in Kant’s theory.  Therefore, Aristotle’s theory could not have, 
and did not, exercise the influence over the history of the concept that Heidegger claims it 
did. 
 In contrast, Augustine’s theory did contain all of these elements.  It certainly had 
all the theological aspects necessary to medieval philosophy.  It had an understanding of 
an eternal presence that frames time.  This makes every moment of time available to 
some being (God, in Augustine’s case).  If every moment of time is available to some 
being, then time exists in an homogenous and spatial way.  This is precisely what 
classical mechanics claims, even if it tries to dispense with the necessity of calling such a 
being God.  Finally, the descriptive nature of time as a distention of the mind offered by 
Augustine in the Confessions bears some remarkable similarities to the way Kant 
describes time as a condition for experience in rational beings in the Critique of Pure 
Reason.   
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 Chapter 1 demonstrates all this by first offering a clear explication of Augustine’s 
theory of time, which is found primarily in his Confessions, Book XI.  In particular, I will 
offer a philosophical interpretation of the role of God as the eternal presence framing all 
time and temporal experience, something which seems to be lacking in Augustinian 
scholarship.  Next, I will discuss several prominent objections from what Bergson refers 
to as the “spatial” tradition and what I refer to as the “quantitative” tradition of thinking 
on time (thinkers like Russell, etc).  Following this discussion, I will show that 
Augustine’s theory is not prone to many of these objections.  And finally, I will 
demonstrate the influence that Augustine’s theory has had on classical mechanics and 
Kant. 
 In Chapter 2, I will take up Aristotle’s theory of time.  Since the history of the 
concept of time is actually Augustinian, but Hediegger claims it is Aristotelian, a detailed 
examination of Aristotle’s theory is in order.  This theory, which is found in Book IV of 
the Physics is, I argue, actually a qualitative theory of time, rather than a quantitative 
theory.  This interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time is novel, I believe, and so it will 
need some justification.9 To do this, I will offer a careful description of Aristotle’s theory 
from Book IV of the Physics.  Next, I will look at interpretations of Aristotle’s theory that 
come out of the spatial tradition of thinking on time.  Following that, I will offer a 
detailed examination of Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time, which is 
found primarily in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology.  Finally, I will give my 
argument for why Aristotle’s theory of time is better understood as a qualitative theory of 
time, rather than as a quantitative theory. 
                                                 
9 This is particularly the case since Aristotle claims in the Categories that time is a quantity.  However, I 
will show that the way time is defined makes it behave more after the fashion of an affective quality, as the 
Categories describes affective qualities. 
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 Chapter 3 will discuss the influence of Aristotle’s theory of time on Bergson’s 
theory of duration.  Bergson’s theory of duration is a purely qualitative theory, which he 
develops to critique what he calls spatial theories of time and to afford us an opportunity 
for pure temporal experience, which he believes will lead to a more satisfactory 
knowledge of the universe through intuition.  Nearly all of Bergson’s works rely on this 
theory.  In this dissertation, I will rely primarily on the theory as it is articulated in Time 
and Free Will, Creative Evolution and various articles and lectures from Creative Mind.  
To show the influence of Aristotle on Bergson, then, I will first discuss Bergson’s Latin 
dissertation, entitled Aristotle’s Conception of Place.  This will show that Bergson 
understood Aristotle in a qualitative, heterogeneous way, rather than a quantitative, 
homogenous way.  This is important, because Heidegger will claim that Bergson 
understood Aristotle to be a spatial thinker.  Next, I will offer a detailed description of 
Bergson’s theory of duration, as that theory is articulated in the works listed above.  
Following that, I discuss what seem to be the two primary schools of interpretation of 
Bergson’s theory of duration: the phenomenological and the Deleuzian.  Neither of these 
schools seems to recognize Aristotle’s contribution to Bergson’s theory, though.  In the 
last part of Chapter 3, then, I describe this influence and show how it offers a more 
reasonable and complete interpretation of Bergson’s theory of duration than do the 
interpretation offered by phenomenologists and Deleuze. 
 Chapters 1, 2 and 3 will put me in a position to articulate and defend the claims 
made above about Heidegger and his theory of authentic temporality.  In Chapter IV, I 
conclude this dissertation by looking at Heidegger’s theory of authentic (or true, 
primordial or original) temporality in light of what has been said about the history of the 
 8
concept of time, Aristotle’s theory of time, and its influence on Bergson’s theory of 
duration.  To do this, I will offer the first detailed examination in English of Heidegger’s 
references to Bergson from his early works.10 These examinations will show that 
Heidegger knew Bergson well, and that he was engaged with him in some way (even if 
he seems to get Bergson’s theory wrong).  Next, I will show that Heidegger’s theory of 
time fits many of the criteria for what Bergson calls “spatial” (and what I call 
“quantitative”) theories of time.  Finally, I will show how these two sets of factors, in 
addition to everything else I have done up to this point in the dissertation, points to the 
fact that Heidegger’s theory of original temporality arose, in part, as a reaction to 
Bergson’s theory of duration.  This is why he draws the genealogy of the concept of time 
from Aristotle to Bergson.  And this is also one of the main reasons why his own theory 
of original temporality actually remains within the tradition of metaphysics he claimed to 
be subverting. 
                                                 
10 The early works I have in mind are Being and Time, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, and The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, each of which has several references to Bergson. 
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CHAPTER 1 
AUGUSTINE’S INFLUENCE ON MODERN THEORIES OF TIME 
 
 
 As I stated in the Introduction, it is strange that Heidegger mentioned Augustine 
as ancient thinker on time whose theory of time was important for his and subsequent 
ages.  It is strange because Heidegger never offers a detailed analysis of Augustine’s 
theory.  Nor does he ever mention what it is about that the theory that is more “original” 
than Aristotle’s theory.  If Heidegger was seeking original temporality, as he says he is in 
his early works, and if original temporality is something different than time as it is 
ordinarily understood (which he says is the case), then it would seem to be an oversight, 
at the very least, to leave Augustine’s theory unexamined – even if Aristotle’s theory 
actually was the more influential. 
 I believe there is a good reason why Heidegger does not undertake a detailed 
examination of Augustine’s theory of time in either Being and Time or The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology.  I believe this is because it was really Augustine’s theory of 
time that was the most influential for the major theories of time I think Heidegger has in 
mind when he discusses “ordinary” theories of time: Kant’s theory and the general theory 
that runs through classical mechanics.  These were the theories that would have been (and 
to a great extent, still are) operative in the so-called “common” understanding of the 
concept of time.  And it was precisely these theories that Bergson was reacting against 
when he offered his critiques of “spatial” theories of time in Time and Free Will and 
other places.  So, since all of this is the case, and because I believe Heidegger is reacting 
to Bergson, I will now offer a detailed description of Augustine’s theory and an argument 
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for why I believe it, rather than Aristotle’s theory, is the dominant theory in so far as 
modern theories of time are concerned.   
To do this, I will divide this chapter into four parts.  In Part I, I will offer a 
detailed explication of Augustine’s theory of time.  This theory is found primarily in 
Book XI of the Confessions.  This theory has four major components.  The first is the 
eternal presence of God.  This eternal presence frames time, particularly because, as an 
eternal being, God has no temporal existence; yet God causes every moment of time that 
exists to exist.  Therefore, there is something outside of time, by which and through 
which all time occurs.  The second component to the theory are the three modes of time’s 
existence:  the past, present and future.  For Augustine, the present is the primary mode 
of time, with the future and the past being attached to it, for us, in the forms of memory 
and expectation.  However, because of the eternal presence of God, the future for us 
actually exists, although it may not exist to us yet.  The third component of Augustine’s 
theory concerns motion and measurement.  Contrary to Aristotle, Augustine’s use of 
number is as the number which counts, not the number which is counted.  This means 
that whatever kind of number time is, it is a uniform number that measures all time 
equally and identically.  The final component to the theory is actually more of an 
epistemological component, although some have confused it with an ontological 
description.11  This concerns time’s definition as a “distention” of the mind.  What this 
actually means for Augustine, though, is that we experience time as a synthesis of past 
and future, that is, memory and expectation, to the present perception.  This makes it 
possible for us to understand time and make some use of its measurements. 
                                                 
11 I believe this causes confusion for thinkers such as Bertrand Russell, and it explains one of the reasons 
why Russell was so quick to dismiss Augustine’s theory as “subjective.”  See Bertrand Russell, 212-215. 
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In Part II, I will look at objections to Augustine’s theory from what Bergson calls 
the “spatial” tradition of temporal thinkers.  Since most of these thinkers have ignored the 
way God functions in Augustine’s theory (a point that many philosophers seem to have 
ignored, unless they were engaged in some kind of philosophical theology), they see 
Augustine’s theory as solipsistic at worst, and fuzzy and lacking in objective 
measurement at best.  In the former category are thinkers such as Bertrand Russell, 
Etienne Gilson and G.S. Whitrow.  In the latter category are thinkers such as Danne W. 
Polk.  All of these criticisms fail, though, when one looks at the way God functions in the 
system from a philosophical, rather than a religious perspective. 
In Part III, I offer answers to these objections that rely, in part, on the way God is 
used in Augustine’s system.  In doing so, many of the neo-Platonic influences that run 
through Augustine will be brought to light, particularly as these influences also run 
through Kant and classical mechanics.  This will show that Augustine’s theory is not 
subjective in the way people like Russell think it is.  Nor does it lack objective 
measurement (or at least, measurability) in the way Polk claims. 
Finally, I will demonstrate how Augustine’s theory can be found at the heart of 
both the theories of time found in classical mechanics and in Kant’s theory of time from 
the Critique of Pure Reason.  Here I will argue that Aristotle’s theory of time could not 
have had the influence Heidegger claims it did, since it is at odds with what is 
fundamental to those modern theories.  Augustine’s theory, though, shares a number of 
key elements, and was therefore much more likely to have been influential on those 
thinkers and theories.  This will prepare the way for a detailed examination of Aristotle’s 
theory in Chapter 2. 
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PART I: AUGUSTINE’S THEORY OF TIME 
 Augustine’s theory of time is found primarily in Book XI of the Confessions.  
There are also references to time in The City of God and On Genesis Contra the 
Manichees.  These later texts serve to compliment the theory of time developed in the 
Confessions.  They also provide evidence that Augustine was aware, in a general way, of 
objections that might come from so-called “objective” and “subjective” perspectives.  
Taken altogether, they reveal a theory of time that has all the components necessary to 
support and influence spatial theories of time. 
 Augustine begins his account of time with a question of God: “O Lord, since you 
are outside time in eternity, are you unaware of these things I tell you?”12 This is more 
than a simple invocation or a traditional benediction.  Augustine is beginning his 
treatment of time with an examination of God’s non-temporal existence.  This non-
temporal existence frames time, though, since he says further:  “Yours is the day, yours 
the night.  No moment of time passes except by your will.”13 So God both exists non-
temporally, yet God causes all temporal moments to exist.  This means that all things 
with a temporal existence, and all the temporal experience those things have, find their 
cause in an eternal thing, which is to say, something that exists independently of or 
outside of time. 
 The concept of an eternal presence framing temporal existence is not original to 
Augustine.  Both Plato and Plotinus held similar views.  Plato held that there was a 
creator who constructed time based on the image of eternity:  “Wherefore he resolved to 
have a moving image of eternity, and when he set in order the heaven, he made this 
                                                 
12 Augustine, Confessions, XI, 1.  References to the Confessions will refer to the book number and 
paragraph number. 
13 ibid., XI, 2 
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image eternal but moving according to number, while eternity itself rests in unity, and 
this image we call time.”14 Plotinus holds that there is a “world-soul” that creates time 
when it seeks to imitate the eternal One: 
Would it, then, be sound to define Time as the Life of the Soul in 
movement as it passes from one stage of act of or experience to another?  
Yes; for Eternity, we have said, is Life in repose, unchanging, self-
identical, always endlessly complete; and there is to be an image of 
Eternity – Time – such an image as this lower All presents of the Higher 
Sphere.  Therefore over against that higher Life there must be another life, 
known by the same name as the more veritable Life of the Soul; over 
against that Movement of the Intellectual Soul there must be the 
movement of the some partial phase; over against that Identity, 
Unchangeableness and Stability there must be that which is not constant in 
the one hold but puts forth multitudinous acts…the lesser must always be 
working towards the increase of its Being; this will be its imitation.15 
 
Augustine owes a debt to both of these ancient philosophers, particularly Plotinus, as 
Roland J. Teske points out.16  But Augustine’s notion of an eternally present and creative 
God goes beyond the relationship between time and eternity found in either Plato or 
Plotinus.  For Augustine, the eternal presence of God both creates and sustains all of time 
and every single moment of time.  He says: “whatever begins to be, or ceases to be, does 
so at the moment when the eternal reason knows that it should begin to be or cease to be, 
although in the eternal reason there is no beginning and no ending.”17  Time is not a 
picture of God, anymore than God is “unaware” of anything that goes on in time.  Time is 
something that is caused by God, but God is not something that exists temporally.  None 
of this can be said to be the case with either Plato or Plotinus.  So even if it is the case 
                                                 
14 Plato, Timaeus, 37d. 
15 Plotinus, Enneads, III. 7, 11. 
16 Teske.  Paradoxes of Time in Saint Augustine  and “The World-Soul and Time in St. Augustine” 
17 Augustine, Confessions, XI, 8. 
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that Augustine took the notion of eternity from Plotinus, as Teske suggests18, he did more 
with the concept. 
 What Augustine did was turn God’s presence into a space that frames time.  This 
also helped answer the objections of the Manichaeaens, who wondered what God was 
doing before time was created, and for how long God was doing it then.  By explaining 
eternity in spatial terms, rather than temporal terms, Augustine avoids the apparent 
contradiction of trying to explain eternity as a temporal phenomenon.  And, by attributing 
time’s existence to the will of an eternal being, Augustine paves the way for modern 
theories that will attempt to define time be reference to that which is not temporal. 
 Having described the way God’s eternal presence frames time, Augustine turns 
his attention to the nature of the past, present and future.  The existence of the various 
modes of time is a standard way to enter discussion of the nature of time and the question 
of time’s existence.  In fact, it was not uncommon for thinkers to wonder about time’s 
existence as such.  Aristotle starts his examination of time this way, saying:  “To start, 
then: the following considerations would make one suspect that it [time] either does not 
exist at all or barely, and in the obscure way.  One part of it has been and is not, while the 
other is going to be and is not yet.  Yet time – both infinite time and any time you like to 
take – is made up of these.  One would naturally suppose that what is made up of things 
which do not exist could have no share in reality.”19 Considerations like this had led some 
thinkers, such as Parmenides, to conclude that there could be no such thing as time.  Only 
                                                 
18 Teske claims that it was necessary to do this in order to defend orthodox Christian doctrine concerning 
God from Manichaean objections: “In order to respond to the Manichaean question about what God was 
doing before he created the world, he needed such a concept of divine eternity as timelessness, and he 
found that concept in Plotinus, for there was simply nowhere else he could have found it.” Paradoxes of 
Time in Saint Augustine, 22. 
19 Aristotle.  Physics, 218a. 
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that which is at the present moment can exist, therefore, nothing ever comes into being or 
passes away.  Thus he says:  “There remains, then, but one word by which to express the 
road: Is.  And on this road there are many signs that What Is has no beginning and never 
will be destroyed: it is whole, still, and without end.  It neither was nor will be, it simply 
is.”20  And he says further:  “How could What Is be something of the future?  How could 
it come-to-be?  For if it were coming-to-be, or if it were going to be in the future, in 
either case there would be a time when it is not.  Thus coming-to-be is quenched, and 
destruction is unthinkable.”21  
 What one gets from descriptions like this in Parmenides, though, is really a 
description of eternity.  But Augusitne is after a description of time.  Now every temporal 
being seemingly experiences time as past, present and future, although only in the present 
moment.  The past is experienced in memory, the present in perception, and the future in 
expectation.  Still, though, there are problems.  One can have a memory of an event that 
happened a long time ago.  One can also have a memory of an event that happened 
yesterday.  But, since neither of these events is happening now, how can we really say 
that one happened a greater amount of time ago than another?  In a similar fashion, 
Augustine wonders how one event can be further in the future than another, if neither 
event exists yet?  After all, only things that exist can be measured, and the past and the 
future, as such, do not seem to exist: 
But how can we measure time except in relation to some measurable 
period?  We cannot use the terms ‘as long’, ‘twice as long’, ‘three times as 
long’, and so on, when we speak of time, except in relation to a given 
period.  But to what period do we relate time when we measure it as it is 
passing?  To the future, from which it comes?  No: because we cannot 
measure what does not exist.  To the present, through which it is passing?  
                                                 
20 Parmenides, Fragments 7a. 
21 Ibid., 7b.  
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No: because we cannot measure what has no duration.  To the past, then, 
towards which it is going?  No again: because we cannot measure what no 
longer exists.22  
 
This is further complicated by examining the present itself.  Can one even say the present 
exists?  If so, the present what?  Is it the present century, the present day, the present 
hour?  But all of these can be further divided into past and future components.  Only this 
very instant can be considered present, but this poses a problem, too.  Augustine says:  
“In fact the only time that can be called present is an instant, if we can conceive of such, 
that cannot be divided even into the most minute fractions, and a point of time as small as 
this passes so rapidly from the future to the past that its duration is without length.  For if 
its duration were prolonged, it could be divided into past and future.  When it is present, 
it has no duration.”23 
Two things help Augustine to solve this paradox.  One is the nature of God’s 
eternal existence.  Since God exists outside of time, all moments of time are equally 
present to God.  Past, present and future moments of time are then past, present and 
future, as such, only to temporal beings.  To God, the eternal being, they are all the same.  
The second thing that helps Augustine, following God’s eternal presence, is the 
connection the past and the future have to the present of a temporal being.  The past and 
the future are connected to the present for a temporal being through memory and 
expectation.  At first glance, this gives them a kind of “virtual” reality that would seem to 
be different from the reality of beings that exist in space.  Upon closer examination, 
though, this is not the case. 
                                                 
22 Augustine, Confessions, XI, 21. 
23 Ibid., XI, 15. 
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 Augustine claims we access the past through memory.  What are memories of?  
They are memories of perceptions that we had before but are not having now.  That is to 
say, the perceptions themselves occurred, but are no longer occurring.  However, as 
temporal beings, we can remember that we once had a perception, say of a lectern, and 
recall that perception by supplying our imagination with an image from memory.  The 
time during which we had the perception, say the lecture during which the lectern was 
used as an example to support some epistemological difficulty in Kant, is no longer 
occurring.  Even if the same lectern is used as an example by the same professor in a 
lecture on the same topic in Kant years after the time in question, that particular time is 
still no longer in existence.  Only our memory of that time exists, and it exists as memory 
attached to the mind of a particular temporal being experiencing that memory in the 
present.  Thus, Augustine claims:  “When we describe the past correctly, it is not past 
facts which are drawn out of our memories but only words based on our memory pictures 
of those facts, because when they happened they left an impression on our minds, by 
means of our sense-perception.  My own childhood, which no longer exists, is in past 
time, which also no longer exists.  But when I remember those days and describe them, it 
is in the present that I picture them to myself, because their picture is still present in my 
memory.”24 
 The future exists for us in a similar fashion.  Temporal beings have expectations, 
and these expectations are images they give to themselves, generally based on current 
perceptions interlaced with memories of similar situations in the past and the ways in 
which the expectations had then were fulfilled.  When events unfold as our expectations 
predicted they would, then we have correctly predicted the future.  When they unfold 
                                                 
24 Augustine, Confessions, XI, 18. 
 18
otherwise, then it will have turned out that we were in error when we made the initial 
prediction.  In any case, we can rest assured that the future and past do exist, since all 
moments of time exist because of God’s will.  After all, prophets do see the future, and 
one cannot see what does not exist.25 For us, though, the past and future exist insofar as 
they are bound to the present.  The predictions I might make about the future are made in 
the present and represent what could occur (or will occur, depending upon how refined 
my powers of expectation and anticipation are).  The same can be said of the past.  
Therefore, the future exists as the future of the present and the past exists as the past of 
the present for temporal beings:  “It might be correct to say that there are three times, a 
present of past things, a present of present things, and a present of future things.  Some 
such different times do exist in the mind, but nowhere else that I can see.  The present of 
things past is memory, the present of present things is direct perceptions; and the present 
of future things is expectation.  If we may speak in these terms, I can see three times and 
I admit that they do exist.”26 
This explains how these things exist for us.  And it explains how the future and 
the past can be real for us.  For an eternal being like God, there is no past or future 
(perhaps, strictly speaking, there is no real present, either).  Everything is at once.  For 
temporal beings such as ourselves, though, not everything is at once.  Only the present 
moment is.  But we can experience images that were formed by present perceptions 
previous to the current perception.  And we can form images based on things we perceive 
now that attempt to predict what we will perceive later on.  This must be why Augustine 
says that when we speak of the future:  “We do not see things which are not yet in being, 
                                                 
25 Ibid., XI, 18. 
26 Augustine, Confessions, XI, 20. 
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that is, things which are future, but it may be that we see their causes or signs, which are 
already in being.  In this way they are not future but present to the eye of the beholder, 
and by means of them the mind can form a concept of things which are still future and 
thus is able to predict them.”27 
This is why it was so important for Augustine to begin his discussion of time with 
a discussion of the eternal nature of God.  All moments of time proceed because God’s 
will mandates that they proceed.  Obviously, this would include all moments of time 
experienced by us.  So even if we understand the future as something dependent upon our 
anticipation, which is based on our present perceptions, or past perceptions held as 
images in memory, whatever moments actually come to be, come to be because God 
willed them to come to be.  They already exist as non-temporal events for God, since 
every temporal event already exists for God in a non-temporal way.  The eternal presence 
of God frames time, even if time as such only seems to exist because particular created 
beings were designed to be temporal beings.  This helps Augustine’s theory avoid 
solipsism or any other kind of rampant subjectivism. 
 Having established that time exists within the framework of an eternal being who 
creates it, and having established that the past, present and future exist as modes of the 
present for temporal beings, Augustine now turns his attention to how time is measured.  
Many ancients, including Aristotle, thought time had something to do with motion.  
Whether it was the measure of motion in terms of the before and after, as Aristotle 
claims, or the moving image of eternity, as Plato claimed, time was often connected with 
                                                 
27 Ibid., XI,18. 
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motion in some way.  Augustine, however, follows Plotinus28 in claiming that time is not 
the same as motion, nor is it connected to motion in any necessary way.  That is, there 
does not have to be motion in order for there to be time.  Time measures both motion and 
the lack of motion, rest.  Furthermore, in order for time to measure anything at all, it 
cannot be the same as motion, or even necessarily bound up with motion, because then 
there would be no time without motion.  But time exists whether there is motion or not.  
And in order to say that one motion took less or more time than another, the way time is 
measured must be independent of those motions.  Otherwise, it would be difficult to 
compare the two motions with respect to time.  This is why Augustine says:  “we 
measure time as it passes.  This enables us to say that a given spate of time is twice as 
long as whatever period we take as the unit of measurement, or that the two are of equal 
duration, and we apply the same principle to any other space of time that we are able to 
measure.”29 
 If motion were necessary to time, or if the unit of measure that measures time was 
somehow dependent on motion, as is the case in Aristotle30, then it would not be possible 
to compare two times in any meaningful way.  But it is possible.  Furthermore, all times 
are part of the same time created by the eternal God who frames time.  So rather than 
identify time with motion, Augustine says: 
                                                 
28 Plotinus sums up the connection between motion and time, or the lack thereof, this way:  “Now, to begin 
with, Movement, even continuous, has no unchanging extent (as Time the equable has), since – to take only 
motion in space – it may be faster or slower; there must, therefore, be some unit of standard outside it, by 
which these differences are measurable, and this outside standard would more properly be called Time.”  
Plotinus, Enneads, III, 7, 8. 
29 Augustine, Confessions, XI, 21. 
30 Aristotle says “time is not movement, but only movement in so far as it admits of enumeration.” Physics, 
219a.  He also says, in reference to the necessity of the perceiving/rational soul to time’s existence, that 
“the before and after are attributes of movement, and time is thee qua countable.” Physics, 223a.  These 
aspects of Aristotle’s definition and discussion of time will be discussed in Chapter 2 below.  
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It is clear, then, that the movement of a body is not the same as the means 
by which we measure the duration of its movement.  This being so, it must 
be obvious which of the two ought more properly to be called time.  The 
same body may move at different speeds, and sometimes it is at rest, and 
we measure not only its motion but also its rest by means of time.  We say 
that it was at rest for the same length of time as it was in motion, or that it 
stood still for twice or three times as long as it moved, and so on…31 
 
All motions that are measured are measured by time, but time is independent of motion 
itself.  This is why, according to Augustine, even when God made the Sun stand still until 
Joshua finished his battle, time still moved from future to past.  That is, for Joshua (and 
the others involved in the battle, presumably), there was still time, they still had temporal 
experiences.32  This time, though, went on regardless of the fact that the sun stopped.  It 
went on because time, as it is measured, time is measured in the mind.  
 Time must be measured in the mind.  This is because it is clear to Augustine that 
time is something that is measured, since some times are said to be longer or shorter than 
other times.  Now only things that are extended can be measured.  Motion is extended.  
But Augustine has already dismissed motion as the cause of time or the place where time 
is found.  This only leaves the mind perceiving time.  Time, therefore, must be some kind 
of extension of the mind: 
It is in my own mind, then, that I measure time.  I must not allow my mind 
to insist that time is something objective.33 I must not let it thwart me 
because of all the different notions and impression that are lodged in it.  I 
say that I measure time in my mind.  For everything which happens leaves 
an impression on it, and this impression remains after the things itself has 
ceased to be.  It is the impression that I measure, since it is still present, 
not the thing itself, which makes the impression as it passes and then 
                                                 
31 Augustine, Confessions, XI, 24. 
32 This is in reference to the popular view that time was somehow governed by the movement of heavenly 
bodies.  Augustine says of this:  “I cannot therefore accept the suggestion that time is constituted by the 
movement of heavenly bodies, because although the sun once stood still in answer to a man’s prayer, so 
that he could fight on until the victory was his, the sun indeed stood still but time continued to pass.  The 
battle went on for as long as was necessary and was then over.” Confessions, XI 23. 
33 Clearly, Augustine does not mean that time only exists in his mind, or even in human minds exclusively.  
He simply means that it does not exist in either objects or their motions. 
 22
moves into the past.  When I measure time it is this impression that I 
measure.  Either, then, this is what time is, or else I do not measure time at 
all.34 
 
This is further illustrated by Augustine’s famous consideration of his mentor’s psalm: 
Deus Creator Omnium.  As he recites the psalm, those syllables which are yet to be 
recited exist in the future as expectation.  That future is attached to the present of 
whomever is reciting the psalm, since presumably that person, knowing the psalm, 
expects to utter the latter syllables after the former syllables.  As Augustine recites the 
psalm, those syllables already recited move into the past.  Augustine remembers saying 
them, though, so an image remains with him, in his mind, of those syllables being said 
before the syllables he is presently speaking. 
 Therefore, what was held in expectation passes through present perception and 
turns into memory.  What was in the future passes through the present and becomes the 
past.  In order to measure this, one needs to measure the time it took for the anticipated 
events to become memories, which means one needs to measure the extension of the 
mind in its temporal experience.  This is what Augustine calls the “distention” of the 
mind.  And this is the definition he finally settles on for time.  Time, for Augustine, is a 
distention of the mind.  However, that is only time as it is experienced by temporal 
beings.  All the moments of time itself exist in the eternal presence of God, which frames 
and creates all the temporal moments at once.  This would appear to give time an 
“objective” (in the sense of existing by a power other than our own) standing.  For us, 
though, time is a synthesis of expectation, perception and memory. 
 This theory of time as a “distention of the mind” bears a remarkable similarity to 
the theories of time found in Kant and Husserl.  Husserl even began his treatment of 
                                                 
34 Augustine, Confessions, XI, 27. 
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internal time consciousness with deference to Augustine:  “The analysis of time-
consciousness is an ancient burden for descriptive psychology and epistemology.  The 
first person who sensed profoundly the enormous difficulties inherent in this analysis, 
and who struggled with them almost to despair, was Augustine.  Even today, anyone 
occupied with the problem of time must still study Chapters 14-28 of the Confessions 
thoroughly.  For in these matters our modern age, so proud of its knowledge, has failed to 
surpass or even to match the splendid achievement of this great thinker who grappled so 
earnestly with the problem of time.”35 Danne W. Polk makes this connection explicit as 
well, point out that:  “Augustine’s insight, which Husserl attempted to make even more 
explicit, is that an object is the product of an act of synthesis which reaches beyond any 
fragmented ‘now’ by incorporating both past and future elements.  Without these 
‘missing’ aspects, the instant is merely an inadequate portion of the object.  Without the 
other’s ‘non-existent’ aspects, the object falls apart.”36 This shows that Augustine had a 
tremendous influence on the early 20th century phenomenological movement, of which 
the early Heidegger was a part.  And it is my contention that Heidegger was well aware 
of Augustine’s influence, but for some reason he chose not to explicitly discuss it in his 
early works on temporality.  To further support this claim, I will look at Augustine’s 
influence on the “ordinary” concept of time, particularly as that concept is expressed in 
Kant and classical mechanics.  First, however, I will answer some of the more prominent 
objections by what Bergson called “spatial” thinkers on time to Augustine’s theory. 
                                                 
35 Husserl, 3.  It is of some interest that these lectures were published in 1928, and that Martin Heidegger 
was credited as being the editor.  He also wrote a little introduction to them.  See Barnett’s introduction to 
the volume, page xii. 
36 Polk, 66-67.  He continues on to say that there is a common theme from Augustine to Husserl to 
Heidegger, and that the definition of time as a distention of the mind forms the basis for Husserl’s 
intentionality and Heidegger’s being-in-the-world.  More will be said on this below, particularly in Chapter 
4 as it concerns Heidegger. 
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PART II: OBJECTIONS TO AUGUSTINE’S THEORY OF TIME FROM THE 
‘SPATIAL’ TRADITION 
 Given that Husserl specifically mentions Augustine’s theory of time, and given 
that phenomenological theories of time like Husserl’s tend to be centered around the 
individual subject, it should not come as much of a surprise that Augustine’s theory of 
time was of great influence on thinkers of this sort.  That is, for those who thought that 
time has something to do with the individual subject and its experiences, Augustine’s 
theory of time as a distention of the mind would have been an attractive starting point.  
For those who hold that time exists independently of human minds (or any other 
subjects’ minds, whomever or whatever they may be), the definition of time as a 
distention of the mind would not have seemed particularly remarkable.  In fact, it might 
seem quaint at best, and solipsistic at worst, to hold such a view.  This seems to be the 
prevailing opinion among those who espouse what Bergson calls the traditional 
“spatial” view of time.  Because Augustine’s theory is “subjective,” it is not a good 
theory of time.   
 I have said, though, that Augustine’s theory of time contains many of the 
attributes found in both “objective” spatial theories of time, as well as subjective spatial 
theories of time.  This influence will be brought to light by first examining some of the 
standard objections spatial thinkers have made to the theory.  In particular, I will look at 
objections by Bertrand Russell, G. S. Whithrow, and Etienne Gilson.  In the next Part, I 
will show how Augustine not only answers these objections, but actually provides the 
early theoretical mechanisms upon which these theories were founded in the first place. 
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 Russell’s criticism of Augustine is the most abrupt.  For Russell, Augustine’s 
theory was hopelessly subjective because it had no sense of history apart from the 
individual engaged in temporal experience.  That is, on Augustine’s theory, there is not 
time for matter independent of human perception.  This means, for someone like 
Russell, Augustine might as well be claiming that nothing temporal ever happened, 
apart from those temporal events experienced by human beings.  But this kind of theory 
even fails on the subjective level, says Russell: 
St. Augustine, whose absorption in the sense of sin led him to excessive 
subjectivity, was content to substitute subjective time for the time of 
history and physics.  Memory, perception, and expectation, according to 
him, made up all that there is of time.  But obviously this won’t do.  All 
his memories and all his expectations occurred at about the time of the fall 
of Rome, whereas mine occur at about the time of the fall of industrial 
civilization, which formed no part of the Bishop of Hippo’s expectations.  
Subjective time might suffice for a solipsist of the moment, but not for a 
man who believes in a real past and future, even if only his own.  My 
momentary experience contains a space of perception, which is not the 
space of physics, and a time of perception and recollection, which is not 
the time of physics and history.  My past, as it occurred, cannot be 
identified with my recollections of it, and my objective history, which was 
in objective time, differs from the subjective history of my present 
recollections, which, objectively, is all now.37 
 
Not only is it the case that someone like Augustine cannot say anything about 
events separate from himself, it would appear that, for the most part, he cannot even say 
anything meaningful about the temporal events he has experienced or is experiencing 
now.  According to Russell, Augustine’s theory is a theory of time fit for someone 
perpetually dreaming.  That is to say, because Augustine defines time as a distention of 
the mind, time becomes nothing more than our own internal perception of things, which 
is to say, it becomes little more than our imagination.  But actual events have happened, 
regardless of what I remember or believe about them; and actual events will happen, 
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regardless of what I hope or expect will be the case.  Therefore, Augustine’s theory is 
mere solipsism, and as such, it should be dismissed.38 
Whitrow raises a similar objection to Russell (minus the ad hominems).  He 
finds that Augustine’s definition of time is too imprecise to be practically useful.  That 
is, he does not see how Augustine’s definition of time will yield any standard measure 
of time that could useful in a general way, since it is always the measurements of a 
particular subject or perceiving soul.  According to Whitrow, this was better than 
Aristotle was able to do, since Augustine’s theory, although imprecise, at least does not 
make the mistake of tying time to motion.39 And it does say something about how we 
experience time.  It just does not really get to what time actually is, or how we could 
come up with any kind of accurate measure of it.  Whitrow says:  “St. Augustine thus 
came to the conclusion that we can measure times only if the mind has the power of 
holding within itself the impression made on it by things as they pass by even after they 
have gone…Although St. Augustine failed to explain how the mind could be an 
accurate chronometer for the external order of physical events, he must be regarded as 
the great pioneer of the study of internal time.”40 This continues the distinction between 
time as we experience it and time as it is apart from our experience, which was 
Russell’s point in making the distinction between “subjective” and “objective” time.  It 
also shares something in common with Gilson’s objection, since it recognizes the 
difference between internal and external time, and the fact that Augustine’s definition 
of time as a distention of the mind was able to give some account of this internal time. 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 213-15 
39 Whitrow, 47-48. 
40 Ibid., 49. 
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Russell and Whitrow are both from the analytic school of temporal thought.  Their 
objections to Augustine stem from an understanding of time worked out by classical 
mechanics that held time to be something devoid (at least potentially) of content that 
exists in the universe in much the same fashion that space exists.  Gilson’s objection is 
more Kantian.  He claims that there may be such a thing as objective time in Augustine’s 
theory.  It just so happens that it is impossible for us to know anything about it according 
to that theory.  Gilson claims that, since the past and future are bound to a present which 
itself is only an instant, it is only by an act of mental synthesis that Augustine is able to 
come to any understanding of time.  In other words, it is only by conceiving time as a 
distention, which is a representation affected by the mind, that human beings can have 
any relationship with time whatsoever.  Since this relationship is still one of 
representation.  Augustine’s theory, then, does not reveal the reality of time, but only our 
experience of time:  “But we also see what superhuman efforts are required of us if we 
would understand the relation of created time to creative eternity.  Man can do this only 
on condition that he finds a haven for the mind beyond the reach of time’s tide, that he 
becomes moored, so to speak, and by gathering together into a permanent present all 
things that are no more and that are yet to be, leaves time behind to cross over, alone, into 
eternity.”41 
God perceives time as it really is.  Humans perceive time as a distention of their 
minds, which is only an image of time, not time itself.  Time remains subjective then, but 
its subjectivity is more in line with Kant’s notion of subjectivity than with the derivative 
notion subjectivity that Russell ascribes to Augustine.  Much like Kant’s 
phenomenal/noumenal split, time gives us an idea of eternity, but not its experience.  This 
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means we cannot truly experience time itself, we can only experience the appearance of 
time that is generated in the distention of the mind.  Only God, who is eternal, can know 
both time (which God creates) and eternity (which God experiences).  Thus Gilson says:  
“Where we fail is in our attempt to get a clear picture of the link between time and 
eternity.  In this case it means comparing two modes of heterogeneous being, and we 
must add that one of these, namely that of God, escapes us almost entirely.  Since we 
ourselves are subject, even in our minds, to the law of becoming, we cannot picture how 
that which is permanent exists.”42 So even though we attempt to know eternity, we 
always come up short.  This means our understanding of time will lack the consistency 
and unity necessary to make the theory sufficiently objective. 
 These sorts of objections to Augustine’s theory are typical of the spatial tradition.  
But I believe Augustine’s theory accounts for all of them and answers all of them.  In 
fact, Augustine’s theory of time provides all of the mechanisms necessary to an objective 
theory in Russell’s sense and Gilson’s sense.  That is, Augustine provides sufficient 
resources in his theory of time to influence those “objective” theories Russell has in mind 
when he talks about world history and physics, namely, the theory of time that pervades 
classical mechanics.  And, Augustine’s theory also has the mechanisms to influence 
internal or rationally subjective theories of time, such as Kant’s.  In the next Part, I will 
show how Augustine answers the objections described above from the spatial theory. 
PART III: RESPONSES TO THE STANDARD OBJECTIONS FROM WITHIN 
THE SPATIAL TRADITION 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 191. 
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 Augustine’s texts already contains answers to the standard objections.  Both 
Teske43 and Ross44 use a textual approach to respond to those who accuse Augustine of 
solipsistic subjectivism and the like.  In particular, Augustine’s other texts on time (City 
of God and On Genesis Against the Manichees) can be used to support the claim that the 
theory of time of develops in Confessions is an objective theory of time after all.  In this 
Part, I will follow them in using that approach to show that Augustine’s theory is not 
subjective in the manner Russell suggests.  Nor is it the case that it lacks the external 
objectivity Whitrow and Gilson say it does.  Rather, Augustine’s theory has an objective 
component that mandates time’s existence without the mandating the existence of any 
particular temporal being.  This is why it was possible for Augustine’s theory to become 
influential on the theory of time that pervades classical mechanics.  And this is why it 
lays at the foundation of all spatial theories of time. 
 As I discussed above in the examination of Augustine’s theory of time in the 
Confessions, all moments of time exist all at once for God.  This is because, as an eternal 
being, God has no temporal presence.  Everything that is simply is all at once, as far as 
God would be concerned.  In fact, one could say that even to say “everything exists all at 
once for God” is not quite appropriate, since the phrase “all at once” seems to imply 
some kind of temporal experience.  Nevertheless, God exists without time, which means, 
from a temporal point of view, God exists before time.  All time is contained within 
God’s eternal frame.  Therefore, time has an existence independent of any particular 
temporal (that is, human) beings – or even all temporal (that is, human) beings taken 
                                                 
43 Teske has written several important works in this area.  In addition to “The world-Soul and Time in St. 
Augustine,” and Paradoxes of Time in St. Augustine (cited above), he also did a translation of Augustine’s 
On Genesis Against the Manichees that offers a number of valuable insights.   
44 Ross, 191-205. 
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together.  All that is needed for time to exist is the fact that God creates it and sets things 
in motion within it.  Thus, in City of God, Augustine says:  “if eternity and time are 
rightly distinguished by the fact that time does not exist without some movement and 
change, whereas in eternity there is no change, who does not see that there could have 
been no time had not some creature been made which, by some movement, could bring 
about change?"45 And in On Genesis Against the Manichees, he adds: 
But even if we believe that God made heaven and earth at the beginning of 
time, we should certainly realize that there was no time before the 
beginning of time.  For God also made time, and thus there was not time 
before he made time.  Hence, we cannot say that there was a time when 
God had not yet made anything.  For how could there be a time that God 
had not made since he is the maker of all time?  And if time began to be 
with heaven and earth, there cannot be found a time when God had not yet 
made heaven and earth…But a time could not pass that God had not 
already made, because he cannot be the producer of time unless he is 
before time.46 
 
 Teske believes that these passages support the claim that time existed before there 
were human beings to have mental distentions.  If this is the case, then the theory does 
not begin as subjectively as traditional objections would have it.  Unfortunately, though, 
this does not prove that time remains objective once human beings arrive on the scene.  
Individual humans, by experiencing time as a distention of the mind, could conceivably 
alter its nature in such a way as to make time itself, on Augustine’s theory, subjective in 
the way Russell claims it is. 
 To save Augustine from this, Teske imports the notion of the world soul into 
Augustine.  Or rather, Teske claims that the notion of the world soul was already there, 
and analyzes the concept.  He says that, after a visit to the libri Platonicorum, Augustine 
returned with a well-worked-out doctrine of an eternal and incorporeal God as well as the 
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concept of the world soul.  Teske claims that Augustine got these notions from Plotinus.  
Neither of these concepts had yet been fully worked out, yet alone accepted as standard 
doctrine, before Augustine was able to successfully import them into Christian theology.  
And they had the added benefit of answering Manicheen objections concerning what God 
was doing before the creation of time.47  As it pertains to Augustine, then, according to 
Teske, the world soul in Augustine could be one or several of three things.  First, it could 
be a unification of all human souls.  Second, it could be a single soul of tremendous 
psychic magnitude and importance upon which other, individual human souls depend.  Or 
finally, it could be a rational principle for the world itself. 
 Teske claims that Augustine himself had difficulty with the notion of a world 
soul.  In some places, Augustine claims the notion can be neither accepted nor rejected.48 
In other places, Augustine struggles to clarify his neoplatonic version of the soul as 
something incorporeal.49 This causes him to apparently fuse the notion of individual 
incorporeal souls with the idea of a Plotinus-like world soul: 
For if I tell you that there is one soul, you will be disturbed because in one 
person it is happy and in another unhappy, for one and the same thing 
cannot be both happy and unhappy at the same time.  If I say that it is one 
and many at the same time, you will laugh, and I would not easily find a 
way to put a stop to your laughter.  But if I say that souls are simply many, 
I shall have to laugh at myself, and I will endure less well my 
dissatisfaction with myself than your dissatisfaction.50 
 
Teske believes this tipped the balance in Augustine’s mind toward the notion of a world 
soul, particularly since Augustine goes on to describe the contemporary Christian 
                                                 
47 See Teske’s footnote in Augustine, On Genesis Against the Manichees, fn 49. 
48 Teske, Paradoxes of Time in St. Augustine, 51. 
49 It is important to keep in mind that the conception of the soul as immaterial was imported into Christian 
theology by Augustine, although there are passages in the epistles of Paul of Tarsus that suggest something 
like the neoplatonic notion Augustine has in mind.   
50 Augustine, De Quantitate animae, cited in Teske, 52. 
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community in this manner:  “If, then, when we think the same thing and love each other, 
my soul and your soul become on soul, how much more is God the Father and God the 
Son one God in the source of love.”51 So, because Augustine has this notion of a world 
soul, he can then be said to have a unified notion of time that does not depend upon any 
individual human soul.  This would make Augustine’s theory of time an objective theory 
of time, according to Teske.52 
 Other commentators agree that Augustine has an objective theory of time, but 
they do not agree that it involves, much less necessitates, the concept of a world soul.  
Quinn, for example, admits that Augustine was influenced by Plotinus.  However, he 
does not think this involves Plotinus’ notion of a world soul.  Rather, he claims that 
Augustine’s theory of time springs from natural experience.  This is why, according to 
Quinn, Augustine seeks to define the natural experience of time as we experience it.  
Plotinus’ theory, though, is a completely metaphysical theory.  It cannot bridge the gap 
between our physical experience of time and the eternal nature of the One upon which it 
is based.  This makes Augustine’s theory objective, because our experience of time is 
based on something in the world that would presumably be there without us experiencing 
it, without making it something purely mental or even mentally inaccessible.  This is why 
Quinn says:  “Whereas in Augustine the distention of the soul is a psychic rendering and 
counterpart of natural intervals, the metaphysical definition of time in Plotinus splits the 
soul off from nature.  Consequently, a certain metaphysical aloofness from natural fact 
entangles him in insuperable paradoxes…”53  
                                                 
51 Ibid., 54. 
52 Ibid., 54. 
53 Quinn, 106. 
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 Ross proposes a third alternative.  He claims that time is a kind of extension 
analogous to space, according to Augustine.  It is only the sequential ordering of time that 
requires the presence of a human mind.54 This is why Augustine starts the discussion of 
time with a discussion of God’s eternal presence.  It is God’s eternal presence that frames 
time, and it is God’s will that creates and sustains time.  The input of the human mind, 
and the definition of time as a distention of that mind, only comes after God’s presence is 
described.  According to Ross, this means that what Augustine had in mind was a theory 
of time that did not depend upon human minds for the existence of time.55 In addition, if 
what Augustine had in mind was something truly subjective, as people like Russell claim, 
then Augustine would have described ‘times’ in his works, rather than a singular ‘time.’  
Finally, even if time seemed to be something subjective, according to Augustine, 
everything, including all human subjects, is still subject to the creative power and 
sustaining force of God’s will.  In other words, human minds, like everything else, are 
created by God.  Therefore, there is still something objective, even in the most subjective 
interpretation of Augustine’s theory of time.56 
 This interpretation by Ross not only answers the objections of people like Russell 
and others, but it points the way to the argument I will advance in the final part of this 
chapter.  Augustine’s theory, which includes a number of spatial components, is the 
theoretical basis of both major modern theories of time: Kant’s theory and the theory that 
pervades classical mechanics.  It was these theories that Bergson had in mind when he 
critiqued what he called “spatial” theories of time.  And it must have been these sorts of 
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theories Heidegger really had in mind when he discussed the “ordinary” conception of 
time in his early works.   
PART IV: AUGUSTINE’S INFLUENCE ON THE TWO MAJOR MODERN 
THEORIES OF TIME 
 A number of reasons can be given as to why Augustine’s theory of time would 
have been influential on a theory of time such as Kant’s.  Both theories seem to make 
time, at least as far as time is experienced by us, the province of the rational subject 
(although Augustine did not use that precise term, of course).  Both theories hold that the 
time we experience is an homogenous medium that measures experience in a uniform 
way.  And both theories make reference to some kind of universality (God, in 
Augustine’s case, the a priori nature of time as a condition for all possible experience in 
Kant).   
 To attempt to connect Augustine with classical mechanics, though, seems like a 
difficult task from the outset.  The theory of time that pervades classical mechanics 
hardly seems related to a “distention” of the mind.  Nor does it seem to be the case that 
something like classical mechanics would be very concerned with the presence of an 
eternal being whose existence frames time and whose will creates and sustains time, even 
if particular thinkers in the tradition of  classical mechanics were themselves very 
religious.57 Additionally, although Augustine does say that time is an homogenous unit, 
he never defines that unit in an kind of systematic way.  So time is the measure of motion 
independent of any particular motion, but he does not say what exactly that unit is, as 
                                                 
57 For example, it is well known that Newton spent much of his professional life attempting to do things 
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Whitrow pointed out.58 Finally, even if time exists in some kind of “objective” fashion on 
Augustine’s theory, it is still a finite time.  This is because, according to Augustine, who 
follows the standard view of Christian Theology, time has a definite beginning and a 
definite end.  The time of the universe as a whole, then, would be finite.59  Classical 
mechanics, though, holds that time itself is an infinite medium.  An infinite medium 
cannot have either a beginning or an end.   
 Certainly these would be (and to some extent, were) the sorts of objections one 
could raise against the attempt to tie the theory of time pervasive in classical mechanics 
to the theory of time found in Augustine.  And on the surface they seem persuasive.  
Upon closer examination, though, the apparent gap between Augustine’s theory of time 
and the theory of time that pervades classical mechanics dwindles significantly.  
According to Quinn, Augustine’s description of time is a description of natural 
experience.  Certainly classical mechanics was also attempting to describe nature.  It just 
remains to be seen whether the nature each theory describes is the same.60 Ross maintains 
that, according to Augustine, time is really an extended, non-sequential phenomenon.  
The sequential nature is supplied by the mind in its experience of time.  But time itself is 
spread out in the same manner of space.61  Classical mechanics also viewed time as 
essentially spread out.  In fact, Laplace would go so far as to say that all moments of time 
are knowable to a being with sufficient intellect and perception of present circumstances 
and their causes.62  
                                                 
58 Whitrow, 49. 
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62 For a discussion of Laplace’s theory, see Capek, The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics. 
 36
 I will advance a third interpretation, although this third interpretation will rely 
heavily on the interpretation offered by Ross.  I will claim that the eternal presence 
ascribed to God by Augustine acts as a “frame” for temporality.  This “frame” works 
whether time is finite or infinite.  And it works in a similar fashion to how space works in 
classical mechanics.  This is because the framing of time by an omni-present entity, 
whether it has a personality or not, creates temporal certainty for both the past and the 
future.  This would make possible any mathematical formula for time, although 
Augustine himself does not get into the specifics of what such a formula might be.  By 
guaranteeing future events through God’s eternal presence, though, he sets the 
metaphysical grounds for such a unit of measurement.  So even if the notion of space in 
classical mechanics lacks the creative personality of Augustine’s use of God, it still 
functions in more or less the same fashion.  That is, space, according to classical 
mechanics, guarantees the predictability of temporal events.  This predictability is 
internalized in our calculations of time, according to classical mechanics, just as our 
experience of time is internalized into the mental synthesis Augustine calls a distention of 
the mind.   
 Classical mechanics developed a model of absolute time.  Absolute time is a 
uniform, homogenous medium that measures events that occur within it.  This is different 
than a theory that would suggest time exists only when there is motion, as Aristotle’s 
theory states.  Time, for theorists of classical mechanics such as Newton, is something 
that exists independent of moving things.  Rather, time is that through which things 
move.  It does not depend upon anything else for its existence:  “Absolute true and 
mathematical time, of itself and by its own nature, flows uniformly, without regard to 
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anything external.”63 Time, on this theory, is everywhere the same.  The unit that 
measures time might change, but that which the unit represents does not.  In fact, the 
specific unit of time is rather arbitrary.  So long as it provides a clear understanding of 
temporal flow to whomever happens to be using it:  “Relative, apparent and vulgar time, 
is some sensible and external measure of absolute time, estimated by motions of bodies, 
whether accurate or unequable, and is commonly used instead of true time; such as an 
hour, a day, a month, a week.”64 According to Newton, only pure mathematics could 
hope to offer an accurate picture of true or absolute time.  And, since mathematics is 
essentially devoid of concrete content, that is, since mathematics does not rely on things 
actually being the case in the world of experience, time, as something that can be 
represented by true mathematics, becomes something that can be (and in reality, is) 
devoid of concrete content in the world of experience. 
 Capek describes this view of time by comparing it to the way the same theorists 
viewed space:  “According to this view time flows no matter whether something changes 
or not; in its own nature time is empty and is only in an accessory and contingent way 
filled by changes.  Changes are in time; they are not time itself.  This distinction between 
time and concrete becoming is at the very foundations of classical physics.  As space 
does not imply matter, time does not imply motion nor change in general.”65 One does 
not find support for this view in Aristotle.  For Aristotle, time could not be considered 
independent from motion or change.  According to Augustine’s theory of time, though, 
neither motion nor change is a necessary component for time itself, which is why he says:  
“It is not your [God’s] will that I should agree to the proposition that time is constituted 
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by the movement of a material body.  For no body moves except in time…For when a 
body moves, it is by time that I measure how long its motion lasts, from the time when it 
begins to move until its movement ceases.”66 Augustine’s theory seems a more 
appropriate vehicle for one of the core elements of the theory of time that pervades 
classical mechanics, then, because he considers time to be independent of motion or 
change, whereas Aristotle thought time was dependent on motion or change.67  
 Further evidence for this is found when we consider the way both Augustine and 
classical mechanics treat the notion of rest.  Rest, in this sense, is the absence of motion 
or change.  For Aristotle, the fact that a soul does not notice motion or change is evidence 
for that soul that time has not passed.  For Augustine and classical mechanics, though, 
time is external to motion because it measures motion.  If time and motion were the same, 
or if time was an attribute of motion, then time could not measure motion in a uniform, 
homogenous way.  This is why Isaac Barrow, one of Newton’s mentors, said the 
following about the relationship of time to motion: 
But does time imply motion?  Not at all, I reply, as far as its absolute, 
intrinsic nature is concerned; no more than rest; the quantity of time 
depends on neither essentially; whether things run or stand still, whether 
we sleep or wake, time flows in its even tenor.  Imagine all the stars to 
have remained fixed from their birth; nothing would have been lost to 
time; as long would that stillness have endured as has continued the flow 
of this motion.  Before, after, at the same time (as far as concerns the rise 
and disappearance of things), even in that tranquil state would have had 
their proper existence, and might by a more perfect mind have been 
perceived.68 
 
This statement is strikingly similar to the following passage from Augustine’s treatment 
in Book XI of the Confessions: 
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68 Isaac Barrow, Mathematical Works of Isaac Barrow D.D., Vol  II, 160f; cited in Capek, 36. 
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It is clear, then, that the movement of a body is not the same as the means 
by which we measure the duration of its movement.  This being so, it must 
be obvious which of the two ought more properly to be called time.  The 
same body may move at different speeds, and sometimes it is at rest, and 
we measure not only its motion but also its rest by means of time.  We say 
that it was at rest for the same length of time as it was in motion, or that it 
stood still for twice or three times as long as it moved, and so on, whether 
we make an exact calculation or a rough estimate – ‘more or less’, as the 
saying goes.69   
 
This shows a common theme running through both theories.  Time is external to 
motion.  It cannot arise from considerations of local motion, any more than pure 
mathematics can arise from considerations of local problems of addition.  We might gain 
insight into pure mathematics by such means as adding things together in the world of 
experience.  But the fact that we do so in no way implies that pure mathematics depends 
on such experiences in the world for its existence or for the truth of its propositions.  
Martin Bertman also recognizes this common theme, which he sees as Platonic.  
Discussing the fact that motions are in time but not constitutive of time, he says:  “The 
motion of all created things is in time but, from a Platonic standpoint (whatever Plato 
himself held) no motions make time.  If this were not so the ideal, that is, mathematical 
measurement of things would arise out o the local motions rather than measure those 
motions.  Time must have an ideal or absolute nature similar to mathematical entities for 
Platonists, including such modern Platonists as Galileo and Newton.”70 Time, therefore, 
is not determined by motion, because it is what determines the rate of motion. 
 If this is the case, though, then where does time occur, or through what?  Time 
measures motion, and is not dependent upon motion.  Nor is time dependent upon human 
consciousness, according to classical mechanics.  Therefore, time must occur within 
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something.  According to classical mechanics, that within which time occurs is absolute 
space.  This concept of absolute space is similar to Augustine’s use of the eternal 
presence of God as a frame within which time occurs.  In fact, the descriptions of 
absolute space offered by classical mechanics use much of the same language as 
descriptions of God’s eternal presence.  For example, another of Newton’s mentors, 
Henry More, described space this way: “One, simple, immovable, eternal, complete, 
independent, existing by itself, existing through itself, incorruptible, necessary, 
measureless, uncreated, unbounded, incomprehensible, omnipresent, incorporeal, all-
pervading and all-embracing, Being in essence, Being in act, Pure act.”71 And More 
recognized that this description was similar to descriptions of God offered by 
theologians.72 It provided a backdrop against which Newton offered a similar description 
of absolute space:  “Absolute space, in its own nature, without regard to anything 
external, remains always similar and immovable.”73 These notions of absolute space were 
necessary to guarantee the mathematical certainty of absolute time.  Without the stability 
provided for by absolute space, calculations made concerning time would be arbitrary.  
However, space is immovable and external to temporal considerations.  That is, space is 
eternal.  Capek believes this notion of eternal space was necessary in order to make sense 
of how and why time proceeds the way it does, according to classical mechanics: 
It is fairly well known how More’s divinization of space influenced 
Newton’s philosophy of nature, in which absolute space is regarded as an 
attribute of God – the sensorium Dei, by which the divine omnipresence as 
well as the divine knowledge of the totality of things is made possible.  
But not infrequently this was dismissed as a mere private theological 
fancy, superadded in an artificial manner to Newton’s scientific 
achievements.  Not so.  If we disregard Newton’s theological language, we 
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see clearly that he merely confused the logical priority of space to matter 
with an ontological priority…The logical, if not the temporal, priority of 
space to its physical content was a dogma which few dared to doubt.  For 
Newton as for Gassendi and More, this priority was temporal as well; 
absolute space being an attribute of God, naturally had to exist prior to the 
creation of the world.74 
 
Without space, then, there would be no time, according to classical mechanics.  Just as 
without God, there would be no time, according to Augustine. 
 These descriptions of absolute space find no support in Aristotle.  Aristotle 
thought that an infinitely extended anything was an absurdity.  For Aristotle, space was 
finite.  Even if one could conceive of something as infinitely divisible, to extend it 
infinitely would cause problems.  This concept, as it is found in classical mechanics, 
could only have come from a reworking of the traditional notion of eternity.  This notion, 
considering the way infinite, absolute space was described in divine-like tones, and the 
admissions of the linguistic and even functional similarities between descriptions of 
Gods’s eternal presence and the infinite, non-temporal existence of absolute space, is 
much closer to what is found in Augustine’s theory of time.  All temporal moments, 
however they are mathematically expressed, happen within and because of space, 
according to classical mechanics.  All temporal moments, however they are experientially 
understood, happen within and because of the eternal presence of God, according to 
Augustine.  Therefore, the influence of Augustine would be paramount over Aristotle, 
whose theory does not seem compatible at all with classical mechanics. 
 By claiming mathematical certainty for time, classical mechanics ends up with a 
theory of time on which the past, present and future have to be said to exist all at the 
same time in some real way.  That is, even though we, as temporal beings, only 
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experience time as present, the past and the future must also exist in order for the 
mathematical certainty to be the case.  Otherwise, predictions made based on the 
knowledge of events now, assuming that the knowledge was accurate, would only be true 
by accident.  Classical mechanics was not interested in theories that were true by 
accident, though.  It wanted certainty in all phases of time.  This sort of certainty was not 
possible on Aristotle’s theory of time, because Aristotle’s theory of time is too bound to 
the concrete experience of perceiving souls.  For Augustine, though, time is predictable 
because all moments of time already exist within the eternal presence of God.  God’s 
eternal presence gives reality to both the past and the future, since the past and the future, 
just like any moment of time, exist by God’s will, which always exists all at once.  For 
us, who exist temporally, the past and the future are accessible in different ways, such as 
anticipation and memory.  But in order for these things to be true, they must refer to 
things that do exist.  Otherwise, their truth value would only be accidental.  This cannot 
be the case, however, as Augustine claims:  “how do prophets see the future, if there is 
not yet a future to be seen?...In the same way people who describe the past could not 
describe it correctly unless they saw it in their minds, and if the past did not exist it would 
be impossible for them to see it at all.  Therefore both the past and the future do exist.”75 
 Regardless of whether it seems like this past and future Augustine describes exist 
only in the human mind, or whether, as seems more likely to be the case, they exist 
independent of human minds, it is definitely the case that Augustine believed the past and 
the future do exist.  And, since God’s eternal presence frames time, and every moment, 
including all the moments experienced by temporal beings, passes because God wills it, 
and all these moments are as one for God’s eternal presence, it would seem that a more 
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accurate interpretation of Augustine’s theory would hold that the past and the future do 
exist, and they are the past and the future of a particular present depending upon who is 
experiencing that present.  But considered independently, they are all present to God.  In 
a similar fashion, absolute space frames absolute time, according to classical mechanics.  
Therefore, just as all places in space exist all at once, all moments in time, from the point 
of view of space, exist all at once.  We, as temporal beings, may only experience certain 
moments as occurring before and after.  But then, we only experience certain places in 
space at any given time.  So, too, do we only experience certain moments of time in a 
given space.  Because of this, should a particular intellect have sufficient knowledge of 
the temporal and/or spatial situations, that individual would be able to say things about 
both the past and the future, from the point of view of that particular moment, which 
would be completely accurate.  This accuracy, in order to be the kind of accuracy 
acceptable to classical mechanics, could not and would not have depended upon any 
external or accidental feature.  It must necessarily be the case that a sufficiently powered 
intellect with sufficient knowledge of the temporal and spatial circumstances would be 
able to make true statements about past and future events.  This is where the theory of 
time that pervades classical mechanics logically finds its resting place, and its fullest 
expression, in the theory of Laplace. 
 According to Laplace, all temporal points could be known in the same way that 
all spatial points could be known.  That is, a sufficiently powerful intellect would have all 
moments in time, past, present and future, before him at once.  In fact, for such an 
intellect, the distinction between past, present and future might seem arbitrary.  If all 
moments of time are known with the same certainty that all locations in space can be 
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known, then the only difference between past, present and future, theoretically, would be 
the temporal “location” of the mind performing the calculation.  The knowledge of the 
events themselves, however, would be no different for such an intellect, regardless of 
when they occurred.  That is, if time is extended like space, then the intellect which 
grasps this is only “in the present” by accident, because all moments of time are equally 
knowable to such an intellect, which therefore makes them all equally available.  
According to Laplace:  “An intellect which at a given instant knew all the forces acting in 
nature, and the position of all things of which the world consists – supposing the said 
intellect were vast enough to subject these data to analysis – would embrace in the same 
formula the motions of the greatest bodies in the universe and those of the slightest 
atoms; nothing would be uncertain for it, and the future, like the past would be present to 
its eyes.”76 Time, on this theory, is really just another dimension of space.  This makes 
Laplace’s theory of time, which is the culmination of the theory of time that pervades 
classical mechanics, a “timeless” theory of time. 
 This theory of time is similar to the interpretation of Augustine’s theory of time 
offered by Ross.  Laplace believed all moments in time could be represented 
mathematically, after the manner spatial co-ordinates.  This has the effect of making the 
sequential ordering of time arbitrary, or at best, a matter of perspective.  That is, for 
Laplace, the past and future of any given point of time is relevant only to the extent that a 
particular observer happens to be temporally located in such a way as to declare one 
moment past and one moment future.  The moments themselves, though, exist 
independently of their being so ordered.  Ross offers the same interpretation of 
Augustine’s theory of time.  He claims that, according to Augustine, time was given all at 
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once.  Only the ordering of time is dependent upon human intervention:  “Augustine’s 
model of time is that of an extended but non-sequential dimension of reality, analogous to 
space.  On this interpretation time is absolutely real; only its sequentialization is mind-
dependent.”77 
 For a being that could perceive time all at once, though, this sequentialization 
would be unnecessary.  For Augustine, this being would be God.  In Laplace, this being 
becomes a sufficiently powerful and well-placed observer with a  certain knowledge of 
mathematics.  But even for Augustine, it is theoretically possible that even a non-divine 
mind could grasp time in a more-or-less eternal fashion, in just the same way Laplace 
thought:  “Surely if there is a mind that so greatly abounds in knowledge and 
foreknowledge, to which all things past and future are as well known as one psalm is well 
known to me, that mind would be an exceeding marvel and altogether astonishing.  For 
whatever is past and whatever is yet to come would be no more concealed from him than 
the past and future of that psalm were hidden from me when I was chanting it:  how much 
of it had been sung from the beginning and what and how much still remained till the 
end.”78 
Either way, it seems clear enough that a similar theory runs through both thinkers.  
And it seems impossible that Aristotle’s theory of time could be this theory.  Augustine, 
though, has all the mechanisms in place to serve as a foundation for this theory, as well as 
classical mechanics in general.  Aristotle’s theory of time is too dependent upon motion, 
too bound up with a rational soul, and too concrete to serve as a foundation for the theory 
of time that pervades classical mechanics.  Augustine’s theory, though, has a spatial-like 
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presence that frames temporality, namely the eternal presence of God.  This eternal 
presence gives certainty to both the existence of temporal moments in relation to human 
minds and experiences and to the existence of those moments in the absence of direct 
human experience.  In other words, time is an objective theory for both, and in its 
essence, behaves the same for both.  Therefore, it is far more likely that it is Augustine 
that lies at the heart of classical mechanics, despite what some 20th century thinkers 
critical of Augustine may think about his theory and its alleged subjectivity.   
 A similar comparison can be made between Augustine’s theory of time and 
Kant’s theory of time.  Kant’s theory of time differs from classical mechanics in that it is 
internalized.  That is to say, time, which is a condition of all possible experience, is not 
something found in things independent of experience (as far as we know, anyway).  Time 
is not the time of the world, it is the time of beings who can experience the world.  
However, this time retains some of the “objectivity” that is usually attributed to theories 
of time like the one that pervades classical mechanics.  Even though time is found in the 
subject, and therefore would seem to be subjective, within the subject it acts as if it were 
being imposed from outside.  In other words, time, for Kant, because it is a condition of 
all possible experience, and because it is something that underlies all representations, is 
not different for different subjects.  All subjects experience time itself as it is in itself the 
same way: as a super-category that makes experience possible.  This makes time uniform 
or homogenous for all rational beings.  And this makes the theory “objective” after the 
fashion of classical mechanics.  This is particularly the case because for Kant, all content 
can be abstracted from time, but time cannot be abstracted in the same way from content.  
He says:  “Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all our intuitions.  
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With regard to phenomena in general, we cannot think away time from them, and 
represent them to ourselves as out of and unconnected with time, but we can quite well 
represent to ourselves time void of phenomena.  Time is therefore given a priori.  In it 
alone is all reality of phenomena possible.  These may all be annihilated in thought, but 
time itself, as the universal condition of their possibility, cannot be so annulled.”79 This is 
identical to the view held by classical mechanics.  The primary difference is the location 
of time itself in the subject, rather than in external, absolute space. 
 At first glance, there would appear to be more similarities between Kant and 
Augustine than between Augustine and classical mechanics.  Both thinkers define time as 
something we experience.  The sequential ordering of time is dependent upon our 
experience of time.  Time is something which can be thought to be devoid of content.  
And time measures both motion and rest in an homogenous fashion.  However, Quinn 
believes that this connection can only be superficial at best, because Kant takes no 
account of the world independent of human experience, that is, the natural world, in his 
theory.  Augustine’s theory, by contrast, is an attempt to describe time as a naturally 
occurring phenomenon.  For Kant, though, time can be nothing more than an idealized 
reflection of consciousness:  “No doubt painstaking scrutiny cannot fail to ferret out some 
parallels in the two approaches, but to take such resemblances seriously seems no less 
questionable than trying to capitalize on remote similarities discernible between the 
stream of consciousness and the flow of electric current.  To read Kantian themes into 
Augustine turns accidental likenesses into essential points of agreement and in addition 
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risks disfiguring his realism, for it is hard to put one’s finger on one piece of solid 
evidence to support Kant’s theory.”80 
 Quinn writes this in response to Taliaferro and Lachieze-Rey, both of whom 
believe Augustine’s theory is full of Kantian undertones.81 And from the point of view of 
Augustine, Quinn would seem to be correct.  Augustine is not describing a phenomenon 
that simply exists in us.  Augustine believes that time exists independently of us because 
it is created and sustained by God’s eternal will and presence.  What Augustine offers 
with the definition of time as a “distention” of the mind, then, is little more than a 
description of our experience of time.  Kant, however, offers only a description of our 
experience of time.  He never gets to time itself apart from human experience.  In fact, he 
suggests such a thing would be impossible. 
 So Augustine is not doing what Kant ended up doing.  Yet this criticism seems 
equally superficial, since we would not expect Augustine to contain Kant – we would 
expect Kant to contain Augustine.  And this is the case.  Kant’s theory operates in the 
same fashion as the descriptive aspects of Augustine’s theory.  It is our minds that order 
time, according to Augustine, because it is our minds that impose their presence on the 
memories of the past and the expectations of the future.  That is to say, our consciousness 
gives the unity to time, for both Augustine and Kant.  In failing to talk about time outside 
of experience, Kant is not lost in a theory of subjectivity.  On the contrary, he objectifies 
subjective experience by fitting it all within an homogenous medium that is shared 
equally by rational beings, just as it is equally generated by and for each rational being 
for that rational being. 
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 Where this differs from Augustine is insofar as Augustine believes the 
unchanging reality that guarantees time is God’s eternal presence.  Kant cannot say 
anything about this in an intelligible manner because such notions are more properly the 
content of the sublime.  According to Kant, we can experience but not cognize certain 
things.  God’s eternal presence would certainly be one of them.  But even what he labels 
“noumenal” reality in general is beyond our boundaries.  This does not mean that what is 
beyond our boundaries holds no influence or trepidation.  It just means we cannot know 
it.  Kant’s theory of time is uniform and homogenous, just like Augustine’s.  The only 
difference is Kant took our experience of time to be constitutive of time itself, whereas 
Augustine took it to be reflective of the wishes of the eternal being. 
So even though Kant did not influence Augustine, we can certainly say that 
Augustine influenced Kant.  And at the same time, we cannot say that anything in 
Aristotle really resembles Kant’s theory.  Aristotle may have held that time only existed 
when a rational soul was able to notice motion or change.  But this experience, and the 
changes noticed, were different and different for each rational being perceiving them.  
For Kant, time is a uniform condition of experience.  Since it does not depend upon our 
perceiving things, because it makes perception possible in the first place, it cannot be 
dependent on motion.  Time measures motion uniformly, according to Kant.  Therefore 
Aristotle’s theory could not have been very influential on Kant’s theory itself. 
So it was Augustine’s theory, not Aristotle’s, that was found to lie at the heart of 
both classical mechanics and Kant’s theory of time.  Augustine’s theory, in fact, provides 
the groundwork for all the “spatial” theories of time that follow.  This includes 
Heidegger’s theory of primordial, true or original temporality, as I shall show in Chapter 
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4.  Augustine’s theory is framed by an eternal presence that functions like absolute space 
does in classical mechanics.  The past and future are real and knowable on all three 
theories.  Time measures motion, but is not dependent upon motion.  In fact, time can be 
thought of without content, although individual moving things can only be thought of as 
moving in time.  And the sequence and ordering of time is brought on by individual 
conscious subjects.  This is why Augustine called time a “distention” of the mind, which 
leads to the arbitrary ordering of temporal events in Laplace and the use of time as a 
condition for all possible experience in Kant.  And these are the two dominant theories in 
modern times.  And these are certainly the two theories that would jointly compose what 
Heidegger claims is the “ordinary” concept of time. 
What is it about Aristotle’s theory that caused Heidegger to link Aristotle to 
Bergson?  I maintain that Aristotle’s theory is actually a qualitative theory.  In fact, even 
though Aristotle calls time a quantity, and even though he defines it as a number, I 
believe it really acts more like an affective quality, and it is the number that is counted, 
which makes a difference.  The number that counts is uniform and homogenous.  The 
number that is counted is different and, potentially, at least, heterogeneous.  This will end 
up connecting Aristotle to Bergson, which Heidegger certainly seems to have wanted to 
do.  But a close examination of Aristotle’s theory will also show, contrary to what 
Heidegger states, that Aristotle’s theory of time was not, nor could it have been, very 
influential on modern “ordinary” conceptions of time. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ARISTOTLE’S QUALITATIVE THEORY OF TIME 
 
 
 Heidegger claims that Aristotle’s theory of time is the primary theory that 
influences what he calls the “ordinary” concept of time.  By this he means that the 
theories of time prevalent in the history of the concept have an Aristotelian tone.  In 
Chapter 1, however, I demonstrated that this is not the case.  Instead, the prevailing tone 
in the history of the concept of time is Augustinian.  In fact, Aristotle’s theory of time is 
incompatible with the two major theories of time in the modern era, which had to be the 
theories of time Heidegger had in mind when he referred to the “ordinary concept of 
time.  This is because, as I shall demonstrate in this chapter, the two prevailing theories 
of time in the modern era, Kant’s theory and the theory that pervades classical mechanics, 
are both quantitative theories.  Quantitative theories, or ‘spatial’ theories of time, possess 
the following characteristics.  They view time as an homogenous medium.  They 
maintain that time acts as a container for motions (or the lack of motions).  They claim 
that time can be conceived as being devoid of content.  And ultimately, they claim all the 
moments of time, past, present and future, can be conceived of as given all at once.  
These characteristics are not found in Aristotle.  They are found in Augustine. 
 Yet Heidegger insists that it is Aristotle’s theory that is the dominant theory.  In 
both Being and Time and in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, he claims again and 
again that Aristotle’s theory is the theory behind the ordinary way, which is the derivative 
way, of understanding time.  And he insists again and again on linking this understanding 
to Bergson, and then setting both against the way he [Heidegger] understands true or 
original temporality.  In order to understand more fully why he makes these claims, and 
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to draw out the influence of Aristotle’s theory of time on Bergson’s theory of duration, I 
will now examine Aristotle’s theory of time.  This examination will consist of four parts.  
Part I will be a detailed description of Aristotle’s theory of time, which is found in the 
Physics, Book IV, Chapters 10 through 14.  In Part II, I will examine the way Aristotle’s 
theory is interpreted from the ‘spatial’ point of view.  That is, I will look at several 
common characteristics that people who interpret Aristotle’s theory use to attempt to 
conform it to the prevailing quantitative or ‘spatial’ way of viewing time.  Part III will 
focus on Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time.  This interpretation is 
worked out most fully in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, paragraph 19.  Here, I 
will demonstrate that Heidegger’s interpretation is a quantitative interpretation in the 
Kantian sense.  That is, Heidegger’s interpretation turns Aristotle’s theory of time into a 
quantitative, subjective theory of time similar to Kant’s theory.  This makes Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time an objective/idealistic interpretation.  Finally, 
in Part IV, I will offer my arguments for why Aristotle’s theory of time is a qualitative 
theory of time, which is why it was able to provide the basis for Bergson’s theory of 
duration.   
PART I: A DESCRIPTION OF ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF TIME 
 There are five key components to Aristotle’s theory of time.  First, time does not 
exist independently of motion or change.  But time is not the same thing as motion or 
change, either.  Therefore time must be some kind of attribute of motion or change.82  
Second, time only seems to exist when perceived by a soul, or at least, when it is 
perceived by a soul capable of noting motion or change.83  Third, time is the number of 
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motion or change with respect to the ‘before’ and ‘after’.84  Fourth, number is used in two 
kinds of ways.  Some numbers are numbers that count.  Other numbers are numbers that 
are counted.  Time is of the kind of number that is counted.85  And lastly, time is 
contained by the ‘now’ and divided by the ‘now’.86 
 Aristotle begins his treatment of time by drawing a distinction between motion or 
change and time as an attribute of motion or change.  This is contrary to one of the 
prevailing views of the period, which held that time was identical to motion or change or 
a kind of motion or change.87  He offers two arguments as to why this cannot be the case.  
The first concerns the motion or the things themselves.  If time were the same as change 
or motion, or a particular type of change or motion, then it would seem to follow that, if 
the thing that changes or moves was removed, then the time would also be removed.  On 
the contrary, though, he says: “time is present equally everywhere and with all things.”88 
This means that time would still be present, even if the specific thing was not present.  
But the motion of the thing would not be present if the thing was not present.  Therefore, 
time cannot be said to be either motion or change, or a type of motion or change. 
 The second argument he offers concerns the way time functions.  Aristotle notes 
that some changes or motions are called fast, while others are called slow.89  What makes 
a change or motion either fast or slow is the amount of time it takes to go from the 
beginning of the change or motion to the end of the change or motion.  If a motion takes a 
short amount of time to go a great distance, it is said to be fast.  If a change takes a great 
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amount of time to go from one state to the next, then it is said to be slow.90  Time itself, 
though, is not thought to be fast or slow, since time determines what is fast and what is 
slow.  This is because one cannot define time by reference to time, either as a certain 
amount of time or as a certain kind of time.  Therefore, since time cannot be either fast or 
slow, since only motions or changes can be, then time is neither identical with change or 
motion nor with a certain kind of change or motion.91 
 Yet although time is neither identical with motion or change nor a certain kind of 
motion or change, Aristotle says:  “neither does time exist without change.”92  This is 
because if there were never any motion or change, then there would be no time.  And this 
is because without motion or change, there would be no way to mark off the ‘before’ and 
‘after’ that will be necessary to identify and define time.93  So time must have something 
to do with motion or change.  And since it is not the same as motion or change, then it 
must be an attribute of motion or change, because:  “Time is neither movement nor 
independent of movement.”94 If it is not movement itself, then, it must be an attribute of 
motion or change. 
 If time is an attribute of motion or change, then two things need to be discovered.  
The first is to discover for whom time is an attribute of motion or change.  The second is 
to figure out how this attribute actually works.  Time is an attribute of motion.  But time 
is not the motion itself.  Things move in the universe, presumably, without being 
perceived.  And it would not make much sense to say that things only move when they 
are being perceived by a perceiving being.  Nor would it make sense to claim that things 
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that are both moving and being perceived by a perceiving being would stop moving the 
way they were moving once the perceiving being that was perceiving those things move 
stopped perceiving those things and their motion.  Since time is not the same as motion 
itself, though, but is only an attribute of motion, then it could be the case that time would 
not exist if a perceiving being did not perceive the motion in question.  In other words, in 
order for time to exist, according to Aristotle, there must be a soul capable of 
experiencing time present to note the motion in question and experience the time. 
 Time is only present, then, when a being capable of perceiving motion perceives a 
motion and counts that motion with respect to the ‘before’ and ‘after’.  When a 
perceiving soul is not present, or when that perceiving soul happens not to be perceiving, 
then Aristotle claims that no time has passed.  This is why the heroes in the cave at 
Sardinia are said not to be part of time’s passing, since they are asleep and therefore 
cannot mark the passage of time:  “For when the state of our minds does not change at 
all, or we have not noticed its changing, we do not think that time has elapsed.”95 
Aristotle was aware that linking time too closely to the soul could be problematic.  This is 
why time, as an attribute, is one thing.  That which time measures, motion, is something 
else altogether.  This is why he says:  “Whether if soul did not exist time would exist or 
not, is a question that may fairly be asked; for if there cannot be some one to count there 
cannot be anything that can be counted either…But if nothing but soul, or in soul reason, 
is qualified to count, it is impossible for there to be time unless there is soul, but only that 
of which time is an attribute, i.e. if movement can exist without soul.  The before and 
after are attributes of movement, and time is these qua countable.”96 The soul is 
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necessary for time to exist because only the soul can count the movement.  Movements 
would presumably continue, regardless of whether souls were there to perceive them.  It 
is simply the case that none of those movements would be counted.  The attribute that 
time is, then, is an attribute that only exists in or through soul, not in or through the 
phenomenon of which the attribute is an attribute. 
 So what sort of attribute of motion is time?  According to Aristotle:  “time is just 
this – the number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’.”97  Time is the way we 
count and measure motion when a particular motion affects us.  That is, when we notice 
something changing, we say that there is time.  If nothing ever changed, we would not 
notice time passing.  Nor would there be time if things changed but nothing was there to 
count the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of that change.  And, since we use time to decide changes 
are fast or slow, or that a particular change took a long time or a short time, then it must 
be the case that time is some kind of number.  Furthermore, it has to be a number that in 
some way matches the motion of which it is an attribute.  That is, the time of the 
movement must go along with the movement in some accurate way.  This means the time 
of a particular movement will share some attributes of the movement, while that time 
itself is itself an attribute of that movement.  So, since all movements are continuous 
from beginning to end, and all continuous things are one and unified, the time of the 
movement will be continuous, one and unified.  
If this were not the case, that is, if time were not continuous as the movement of 
which it is the time is continuous, then we would arrive at the paradoxes of the Eleatics.  
According to Zeno, nothing moves because it could never both be in the place it is and 
the place it is not.  He says:  “If anything is moving, it must be moving either in the place 
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in which it is or in a place in which it is not.  However, it cannot move in the place in 
which it is [for the place in which it is at any moment is of the same size as itself and 
hence allows it no room to move in], and it cannot move in the place in which it is not.  
Therefore movement is impossible.”98  
According to Parmenides, time does not exist, there is only the present.  Only that 
which already is, exists.  There can be no such thing as coming-to-be from non-being.  
Nor can that which pass into non-being.  This means, among other things, that there can 
be no such thing as the future or the past.  This is why he says:  “There remains, then, but 
one word by which to express the [true] road:  Is.  And on this road there are many signs 
that What Is has no beginning and never will be destroyed:  it is whole, still, and without 
end.  It neither was nor will be, it simple is – now, altogether, one, continuous.”99 
But it is obviously the case that things move from one place to another.  Just as it 
is obviously the case that some things happen before other things in time, or that 
something that changes from one state to another state used to be in one state, and then 
later is in a different state.  All of this is because the movement or change of the thing is 
continuous.  To prevent the absurdity of an eternal presence without past and future, time 
must also be as continuous as the movement to which it is attached as an attribute. 
 So time is continuous and the number of motion.  But what kind of number is it?  
According to Aristotle, number is used in two ways.  He says:  “Number, we must note, 
is used in two ways – both of what is counted or countable and also of that with which we 
count.  Time, then, is what is counted, not that with which we count: these are different 
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kinds of things.”100  This will turn out to be a very important distinction.  If time were the 
number that counts, then it would count everything everywhere the same.  That is, even 
though different movements are specifically different from each other, and even given 
that different kinds of movement (e.g., locomotion and alteration) are completely 
different than each other, the same time would be employed to count them all.  Time 
would have a unit, in this case, and every different kind of motion or change could be 
construed in terms of this unit.  This would have the effect of construing all motion as 
more or less measurable in terms of all other motion.  Or, in other words, all motions or 
changes would become identical in terms of time. 
 All changes or motions are not the same, though, either when different instances 
of the same kind of motion, or between the different kinds of change or motion.  That is 
to say, each instance of locomotion is different than each other instance, because each 
movement has a different ‘before’ and ‘after’.  This is why Aristotle says:  “Time is not 
number with which we count, but the number of things which are counted; and this 
according as it occurs before or after is always different, for the ‘nows’ are different.  
And the number of a hundred horse and a hundred men is the same, but the things 
numbered are different – the horses for the men.”101 As the number that is counted, then, 
each different perception of movement will have a different time.  And each different 
kind or movement of change, that is, locomotion or alteration, will have a different time.  
The ‘nows’ are always different.  The ‘befores’ and ‘afters’ of the various movements are 
always different.  So, since time is the number of these movements, and these movements 
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are different, then the numbers of the movements will also have to be different.  This is 
why time has to be the number counted, not the number counts. 
 Time is the number counted.  This number is the number of the motion that is 
perceived by a soul as that soul notices the motion or change.  But this time is not the 
same as the motion itself, nor is it a kind of motion.  Rather, time is an attribute of 
motion.  Motion is continuous from the ‘before’ which marks the start of the motion in 
question to the ‘after’ that marks its completion.  This is why the paradoxes of Zeno do 
not work; this is why Parmendides’ notion that there could be no such thing as time also 
fails.  But if motion is continuous from the ‘before’ to the ‘after’, what is it exactly that 
marks one ‘before’ off from another?  In the case of locomotion, the ‘before’ would seem 
to be the place where the movement began, and the ‘after’ would be the place where the 
movement ended.  But what if another movement started at the place where the former 
movement ended?  That is, what if the ‘after’ of movement 1 ends up being the ‘before’ 
of movement 2?  Are they still two motions, or are they one and the same motion?  If 
they are two, why are they counted as two when the ‘before’ of the second is the ‘after’ 
of the first?  And if they are one continuous motion, do we not arrive at something similar 
to the paradoxes of the Eleatics?  For then it would seem that there was only one great 
motion.  But if there is only one great motion, and no discernable ‘after’ (or ‘before’, for 
that matter), and if time is the number of that motion from the ‘before’ to the ‘after’, then 
either time or motion or both would be impossible. 
 There is a way to distinguish the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of motion or change.  This is 
the ‘now’.  Aristotle’s treatment of the ‘now’ is the most complex part of his theory of 
time.  In particular, the fact that Aristotle begins his treatment of time with three 
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paradoxes concerning the ‘now’ makes his use of the ‘now’ problematic.  These 
paradoxes arise from the commonly held belief that time is composed of ‘nows’ that 
come into being and pass away.  If this were the case, though, then the following would 
result.  Either the now is always different or it is the same.  If it is different, then it would 
have to cease to exist at some time in order for the following ‘nows’ to exist.  But if this 
is the case, then either it would have to cease to exist in itself or in another ‘now’.  It 
cannot cease to exist in itself.  But neither can it cease to exist in another ‘now’, because 
two ‘nows’ cannot be next to each other.  Therefore, all the different ‘nows’ will exist at 
the same time, which is absurd.  But if the ‘now’ is always the same, then either of two 
impossible things results.  Either the ‘now’ would be a determinate divisible thing with a 
single termination, which is absurd, or the events of ten thousand years ago would happen 
simultaneously as events of today, and nothing would be earlier or later than anything 
else.  This is also absurd.  Therefore, it does not appear that time is composed of 
‘nows’.102 
  Aristotle solves these dilemmas, and imports the ‘now’ into his theory of time by 
claiming that the ‘now’ does not compose time, but rather, defines time.  The ‘now’ is 
what separates a ‘before’ from an ‘after’, even if the ‘before’ and ‘after’ seem to be one 
and the same.  Even though a particular ‘after’ appears to be, or even is, identical with a 
particular ‘before’, they still denote the ‘after’ and ‘before’ of two distinct movements.  
This means they still denote two differently experienced ‘nows’.  And this makes it 
possible to say that there are more motions than one.  The ‘now’ also unifies the motion, 
since while the motion itself is being perceived by a perceiving being, that perception, 
that noticing of the change or motion, is also referred to as the ‘now’.  Therefore, the 
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‘now’ serves two purposes for Aristotle.  It makes each experience of time a unified 
experience in and of itself.  And it also separates one temporal experience from another.  
This helps explain why motion itself is possible in the first place.  And it helps to explain 
why all experience is not of an ever-present ‘now’, as Parmenides held. 
 The ‘now’ is one with itself and continuous because the body that is in motion or 
undergoing change is one with itself and continuous.  The body is the continuous, 
therefore the magnitude of its motion or change is continuous, and the ‘now’ goes along 
with this change or motion so that this change or motion can be counted.  Therefore, the 
‘now’ is one and the same and continuous.  This is the case even in alteration, since the 
being that undergoes alteration is still the same in substratum.  A child who becomes an 
adult is no longer a child, but the person who undergoes the alteration of aging from 
childhood to adulthood is still the same person.  Likewise, the ‘now’ is the same for the 
entirety of the motion or change, even if the thing that changes happens to change in its 
being.  This is why Aristotle says:  “For the motion or locomotion is made one by the 
thing which is moved, because it is one…because it is one in definition; for this 
determines the movement as ‘before’ and ‘after’.”103 
 So the ‘now’ is one and the same with itself and continuous.  But the ‘now’ is also 
different and different.  That is, there are different particular ‘nows’, since there are 
different particular times, particularly when it comes to movements that are not 
locomotion.104 And there are also different particular bodies which move, just as there are 
different particular souls to perceive the motion and count it from the ‘before’ to the 
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‘after’.  And the fact that souls can count from the ‘before’ to the ‘after’ indicate that the 
‘before’ and ‘after’ as such must be different from each other, even if the movement or 
change that they mark off is one and the same with itself.  That is, even though the 
magnitude, and therefore the time of the motion or change is continuous, it still must 
have a beginning and end in order for that continuous motion or change to be counted.  
This means that even though the substratum of the movement remains the same, because 
the body is always the same in substratum, the being of the moving thing will change.  
This is why he says:  “Hence in these also the ‘now’ as substratum remains the same (for 
it is what is before and after in movement), but is being is different’; for it is in so far as 
the before and after is that we get the ‘now’.”105 
This is why the ‘now’ is both the same and continuous and different ‘nows’ are 
different and different.  And this is why time is defined by the ‘now’ without being 
composed of ‘nows’.  Time is not composed of ‘nows’, time is the attribute of motion or 
change that makes motion or change countable.  The fact that time is bound by the ‘now’ 
and differentiated by the ‘now’ is what makes temporal experience possible and 
intelligible.  And even though different times are different, insofar as they are counted by 
different perceiving souls and insofar as they concern different instances and types of 
motions, all times are unified, in their definition, by the way the ‘now’ functions as both 
unifier and divider.  This is why Aristotle says: 
Clearly, too, if there were no time, there would be no ‘now’, and vice 
versa.  Just as the moving body and its locomotion involve each other 
mutually, so too do the number of the moving body and the number of its 
locomotion.  For the number of the locomotion is time, while the ‘now’ 
corresponds to the moving body, and is like the unit of number…The 
‘now’ is the link of time…(for it connects past and future time), and it is a 
limit of time (for it is the beginning of the one and the end of the 
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other)…It divides time potentially, and in so far as it is dividing the ‘now’ 
is always different, but in so far as it connects it is always the same, as it is 
with mathematical lines.106 
 
 So Aristotle’s definition of time is that time is an attribute of motion that makes it 
possible for a soul with the power enumeration to count the number of the change from 
‘before’ to ‘after’ for a particular motion, this number is the number counted, and the 
time that it counts is bounded by and unified by Aristotle’s duel concept of the ‘now’.  
This theory of time appears to be highly subjective, perhaps even solipsistic after the 
manner that Russell described Augustine’s theory.107  Many commentators on Aristotle’s 
theory of time, from Simplicius to present-day commentators like David Bostock and 
Sarah Waterloo, have tried to interpret Aristotle’s theory in such a way as to bring it in 
line with the general, quantitative nature of the prevailing theories of time.  In other 
words, most commentators over the years have tried to read Aristotle’s theory of time as 
an homogenous, quantitative (spatial) theory of time – one that was in line with the 
prevailing notions on the subject.  It is to these interpretations that I now turn. 
PART II: TRADITIONAL SPATIAL/QUANTITATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF 
ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF TIME 
 
 Most thinkers have attempted to interpret Aristotle’s theory of time as a 
traditional, quantitative theory of time.  I believe there are two reasons for this.  The first 
is the fact that, as I just mentioned above, quantitative interpretations of time in general 
were the prevailing interpretations of theories of time for most of the history of the 
concept.  It should be no surprise, then, that people attempting to make sense of Aristotle 
would read him in the light of the prevailing theories of time, such as Augustine’s and the 
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schools of thought over which Augustine exercised a great influence.  The second reason 
lies within Aristotle’s text itself.  Aristotle’s text seems ambiguous on several key points.  
This makes it textually possible to offer spatial as well as other kinds of interpretations of 
Aristotle’s theory.  In particular, there are three areas of ambiguity that make attempts to 
interpret Aristotle’s theory problematic.  First, he claims that time is everywhere and with 
all things, and it is defined by the ‘now’.  But the ‘now’ is both the same with itself and 
different and different.  This means one could claim that time is uniform and 
homogenous, since it is everywhere and with everything.  One could also claim, though, 
that since the ‘nows’ are different, and since time is defined by the ‘now’, that all specific 
times are different and therefore time itself is not homogenous.  Second, even though 
Aristotle says specifically that time is the number that is counted, not the number that 
counts, towards the end of his treatment of time he seems to reverse himself.  In 
particular, he claims that all motion is measurable by the circle.  This seems to change 
time from the number counted to the number that counts.  This would mean that, rather 
than having as many different times as there are different motions counted, all time 
would be reducible to one counted number.  This could lead to an homogenous unit for 
time, which would make it the number that counts.  And third, even though the ‘now’ is 
both one and the same with itself and continuous, and all ‘nows’ are different and 
different, he also says that motions or changes that have the same ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
have the same time, even if they are different from each other. 
 To resolve these apparent inconsistencies in a way consistent with the prevailing 
style of thinking on time, spatial commentators on Aristotle’s theory tend to do one or 
more of the following.  They try to unify time into an homogenous medium.  They 
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concentrate on the parts of Aristotle’s theory that seem to change time from the number 
counted to the number that counts, and then argue that Aristotle really meant time to be 
the number that counts.  And they try to claim that time is something that can (and does) 
exist independently of rational, perceiving souls.  I will now offer an examination of 
these characteristics, using three commentators as representative of this style of 
interpretation.108 
A unified, homogenous view of time is a view of time that insists on the two 
following characteristics.  First, time must be the same everywhere.  Second, the units 
used for measuring time must be fundamentally the same.  That time is the same 
everywhere is the view of time held by Augustine, classical mechanics, and Kant.109  And 
if time is the same everywhere, then the fundamental unit for measuring time must be the 
same everywhere as well.  This unit might be called a second, a minute, or a year.  But 
this is only because we lack the precision to get to the precise unit of time (and it was the 
attempt to find this precise unit that occupied much of classical mechanics’ thinking on 
time).  There are three particular passages in Aristotle’s treatment of time that support 
such a view.  First, Aristotle claims early on in his theory that “time is present equally 
everywhere and with all things.”110  The second and third passages come at the end of his 
treatment of time.  There he says: 
But other things as well may have been moved now, and there would be a 
number of each of the two movements.  Is there another time, then, and 
will there be two equal times at once?  Surely not.  For a time that is both 
equal and simultaneous is one and the same time, and even those that are 
                                                 
108 I have chosen Simplicius, from the ancient perspective, and Sarah Waterloo and David Bostock from the 
modern perspective, although certainly many other people have written about Aristotle’s theory of time.  I 
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interpretations, though, and therefore should be adequate for my purposes here. 
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not simultaneous are one in kind; for if there were dogs, and horses, and 
seven of each, it would be the same number.  So, too, movements that 
have simultaneous limits have the same time, yet the one may in fact be 
fast and the other not, and one may be locomotion and the other alteration; 
still the time of the two changes is the same if it is both equal and 
simultaneous, and for this reason, while the movements are different and 
separate, the time is everywhere the same, because the number of equal 
and simultaneous movements is everywhere one and the same.111 
 
And then immediately following that, he adds: 
Now there is such a thing as locomotion, and in locomotion there is 
included circular movement, and everything is counted by some one thing 
homogeneous with it, units by a unit, horses by a horse, and similarly 
times by some definite time, and, as we said, time is measured by motion 
as well as motion by time (this being so because by a motion definite in 
time the quantity both of the motion and of the time is measured): if, then, 
what is first is the measure of everything homogeneous with it, regular 
circular motion is above all else the measure, because the number of this is 
the best known.  Now neither alteration nor increase nor coming into 
being can be regular, but locomotion can be.  This also is why time is 
thought to be the movement of the sphere, viz. because the other 
movements are measured by this, and time by the movement.112 
 
When these three passages are taken together, they cause some commentators to believe 
that Aristotle holds a unified, homogenous view of time. 
 If time is, in fact, equally everywhere and with all things, and if simultaneous 
motions or changes are the same, then all time must be one and the same thing.  And this 
must be true regardless of whether the motion in question is locomotion, alteration, or 
coming-into-being, or any other conceivable kind of change or motion.  This is what 
Sarah Waterloo claims is the case with Aristotle’s theory.  She says:  “The result is a 
universal temporal order: universal, that is, in the sense that there is a place in it for every 
member of every pair of kinetic series Kx and Ky such that some member of Kx coincides 
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with some member of Ky.”113  If this were not the case, then time could be the same as 
itself and different than itself.  But this is not the case, since nothing can be different than 
itself.  So if time is measured from a specific ‘before’ to a specific ‘after’, then what 
needs to be considered are the specific ‘befores’ and ‘afters’, not the particular motions 
themselves.  This is why even different kinds of movements, such as alteration and 
locomotion, will have the same time, so long as they have the same ‘before’ and ‘after’.  
All simultaneous times are the same time, and this is what makes time a unified and 
homogenous medium. 
 If all simultaneous times are the same time, and therefore, if time is a unified, 
homogenous medium, then it will have a basic, identical unit that can be used to measure 
any and all specific times.  This is the view Simplicius held.  He notes that Aristotle even 
goes so far as to give a unit to time that would make all time homogenous.  This unit is 
the circle.  Thus, Simplicius states: 
He [Aristotle] therefore looks for the primary and most simple time, which 
will measure all time.  So, if time is the measure of change, if some 
change be found which is the measure of all other changes, it is clear that 
its time will be found to be the measure of time.  So what change is such?  
Clearly, that which is primary, uniform and well-known.  For one that was 
not primary and was irregular and unknown would be an unsuitable 
measure…only circular motion has this character; so this is the measure of 
change and, consequently, of time.  It becomes the measure of change by 
being determined by time and thus being a certain quantity.114 
 
And it certainly seems to be the case that Aristotle must be held to this view, even though 
he claims that changes other than locomotion are not regular and so do not have a regular 
unit of measurement.  This is because all specific times are the number of motion from a 
particular ‘before’ to a particular ‘after’.  If the ‘before’ of a particular alteration 
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coincides with the ‘before’ of some locomotion (and I imagine it would not be too hard to 
find such coinciding ‘befores’ for any case of alteration), and the ‘afters’ of both also 
coincide, then the times must be the same.  Therefore, if one of these two times, namely 
locomotion, is subject to the regular measurement of the circle, then the other of these 
two times, namely alteration, must also be equally subject to that regular unit of 
measurement.  Otherwise, Aristotle’s theory would seem self-contradictory.  This means 
that all motions must be subject to the unit of circular measurement. 
 If this is the case, though, then what is the most fundamental unit of circular 
measurement?  Johannes Fritsche attempts to answer this question by reviving the notion 
that time is fundamentally measured by the circular motion of the heavens.  It is the 
circular motion of the heavens that makes time one and the same with itself and the same 
everywhere and with everything:  “It is one and only one time, since no earthly change or 
form produces time.  Rather, time is produced by the heavens.  It is everywhere within 
the cosmos, since it is brought to us on earth through the heavens’ causal action.  As 
such, time can be the measure of terrestrial change (and rest) as well as the measure of 
the heavens’ motion.”115 And this solution seems to work, insofar as finding the basic 
unit for a homogenous theory of time in Aristotle is concerned.  Even though Aristotle 
dismisses the view that time is the same as the motion of the heavens early in his 
treatment, saying:  “Besides, if there were more heavens than one, the movement of any 
of them equally would be time, so that there would be many times at the same time,”116 
Fritsche can still say with some legitimacy that the heavens work as a basic, homogenous 
unit.  This is because Aristotle’s claim concerns identifying time with the motion of the 
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heavens themselves.  And time, according to Aristotle, is neither the same as motion nor 
a particular kind of motion.  But as the attribute of the motion of heavens, the time thus 
counted could still serve as a homogenous unit.  And, since everything in Aristotle’s 
universe is encompassed by the sphere of the heavens, and this sphere is not infinite, then 
it could (and according to Fritcshe, Waterloo and Simplicius, it is) provide a standard unit 
by which all other times could measured, and to which all other times could be reduced.  
And this would be the same for all motions and the times that go with those motions, 
whether they are locomotion, alteration, or any other kind. 
 If Aristotle’s theory of time is read as being a unified, homogenous medium with 
a single unit of time that all other experiences of time can be reduced to, then it seems to 
follow that the way number is conceived in his theory will change, too.  Aristotle says 
time is the number counted.  And he seems indicate that this means that, even though 
numbers as numbers are the same, the things they count are different, and therefore the 
number counted is different.  If all motions of which time is the measure, though, can be 
reduced to circular locomotion, and the number of units counted constitutes a standard 
form of time, then all counted units will be the same.  This will change time from the 
number counted to the number that counts.  And if time is to be the same everywhere, 
and Aristotle is to be kept consistent, then it must be the case that time, as a quantity, is 
really the number that counts; and what it counts would be particular amounts of time. 
 Those who hold that time is a unified, homogenous thing, according to Aristotle, 
generally also treat number as the number that counts, and for the reasons given above.  
Yet Aristotle seems clear on the point that time is the number counted.117  And Aristotle 
also says things in several places that indicate time is a unified, homogenous medium.  
                                                 
117 He says this explicitly at both Physics 219b and 220b. 
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This by itself might not seem enough to change the concept of number Aristotle is using 
from within the text.  There are two further passages, though, that seem to address the 
nature of number, and turn the emphasis from the number counted to the number that 
counts.  The first reads:  It is clear, too, that time is not described as fast or slow, but as 
many or few and as long or short.  For as continuous it is long or short and as number it is 
many or few; but it is not fast or slow – any more than any number with which we count 
is fast or slow.”118  And he clarifies this a bit further on, saying: 
We describe the time as much or little, measuring it by the movement, just 
as we know the number by what is numbered, e.g. the number of horses by 
the one horse as the unit.  For we know how many horses there are by the 
use of the number; and again by using the one horse as unit we know the 
number of the horses itself.  So it is with the time and the movement; for 
we measure the movement by the time and vice versa.  It is reasonable that 
this should happen; for the movement goes with the distance and the time 
with the movement, because they are quanta and continuous and 
divisible.119 
 
 When these two passages are considered along with the previous passages cited in 
support of the homogeneity and unity of Aristotle’s theory, one can see why it is that 
spatial commentators are not reluctant to rethink the way Aristotle uses number, even 
within the text itself.  If time is only the number counted, and not the number that counts, 
then time could be fast or slow.  And it is certainly the case that time, if it is considered to 
be the number counted, can be as many and different as there are different motions or 
changes and different kinds of motions or changes.  If time is the number counted, then 
time would have no universality.  Even the same movement could end up having 
different times.  This is why David Bostock claims: 
The full doctrine, then, seems to be this.  There are such things as amounts 
of duration, e.g. 5 minutes, and the time of a movement is its amount of 
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duration.  But this is an ambiguous expression, depending on the extent to 
which the amount of duration of one movement is thought of as capable of 
being the same amount of duration as that of another.  If we construe the 
expression quite universally, it simply applies to all movements which last 
equally long, no matter when they occur.  On this construal it would, I 
think, count as a ‘number by which we number’, though also of course as 
a ‘particular kind of number’ rather than a number without 
qualification.120 
 
That is, because all measurements of time measure the same thing, that is, time, then 
those units must fundamentally be the same.  And if they are fundamentally the same, 
then time must really be the number that counts, not the number counted. 
 Aristotle’s ambiguity in terms of what kind of number time is can be further 
clarified if the distinction between time as the number counted and the number that 
counts is removed in favor of a definition of time as number where number 
simultaneously counts and is counted.  That is, the number that is time is the 
counting/counted.  Time is counted as being the number of change from ‘before’ to 
‘after’.  But something must be used to count this number, and that something is time.  
This is why Simplicius states:  “For the measures are measured in their turn by the things 
measured.”121  That is to say, time is both what counts and what is counted when the 
movement is enumerated.  This reduces all temporal experience to something quantifiable 
in a general way, and that which is generally quantifiable must be conceived of as 
counting that which it quantifies.  This is the view Waterloo holds regarding Aristotle’s 
use of number:  “The extent to which he is committed to a quantitative treatment will 
show even more as we go on.  But it can already be said that for him the concept of 
simultaneity comes to life only in the context of temporal quantification.  Thus his whens 
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are above all termini of quantifiable intervals.”122  And since, in order for quantifiable 
intervals to measure the same things, they must themselves be the same, and since 
Aristotle already seems committed to the view that simultaneous motions or changes 
have the same time, then time must be the number that counts, not the number counted.  
Thus, Bostock claims: 
And this, I think, is the point he is getting at when he says that time is a 
thing numbered rather than a thing we number with.  But, so construed, 
the amount of duration is still a universal, not confined to this or that 
particular movement but shared by all simultaneous movements.  It is 
partly for this reason, I believe, that Aristotle continues to call it a number.  
For when explaining his point that simultaneous movements to have 
exactly the same time he again makes use of the idea that time is a 
number…and once more he adds in comparison that 7 dogs and 7 horses 
have the same number.123 
 
So therefore, this number must be the number that counts, as well as the number counted. 
 Time is everywhere all the same.  This makes it an homogenous medium.  And 
because it is an homogenous medium whose primary unit is the circle, then the number of 
motion turns out to be more like the number that counts.  The third thing spatial 
interpreters of Aristotle’s theory seek to do, then, is address the issue of time’s 
relationship to the soul.  Aristotle connects time to the soul, since it is in soul that one 
finds the power of enumeration.  Time is not motion, but it is an attribute of motion.  This 
attribute is motion as countable.  Therefore, since a soul is needed to count things, time 
must only exist when a soul perceives motion or change and counts the time from the 
‘before’ to the ‘after’ of that motion or change.  Otherwise, Aristotle indicates we think 
that no time has passed. 
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number that counts.  Bostock, 163. 
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 If time is going to be a universal, homogenous medium, though, that is 
everywhere and with all things, then it would seem that its existence must be independent 
of individual souls perceiving motion or change.  In fact, if time is truly universal, it 
would seem to be the case that it must exist independent of all souls.  This has caused a 
problem for spatial interpreters of Aristotle’s theory.  If Aristotle’s theory is dependent 
upon perceiving souls, then it will be only a subjective theory of time.  And this seems to 
be the case, for Aristotle says towards the end of his treatment of time: 
Whether if soul did not exist time would exist or not, is a question that 
may fairly be asked; for if there cannot be some one to count there cannot 
be anything that can be counted either, so that evidently there cannot be 
number; for number is either what has been, or what can be counted.  But 
if nothing but soul, or in soul reason, is qualified to count, it is impossible 
for there to be time unless there is soul, but only that of which time is an 
attribute, i.e., if movement can exist without soul.  The before and after are 
attributes of movement, and time is these qua countable.124 
 
 The way spatial interpreters tend to solve this problem is to focus on the fact that 
motions or changes are thought to exist independently of anyone’s perceiving motions or 
changes.  Time is an attribute of motion or change, in so far as any motion or change can 
be counted.  Therefore, even if there were no soul to count, time would still exist as an 
attribute of motion potentially.  This is the solution Simplicius offers.  He claims that 
time, as the duration of motion, exists as duration whether or not it is perceived or 
counted by a soul.  It is only time’s status as a number that depends upon a counting soul 
for its existence.  He says:  “For nothing prevents the substrate of time, or the 
enumerated, from existing without soul existing, if it is in general possible for change to 
exist without soul.”125 And he says further that: “it is worth noting, I think, that if the 
enumerator is abolished time as an enumerated number is abolished, but as the before and 
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after in regard to duration of change it is not abolished.  In that respect time exists.”126  So 
time can exist, either qua duration or as potential number, regardless of whether or not 
souls exist who can count a particular motion or change.   
 These are the characteristics of traditional spatial interpretations of Aristotle.  
Time is an homogenous medium.  Time consists of identically reducible units that are the 
same everywhere.  This unit is the circle of locomotion.  The fact that all units of time 
can be reduced to the circle of locomotion means that time really turns out to be the 
number that counts, not the number counted.  And finally, time must exist independently 
of perceiving, counting souls, and it does as a potentially countable attribute of motion.  
These interpretations force Aristotle’s theory into the mold of spatial theories that have 
their most complete source in Augustine. 
 To force Aristotle into such an Augustinian framework, though, compels one to 
ignore too much of the text.  Aristotle’s theory may not be as objective as the above 
mentioned spatial interpreters would have it be.  In fact, according to Heidegger, it is not 
objective at all – at least, not in the sense discussed above.  In the next part of this 
chapter, I will turn my attention to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of 
time.  This interpretation, which is found in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, will 
also turn out to be a spatial interpretation, although not in quite the same way as those 
discussed above.  This is because Heidegger brings a Kantian/German Idealist spin to his 
interpretation of Aristotle.  This will make Aristotle’s theory more closely resemble 
Kant’s than is perhaps usually thought to be the case.  And it will help to show how and 
why Heidegger will attempt to connect Bergson to Aristotle in his early works, and what 
that connection says about Heidegger’s own theory of original temporality. 
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PART III: HEIDEGGER’S IDEALISTIC/SPATIAL INTERPRETATION OF 
ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF TIME 
 Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time differs from more 
traditional, spatial interpretations because Heidegger interprets Aristotle’s theory 
primarily through his [Heidegger’s] notion of the subject: Dasein.  Heidegger attempts 
this interpretation in order to restore something of what he takes to be the original 
meaning of Aristotle’s theory of time to the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time.  
What Heidegger ends up with, though, is a spatial interpretation of Aristotle’s theory that 
reads Aristotle in a Kantian light.  In particular, Heidegger’s attempt to think past the 
subjective/objective distinction that troubles so many traditional spatial interpretations 
demonstrates the Kantian undertones of his interpretation.  This Kantian interpretation of 
Aristotle also sheds light on the connection Heidegger draws between Aristotle and 
Bergson.  That is, it shows what Heidegger thought to be the connection between these 
two, which in turn will reveal something about Heidegger’s own theory of original 
temporality in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
 There are four basic components to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s 
theory of time.  First, Heidegger believes Aristotle’s theory of time is “stretched out.”  
That is, Heidegger interprets Aristotle to say that time is a kind of extension.  Heidegger 
claims extension is used in two ways: both concretely in space and formally in dimension 
(but not necessarily in space).  Aristotle’s theory of time is extended in the sense of being 
extended formally in dimension.  Second, Heidegger, like traditional spatial interpreters, 
takes the number of time to be the number that counts and is counted, or the 
“counting/counted”.  This counting/counted differs from traditional theories in one 
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aspect, though, which is also the third component of the interpretation.  Time, according 
to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory, forms a horizon.  Or, to be more 
specific, the ‘now’, which as number is the counting/counted, forms a horizon for 
temporal experience.  This horizon is both functional and a demonstration of time’s 
(formal) extension.  This will allow time to act as a kind of container for motion.  Finally, 
Heidegger dissolves the subjective/objective split by claiming that time can be objective, 
as spatial theories tend to maintain, while still be located only in perceiving souls while 
they are perceiving and counting motion or change. 
 Heidegger claims that Aristotle’s theory of time involves extension.  Extension, as 
Heidegger uses the term, is not the same thing as space.  Heidegger claims that what time 
is, on Aristotle’s theory, is ‘extensity’, or a ‘stretching out’.  This constitutes a dimension 
only in the formal sense.  Therefore, time cannot be reduced to space as space is normally 
understood by traditional theories of time: 
The comparison with alloisosis shows that this “away from something 
toward something” need not necessarily be taken spatially.  We shall call 
this structure of motion its dimension, taking the concept of dimension in 
a completely formal sense, in which spatial character is not essential.  
Dimension expresses a general notion of stretch; extension in the sense of 
spatial dimension then represents a particular modification of stretch.  In 
the case of the determination of ek tinos eis ti [away from something 
toward something (Heidegger’s translation)] we should rid ourselves 
completely of the spatial idea, something that Aristotle did, too.  A 
completely formal sense of stretching out is intended in “from something 
to something.127 
 
This completely formal sense of dimension depends upon what Heidegger takes to be 
Aristotle’s notion of continuity.  All motions are continuous, according to Aristotle.  If 
the motion is continuous, the magnitude, or, as Heidegger calls it, the extension, will also 
be continuous.  This means that the motion and its extension are one with themselves and 
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complete.  And the fact motions are one with themselves and complete means that they 
cannot be divided up they way that space is normally thought to be divisible.  That is, 
motions are not infinitely divisible the way traditional space is.  Therefore, time, on 
Aristotle’s theory, is not infinitely divisible, and therefore time is not like traditional 
theories of space.  Instead, Heidegger claims that it is a “stretching out that is closed 
within itself.”128 
 The continuity and extension of motion are not merely facts of our experience of 
motion.  According to Heidegger, one can only believe this of locomotion, since 
locomotion involves places external to the observer.  Aristotle is concerned with all kinds 
of motion or change, though, and the extension Heidegger finds in his theory is found in 
the very nature of time itself.  It is found in its ontological character, not only in the 
factual experience of perceiving beings perceiving motion or change in the world.  This 
makes it a condition for our ability to perceive motion or change and note the difference 
between the ‘before’ and ‘after’ which makes it possible for us to notice time.  This is 
why the ontological nature of Aristotle’s theory needs to be examined, rather than simply 
looking at the way time is experienced: 
Aristotle expresses this set of circumstances in reverse order when he says 
that motion follows (comes in the wake of) dimension (extension).  This 
proposition should be understood not ontically but ontologically.  It does 
not mean that a motion proceeds ontically from stretch or continuity, that 
dimension has motion consequent to it.  To say that motion follows 
continuity or follows dimension means that by the very nature of motion 
as such dimensionality, and thus continuity, precedes it.  Extension and 
continuity are already implicit in motion.  They are earlier than motion in 
the sense of being a priori conditions of motion itself.129 
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Even though time is ‘stretched out’ as an a priori condition of temporality, Heidegger 
maintains that, because this ‘stretching out’ is purely formal as a condition for temporal 
experience, Aristotle’s theory of time is not a spatial theory in the usual sense of time’s 
being thought of as spatial. 
 By attributing this sort of dimensionality to Aristotle’s theory of time, though, 
especially as a condition of time’s being time and time’s being something that can be 
experienced, Heidegger clearly offers something that can be read as a traditional spatial 
interpretation of Aristotle’s theory.  The only way this cannot be the case is if we can 
draw an actual distinction between space as a concrete phenomenon and dimension as an 
abstract dimension.  But this distinction breaks down on closer examination.  If time is an 
attribute of motion, as Aristotle clearly says it is, then wherever there is motion, there will 
be time, at least potentially.  If time is something with formal extension (or any kind of 
extension, for that matter), then one or both of the following would have to be the case 
for Aristotle.  Either time would have to be motion or a kind of motion.  Or time would 
have to be some completely independent phenomenon not related to motion at all.  
Neither of these things can be the case, though, according to Aristotle.  So if time has 
extension, it must follow the motion.  All motions, including alteration, take place in a 
place.  Now Heidegger claims (correctly) that Aristotle’s notion of place is not the same 
as the modern notion of space.130  However, all place must have some kind of spatial 
extension.  Therefore, Heidegger’s claim that time is only formally extended breaks 
down, since all motions that time measure happen in place, which is always concrete, 
according to Aristotle. 
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 So the fact that Heidegger claims that time is a form of extension is one 
component to his interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time, and it is one reason why 
Heidegger’s interpretation is a spatial interpretation.  The next component of his 
interpretation is to claim that the way Aristotle uses number in his theory of time is as the 
counting/counted, not only as the number counted.  That is, Heidegger believes the 
concept of number employed by Aristotle is a homogenous concept that brings a kind of 
uniformity to the counting of time.  This counting/counted number is called the ‘now’, 
and it is this ‘now’ that we count, Heidegger claims, when we count the number of 
change from ‘before’ to ‘after’ of any given motion or change:  “As counted, the nows 
themselves count – they count the places, so far as these are traversed places of the 
motion.”131  The ‘nows’ count as they are counted.  This means that the unit called the 
‘now’, by which any particular ‘now’ is identified, must exist prior to any particular 
motion.  By having a prior unit, two times can be compared to each other to see which is 
greater, just as two motions can be compared to see which is faster according to the same 
overall definition of and experience of time. 
 If the ‘now’ is a counting/counted number, though, as Heidegger claims it is, then 
Heidegger’s interpretation is a spatial interpretation for this reason, too.  Any attempt to 
create an a priori unit that measures all time, which seems to be what Heidegger is doing 
with the ‘now’, necessarily homogenizes time into a specific, quantifiable phenomenon.  
This is exactly what spatial interpretations of Aristotle’s theory attempt to do with that 
theory, just as spatial theories in general attempt to do so with the phenomenon of time in 
general.  So Heidegger ends up following the traditional interpretations of Aristotle’s 
theory when he says: 
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The now is what it is, he d’ arithmei, so far as it counts, hence number.  
Time as now is not limit but transition, and as transition it is possible 
number, possible mensural number of motion.  It measures a motion or a 
rest in such a way that a specific motion, a specific change and advance is 
fixed, for example, the advance from one stroke of a second to the next, 
with which mensural number then the entire movement is measured.  
Because the now is transition it always measures a from-to, it measures a 
how-long, a duration.  Time as number fixes the limits of a specific 
movement.  This delimited movement is intended for measuring the whole 
of the movement to be measured.132 
 
This treatment of the ‘now’ fixes time into an homogenous medium.  And by doing so, it 
paves the way for Heidegger to set the limits to this medium, which he does by 
construing the ‘before’ and ‘after’ that surround particular ‘nows’ as a horizon for 
temporal experience. 
 According to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time, in order to 
understand how the ‘nows’ are to be counted, so that one can properly experience the 
time of the motion, one must first understand that motions within Aristotle’s system do 
not occur over space.  At least, they do not occur over space as modern thinkers normally 
view space.  Nor is it the case that places in Aristotle’s system are related to each other 
by simple juxtaposition.  This can make it difficult to mark off the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of 
a particular motion.  However, if we understand the horizon within which any particular 
motion occurs, then we will be able to properly mark off the ‘before’ and ‘after’, and 
therefore, we will be able to properly count the change and hence know the time.  This 
horizon provides both a frame for the movement, and a goal for the movement.  By 
providing a goal for the movement, the horizon provides the movement’s direction.  This 
makes the motion intelligible, and allows Dasein to experience time:  “If we thus see the 
place manifold in the horizon of the ‘away from there – toward here’ and traverse the 
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individual places in this horizon in seeing the motion, the transition, then we retain the 
first traversed place as the away-from-there and expect the next place as the toward-here.  
Retaining the prior and expecting the posterior, we follow the transition as such, the 
individual places within the transition, which can stretch arbitrarily far, we no longer fix 
the places as individual points or as individual theres and heres arbitrarily paired.”133 The 
horizon fixes our experience of time, then, and it provides a number of nexus-points by 
which we can mark off the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the motion in question.   
 By fixing our experience of time, though, Heidegger ends up importing spatial 
notions back into his interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time.  A horizon, in the sense 
Heidegger is using the term, frames the temporal motion.  It provides ready-made starting 
and stopping points for that motion.  Furthermore, it provides them based primarily on 
the stopping points, which makes the horizon teleological.  This means that Heidegger 
believes Aristotle’s theory of time is based on the goals of particular actions.  And this 
brings his interpretation of Aristotle’s theory very close to the theory of original or true 
temporality that he develops in his early works.  It also imports Augustinian language 
into Aristotle’s theory, which supports my contention that Heidegger was more 
influenced by Augustine than either he or his critics and commentators generally 
acknowledge. 
This is particularly the case when Heidegger uses terms like ‘retain’ and ‘expect’ 
when he describes the way the horizon works in Aristotle’s theory.  Aristotle never uses 
these terms.  In fact, it seems to me that Aristotle does not use terms that are similar to 
‘retain’ and ‘expect’.  Augustine does use these sorts of terms, however.  According to 
Augustine (as I discussed in Chapter 1), our memory and our anticipation, or our 
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‘retention’ and ‘expectation’, in this case, connect the past and the future to a particular 
present.  Both the past and future of the present in question, though, are understood 
within a particular horizon.  For Augustine, this is God’s eternal presence.  What exactly 
it is for Heidegger is a matter of some dispute.  Perhaps it is the horizon of the world 
created by Dasein, or something like that.  In any case, whatever it is, it seems to have 
been added to Aristotle’s text.  At best, Heidegger could claim, along with the traditional 
spatial interpreters I looked at above, that the heavens are the ultimate place for Aristotle, 
and so serve as a horizon for the counting of any particular motion or change.  This may 
be what Heidegger had in mind when he imported the notion of ‘intratemporality’ 
(Heidegger’s term) into Aristotle’s notion of time. 
According to Heidegger, there are two senses of horizon.  One is particular to 
particular Daseins, insofar as they have particular retentions and expectations around a 
particular motion that they count when they are having a temporal experience.  This is 
how he interprets Aristotle’s use of the ‘now’, which is an Augustinian interpretation.  
There is a second sense of horizon, though, and this is what Heidegger associates with his 
term ‘intratemporality’.  ‘Intratemporality’ is the “time of times.”  He says:  “given that 
time embraces beings, it is required that it should somehow be before beings, before 
things moving and at rest, encompassing them.  Kant calls time the “wherein of an 
order.”  It is an embracing horizon within which things given can be ordered with respect 
to their succession.”134  It is the time that frames all other times, within which every 
particular time or temporal experience occurs.  It is difficult to grasp exactly which part 
of Aristotle’s theory of time Heidegger believes he is referencing with this notion.  At 
best, this could be an attempt to come to grips with Aristotle’s claim that time is 
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everywhere and with all things.  But the notion of a time that encompasses all times 
seems to go beyond what Aristotle said, particularly in light of the way time is explained 
in the rest of Aristotle’s theory.  Heidegger seems to be importing his own notion of 
original temporality into Aristotle’s theory in order to explain that theory. 
 There is evidence that this is what Heidegger is doing at the beginning of his 
interpretation of Aristotle’s theory.  He claims that Aristotle believes common time must 
be understood by way of original time, saying:  “as Aristotle says in his interpretation, 
time can be interpreted only if it is itself understood again by way of time, that is, by way 
of original time.”135  But what is this original time?  According to Heidegger, it is 
temporality:  “Anyone who has once seen these interconnections must plainly demand 
that in the definition of time the origin of time in the common sense, of time as we 
encounter it immediately, should come to light from temporality.  For its origin belongs to 
its essential nature and thus demands expression in the definition of this nature.”136  But 
this definition of temporality is not found anywhere in Aristotle’s treatment.  It is 
something Heidegger clearly imports into Aristotle’s text.  But by importing this notion 
into Aristotle’s theory, Heidegger also imports the primary characteristics of this notion, 
in particular, that temporality is essentially a phenomenon based on the future.  This 
would mean that Heidegger sees Aristotle’s theory as being based, essentially, on an 
understanding of the ‘after’ in ‘expectation’, which is what he means when he places 
temporal experience, according to Aristotle’s theory, within a horizon.  This horizon, 
which is formed by Dasein’s future, acts as a container for the motion of change taking 
place.  If a motion or change takes place within a ready-made container, whether of 
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Dasein’s own making or within the auspices of the ‘intratemporal’ “horizon of horizons”, 
then the entirety of that motion is already given.  If it is already given, then what 
Heidegger ends up with in his interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time is another 
version of the traditional spatial interpretations I discussed in Part II of this chapter. 
 Where Heidegger’s spatial interpretation of time differs from the traditional 
theories I described in Part II is in Heidegger’s use of Dasein.  One of the major 
stumbling blocks for many traditional, spatial interpreters of Aristotle’s theory of time is 
its apparent reliance on a perceiving, rational soul in order for time to exist.  One way this 
apparent reliance has been explained away is to say that, even if there were no perceiving 
souls which could count the numbers of different motions, time would still exist as an 
attribute of motion potentially.  Heidegger goes a different way here.  Relying on the 
Kantian side of the Augustinian heritage, Heidegger claims that the horizon that frames 
time is fixed by Dasein’s attention.  Dasein’s attention, in turn, is fixed by the horizon of 
the world in which Dasein finds itself.  This would seem to lead to the problem of “which 
came first?”  For Heidegger, though, this is a false problem:  “We see by the 
interpretation of “being in time” that time, as the embracing, as that in which natural 
events occur, is, as it were, more objective than all objects.  On the other hand, we see 
also that it exists only if the soul exists.  It is more objective than all objects and 
simultaneously it is subjective, existing only if subjects exist.”137 To try to claim that time 
exists potentially, without perceiving, rational souls, or, as Heidegger puts it, without 
Dasein, is to miss the point.  Time is objective because Dasein creates it by and through 
its being.  It posits time as a horizon, even while all its experiences are made intelligible 
by this very same horizon.  It is a joint move on the part of Dasein and its world.  This is 
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why temporal experience is both unique to Dasein and a function of the world as such.  
And this is why every particular temporal experience has its own horizon, yet all 
temporal experiences are contained within the horizon of horizons, that is, the world 
itself.  Or, to put it another way, by substituting the term “Dasein” for the term “soul”, 
Heidegger can claim that, according to Aristotle’s theory of time, the soul creates the 
very objectivity which contains it:  “We indicated earlier that the phenomenon of the 
world manifests something of the sort.  Given that the Dasein exists, is in a world, 
everything extant that the Dasein encounters is necessarily intraworldly, held-around 
[con-tained] by the world.  We shall see that in fact the phenomenon of time taken in a 
more original sense, is interconnected with the concept of the world and thus with the 
structure of the Dasein itself.”138 
 Now Heidegger admits that Aristotle did not explicitly state things this way.  
According to Heidegger, though, this must have been what Aristotle was attempting to do 
with his theory.  The soul constitutes time.  And the act of constituting time places the 
soul within the time it constitutes.  The soul is then contained by time, just as it is 
contained by the world.  This time that contains the soul (Dasein) is while it is being 
created by that soul, serves as a horizon for that soul’s temporal experience.  This gives it 
extension in what Heidegger calls the formal sense of the term (which he claims, 
incorrectly, is not concretely spatial).  This formal extension gives the ‘now’ that is 
counted the characteristic of both the thing counted and the unit by which it counts.  That 
is, the number Aristotle has in mind is really a counting/counted number, not simply the 
number that is counted.  This counting/counted number is the ordinary understanding of 
time that Aristotle gives to explain particular experiences of time.  What time itself is, 
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though, according to Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory, is the horizon of 
possible experiences that Dasein constructs in such a way as to then be temporally 
constituted by it. 
 This interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time is a spatial/quantitative 
interpretation (as I have been using the terms ‘spatial’ and ‘quantitative’).  Even if Dasein 
constructs the horizon, this horizon still exists externally to any particular Dasein.  This 
makes it a frame or container for temporal experience.  This container is formally 
extended.  But since all temporal experience is necessarily concrete, it is impossible to 
construe it as anything other than concretely extended, too.  The experience of time the 
soul has, on this interpretation, is of a counting toward an expectation and from a 
retention.  That is, the soul counts its memories and anticipates what is to come when it 
counts the number of change from before to after, as these things are constituted by the 
horizon.  This turns time, though, since it is already given in a general way by the 
‘intratemporality’ of the world, into an homogenous medium with a basic, identical unit.  
All of this comes across as different and original at first glance.  But deeper investigation 
shows that Heidegger’s interpretation only differs from traditional interpretations insofar 
as Heidegger’s notion of space seems, on the surface, to be more elastic, because the 
horizon of the world is constituted by Dasein.  But, since this constitution in turn 
constitutes Dasein, Heidegger’s notion of space is no less concrete than traditional 
notions.  It is simply the case that Heidegger’s notion returns to the root of the 
Augustinian tradition by making space finite again.  This does not change the fact, 
though, that the time experienced by the soul, on Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s 
theory, is homogenous, and ultimately, something external and objective. 
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 Both Heidegger’s Kantian interpretation and the traditional spatial interpretations 
miss the mark, I believe.  Aristotle’s text offers a theory of time that is actually 
qualitative, not quantitative/spatial.  And it is just as subjective as Aristotle seems to be 
saying that it is.  In the final part of this chapter, I will offer my qualitative interpretation 
of Aristotle’s theory.  I believe this interpretation will solve some of the apparent 
problems in Aristotle’s text in a more satisfactory way than both the traditional spatial 
interpretations and Heidegger’s interpretation do.  And I believe it will lay the 
groundwork for demonstrating the influence of Aristotle’s theory of time on Bergson’s 
theory of duration. 
PART IV: ARISTOTLE’S QUALITATIVE THEORY OF TIME 
 I believe that one of the major reasons different commentators have had trouble 
interpreting Aristotle’s theory of time is because of the perceived need to make 
Aristotle’s theory fit within the framework of ordinary spatial theories of time.  This is 
why Bostock and Waterloo were concerned about the apparent lack of ‘objectivity’ in 
Aristotle’s theory.  This is why Heidegger makes Aristotle’s theory into a 
Kantian/idealistic theory of time (although Heidegger would not be likely to admit that 
this is exactly what he was doing).  This is why both sets of thinkers turn Aristotle’s use 
of number as the number counted into some kind of homogenous number that counts.  
And this is why spatial thinkers (except Heidegger) seem concerned to divorce time from 
the perceiving rational soul. 
 The qualitative interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time that I will develop in 
this part will be able to solve the apparent inconsistencies in Aristotle’s theory.  It will be 
able to do this because it will show that these problems in Aristotle’s theory are only 
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problems if one tries to fit his theory into the framework of spatial/quantitative theories of 
time.  If one takes the theory as it is in the text, and understands it as a qualitative theory, 
the apparent inconsistencies disappear.  The so-called ‘lack of objectivity’, the 
dependence on the perceiving, rational soul, and the heterogeneous nature of time as the 
number counted are all phenomena that my qualitative interpretation accounts for without 
putting modern or contemporary notions back into Aristotle’s theory. 
 My qualitative interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of time has four components.  
First, it focuses on Aristotle’s claim that time is an attribute of motion.  An attribute is 
something that exists in a subject.  It does not exist independently of that subject.  This 
makes time a qualitative phenomenon.  The second component focuses on time as the 
number counted.  Time is the attribute of motion that makes it countable.  How it is 
countable becomes a concern only when we assume the counting of time must be 
identical.  But if this was the case, Aristotle would surely have said as much.  Instead, he 
said it was the number counted, which means each specific time is different than each 
other specific time.  Third, I will look at the way Aristotle defines the ‘now’.  Aristotle 
claims the ‘now’ is both the same with itself and different and different.  This is a 
qualitative description.  A quantitative phenomenon could only ever be the same, that is 
to say, homogenous.  Otherwise, one would not be able to coherently count it.  Time is 
the number counted, though, and that number is determined by the different kinds of 
‘nows’ the perceiving, rational soul encounters.  This makes time a heterogeneous 
phenomenon, which makes it a qualitative phenomenon.  Finally, my qualitative 
interpretation looks at the way Aristotle uses the perceiving, rational soul in his theory of 
time.  I believe Aristotle means it when he says soul is necessary for time to exist.  I 
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differ with Heidegger’s Kantian interpretation of this claim, though.  I do not believe the 
soul reduces all temporal experience to some sort of homogenous, horizon-based 
experience.  I believe the time the soul encounters when it encounters motion, and counts 
that motion, is a different experienced time each time that time is experienced.  Because 
each time is different, then, Aristotle’s theory of time must be a qualitative theory. 
 Aristotle says that something can belong to something else in a number of ways.  
Something can be a quantity, quality, a relative, and so forth.  Aristotle lists time as a 
quantity.139  This would seem to end the discussion regarding time as a quality, 
particularly since time is also defined as a number.  But time does not behave like a 
quantity in the strict sense.  To begin with, all quantities count something identical.  That 
is, all quantities, as quantities, are quantities of homogenous units.  This is how one 
quantity can be larger than another quantity, because it has more of whatever that unit is.  
But an homogenous unit, when it is used to designate a certain amount of something, is 
used as the number that counts.  Aristotle, on the contrary, says time is the number 
counted.  Therefore, time cannot be a quantity in the sense Aristotle generally uses the 
term quantity.  Because if it were, then what was counted would always be the same.  
And Aristotle says that different kinds of motion are not the same, nor are they reducible 
to each other.  This is why he says:  “Now neither alteration nor increase nor coming into 
being can be regular…”140  If time were a quantity, though, then those motions would 
have to be regular insofar as the time was concerned.  But they are not.  So time must be 
something else other than a quantity. 
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 Of course, the fact that time may not be a quantity in the strict sense does not 
mean that it must be a quality per se.  It could be a hybrid of a quantity and a relative.  
When speaking about relatives, Aristotle says:  “We call relatives all such things as are 
said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to 
something else.  For example, what is larger is called what it is than something else…”141 
Time is not fast or slow, although motions are fast or slow in relation to how much time 
they take.  So even if alteration cannot be reduced to the circle of locomotion, we can still 
tell that one alteration happened quicker than another.  This can only happen, though, if 
there is something about the times of two alterations to make them comparable.  And this 
something is the amount of time, which makes time a quantitative phenomenon.  If it 
were a quality, then each of two alterations would have a different time, even they were 
alterations of the same sort, such as melting ice.  All comparisons between fast and slow 
in relation to the motions would be impossible, since the time of each motion would be 
unique to that motion.  Time, this objection would conclude, while it may not be a 
quantity in the strict sense, is a relative quantity.   
 This would seem to be true for two instances of the same kind of motion.  And 
Aristotle does maintain that identical motions have the same time.  If time really were a 
relative quantity, though, then even different kinds of motion, like alteration and 
locomotion, should be comparable.  But alteration does not admit of regularity.  And that 
which does not admit of regularity cannot be an homogenous measure for anything.  This 
would mean that time must be a quality.  And this is particularly the case when one looks 
at the fact that time only seems to exist in actuality when a motion is perceived and 
counted by a soul which perceives the motion and has the rational capacity to count it. 
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 If something only exists when it has an effect on something else, then it must be 
an affective quality.  An affective quality is something that the perceiver of the object is 
affected by for himself or herself, but which the object itself is not affected by.142 Some 
affective qualities are called affective qualities in virtue of the affect they produce in the 
perceiver of the quality.  For example, bitter and sweet are affective qualities.  They 
affect the perceiver who tastes the sweet or bitter thing, causing the perception to happen 
in that perceiver.  They do not affect the object of which they are they affective quality.  
That is, a piece of candy is not affected by its being sweet.  Nor is it really sweet unless a 
perceiving being with a fully functioning sense of taste eats the candy and notes the 
sweetness. 
 Time is an affective quality of motion.  Motion exists whether there are perceivers 
of motions or not.  Time is an attribute of motion, the attribute that makes it countable.  
This attribute only exists, though, when some rational, perceptive soul, notices the motion 
or change, notes the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of that motion or change, and therefore counts 
the time.  And the time this rational soul counts is always the number counted, which 
means the time will always be different for different kinds of motion.  So even though 
Aristotle says:  “there is the same time everywhere at once,”143 he also says further:  “But 
not the same time before and after; for while the present change is one, the change which 
has happened and that which will happen are different.  Time is not number with which 
we count, but the number of things which are counted; and this according as it occurs 
before or after is always different, for the ‘nows’ are different.  And the number of a 
hundred horses and a hundred men is the same, but the things numbered are different – 
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the horses and the men.”144 If time were a quantity, then the ‘before’ and ‘after’ would 
not really matter.  In fact, if time were a quantity, then it would seem to exist whether 
something was there to count it or not, just as two objects are still two, even if no one 
counts them.  However, those two objects cannot be counted objects, unless someone 
does count them.  And time is like this, it can only exist when the motion is counted. 
 So Aristotle can say that time is everywhere and with all things, presuming that 
someone is present to count all those motions, because time, as a quality, is the same.  
That is, just as sweetness is sweetness and bitterness is bitterness, so, too, time is time.  
But a particular sweet thing is sweet in a particular way.  It would not make sense to say 
that it had a particular amount of sweetness.  When we say that a thing is sweeter than 
something else, what we mean is that we were affected more profoundly in terms of the 
sweetness, not that something had more ‘units’ of sweetness.  Time is like this.  It only 
exists when we are affected (or rather, when perceiving, rational souls are affected).  But 
the individual experiences of time, that is, the individual ‘nows’, ‘befores’ and ‘afters’ are 
always different.  And the kinds of motion are also always different.  This could not be 
the case if time were a quantity or a relative quantity.  Therefore, time must be an 
affective quality. 
 Further evidence for the qualitative nature of Aristotle’s theory is found in the 
nature of the ‘now’.  The ‘now’ is the same as itself, yet it is different and different.  
What Aristotle means by that is this.  All motions are continuous.  Since they are 
continuous, they are one and unified.  Each motion, as a motion, is indivisible as that 
motion.  This is how Aristotle avoids the paradoxes of the Eleatics.  Yet the ‘now’ is also 
different and different.  What this means is the following.  All motions have a beginning 
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and an end.  That is, all motions start in a particular place, or state, or as a particular kind 
of thing, and then go to a different place, change to a different state, or become another 
particular kind of thing.  In temporal terms, the former is called the ‘before’ and the latter 
the ‘after’.  And it is by counting the number of the motion from ‘before’ to ‘after’ that 
we get time, according to Aristotle.  The ‘now’ is what distinguishes the ‘before’ from 
the ‘after’, the earlier from the later, and so on.  This is why it is different, because the 
being of the ‘now’ when it was the ‘before’ is different in some way from the being of the 
‘now’ when it becomes the ‘after’.  This is what he means when he says:  “the ‘now’ is 
the same in substratum – though its being is different – and the ‘now’ determines time, in 
so far as time involves the before and after…but its being is different; for it is in so far as 
the before and after is that we get the ‘now’.”145 
 If this were not the case, Aristotle maintains, there would be no way to 
differentiate events from the distant past from events that are taking place today.  The 
‘now’ that constitutes time must be different, in order for it to be ‘before’ or ‘after’, even 
while it also constitutes one complete attribute of motion as the temporal substratum of 
that motion.  This makes the ‘now’, and the time it constitutes, a qualitative phenomenon.  
Only a quality can be different in its particular instances.  A quantity must ultimately be 
the same.  But if time were a quantity, then it would be countable in a different way than 
it is when viewed as a quality.  As I discussed in Chapter 1, quantitative theories of time 
can end up treating the order of temporal events as a convention.146  If time were a 
quantity, then what about time, other than a particular, changeable convention, would 
require it to be counted in any particular way?  It would be hard to differentiate the 
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‘before’ from the ‘after’, since both would be expressible in the same terms and reducible 
to the same number.  This would render time unintelligible.  As a quality, though, the 
‘now’ can be different in being, retain its unified substratum, and maintain temporal 
order.  This is because qualities, even qualities of the same type, are not individually 
reducible to each other.  One shade of red is not reducible to another.  Sweetness in one 
kind of food is not expressible in terms of other kinds of food.  One can only offer 
approximations that always fall short of actual experience.   The same is the case when 
trying to compare the times of two different motions.  One can say that the time it takes 
to move from one place to another is the same as the time it takes for a particular 
alteration to occur.  But the way the time is counted will be different.  And so the time 
will be different, too.  This makes time a qualitative phenomenon. 
 Finally, time is a qualitative phenomenon because of time’s dependence on 
perceiving, rational souls.  The fact that Aristotle makes time so dependent on the soul is 
a problem for traditional spatial interpreters, because it would seem to make Aristotle’s 
theory too subjective.  For non-traditional spatial interpretations, such as the one offered 
by Heidegger, the apparent subjectivity does not seem to be a problem, because 
Heidegger believed the time constituted by the soul was more objective than any 
traditional theory of time, anyway.  The time that ends up being posited on this 
interpretation, though, is itself spatial, after the manner of Kant’s theory of time.  I 
believe neither of these kinds of interpretation of the role of the soul in Aristotle’s theory 
is correct, however.  I believe the soul is more subjective than Heidegger suggests, and 
more constitutive than traditional spatial theories suggest.  This leads me to believe that 
Aristotle’s theory of time is a qualitative theory, because no coherent quantitative theory 
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could account for all the differences in constitutive temporal experience that Aristotle’s 
theory calls for.  
 If time were a quantity, then it would exist so long as the thing of which it is a 
quantity existed.  This is what spatial interpreters believed must be the case when 
Aristotle claimed that time was an attribute of motion.  So long as motion exists, then 
time exists, at least potentially.  David Bolotin suggests that this is not the case, however.  
He thinks that Aristotle made it seem as if time would exist without perceiving rational 
souls for those less astute observers.  But at its core, Aristotle’s theory is, in fact, a theory 
that relies on the perceiving rational soul for the existence of time.  Bolotin says:  “And 
so it seems to me that in his serious view, even what he presents here as the substrate of 
time is dependent on a perceiving and counting soul.  And his explicit assertion of the 
dependence of time upon soul states the core of his position, although he pretends, for he 
less demanding of his readers, that he believes that time has an unchanging substrate 
whose permanence does not depend on a counting soul.”147 Time does depend on soul for 
its existence.  This is why he Aristotle claims: “for when the state of our minds does not 
change at all, or we have not noticed its changing, we do not think that time has elapsed, 
any more than those who are fabled to sleep among the heroes in Sardinia do when they 
are awakened; for they connect the earlier ‘now’ with the later and make them one.”148  
So since time only exists when a perceiving, rational soul notices change or motion, and 
is affected by it in such a way as to count the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of that motion, and 
since the number used is the number counted, which makes the counting of the motion 
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different for each experience of each motion, then time must exist only in the perceiving, 
rational soul as that quality which causes it to count the motion or change. 
 So Aristotle’s theory of time is better understood as a qualitative theory of time.  
This interpretation follows the text of Physics, Book IV more closely than do spatial 
interpretations, whether they are traditional or Heideggerian.  It does not force modern or 
contemporary notions of Kantian subjectivity onto Aristotle’s theory, which John Proteri 
describes as “neglect of the context, as well as a certain freedom of interpretation.”149 It 
does not feel the need to fit Aristotle’s theory into preconceived notions of the necessity 
of the independence of time from perceiving, rational souls, as traditional spatial 
interpretations do.  Nor does it fix time into some strange horizon constructed by 
concepts Aristotle did not have access to, such as Dasein and its temporality, as 
Heidegger does when he feels that he “must intervene in several of Aristotle’s economies 
of meaning in order to read the Aristotelian treatise on time as a clue to Dasein’s 
temporality.”150  Nor does my qualitative interpretation try to make time into an 
homogenous medium where time is the number that counts (or the counting/counted, as 
Heidegger put it), rather than the number counted, since “an extended present, of a given 
length and location, will not be homogenous in the way that a punctual present must be.  
But that need no more matter than the fact that the past and the future are not 
homogenous in that way.”151 
 Instead, my qualitative interpretation accounts for the way Aristotle uses the 
notion of the rational, perceiving soul in a way consistent with the text.  Aristotle says 
time only exists when a soul capable of counting notices a change from before to after 
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and is affected in such a way as to count that change.  Furthermore, the specific times are 
different, since the different kinds of motions are different.  But if time were a quantity, 
then all motions or changes would be reducible to one number that counts.  Aristotle, 
however, insists that time is the number counted, that alteration and other kinds of 
motions are irregular, and that these things do not exist independent of the soul.  So time 
cannot be a quantity, then, which means it must be a quality. 
 This is what allows Heidegger to connect Arsistotle to Bergson, even if Heidegger 
himself did not interpret Aristotle this way.  Aristotle’s theory of time is a qualitative 
theory where time is intimately connected to the soul and each temporal experience is 
qualitatively different.  Bergson’s theory of duration is also a theory of time were time 
(true time, that is) is intimately connected to the soul and each temporal experience is 
qualitatively different.  In fact, as I shall discuss in Chapter 3, Bergson identifies his 
theory as a purely qualitative theory, in contrast to the quantitative, or what he calls 
spatial, theories of time that abound in the tradition.  But the tradition of spatial theories 
of time, as I have already shown, is Augustinian in nature.  Furthermore, Bergson was 
well aware that Aristotle’s theories do not depend upon the notion of space prevalent in 
the tradition.  In fact, Bergson wrote his Latin dissertation, Quid Aristoteles De Loco 
Senserit (Aristotle’s Concept of Place) on Aristotle’s notion of place, and demonstrated 
that this notion had nothing in common with modern notions of space.  
 So Heidegger was correct to connect Bergson to Aristotle, even though that 
connection is not quite the connection he seems to have believed to have been the case.  
In the next chapter, I will examine Bergson’s theory of duration.  This theory is also a 
qualitative theory.  I will show that Aristotle’s theory of time influenced Bergson’s theory 
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of duration in a positive way.  This will set the stage for me to show that Heidegger’s 
theory of original or primordial temporality is, in part, a reaction to Bergson’s theory of 
duration that falls back into the actual tradition of metaphysics he claimed to be 
attempting to escape. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BERGSON’S ARISTOTELIAN THEORY OF DURATION 
 
 Heidegger claims that there is something that connects Bergson and Aristotle.  I 
believe he is correct, insofar as the connection goes between those two.  I believe he is 
incorrect in claiming that there is a theme that includes all other major theories of time 
that fall between them historically.  I have already demonstrated that Augustine’s theory 
of time was far more influential than Aristotle’s on several of the major theories of time.  
In fact, Aristotle’s theory is contrary to the theories of time found in classical mechanics 
and Kant.  But Aristotle’s theory of time shares a number of characteristics with 
Bergson’s theory of duration.  This leads me to believe that Bergson found inspiration for 
his theory in Aristotle, and that Aristotle’s theory of time informs many key elements of 
Bergson’s theory of duration.  This would mean that Heidegger was also incorrect when 
he claimed that Bergson misunderstood Aristotle’s theory of time, since it does not seem 
to be the case that Bergson had Aristotle’s theory in mind when he critiqued spatial 
theories of time, nor is it the case that Bergson understood Aristotle’s notion of place to 
be something equivalent to the modern notion of space.152 
 Bergson wrote his Latin dissertation, Quid Aristoteles De Loco Senserit 
(Aristotle’s Concept of Place) on Aristotle’s concept of place.  His interpretation of 
Aristotle is both interesting in its own right and useful as an aid to understanding 
Bergson’s theory of duration.  Duration is a purely qualitative theory of temporality.  It 
does not rely on mathematical notions of space that frame temporal movement and 
                                                 
152 In Being and Time, Heidegger claims that Bergson misinterpreted Aristotle’s theory of time as a spatial 
theory of time, and that Bergson actually read the modern notion of space back into Aristotle’s theory.  
This comes in the long footnote on Hegel at the end of Being and Time.  Its significance for Heidegger’s 
pairing of Aristotle and Bergson, his misreading of the history of the concept of time, and the resulting way 
he tries to react to Bergson’s theory of duration with his own theory of primordial/original temporality will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  See Heidegger, Being and Time, note xxx. 
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experience.  It is not reducible to mathematical formulas in the way that traditional, 
quantitative (which Bergson calls ‘spatial’) theories time are.  It does not presuppose that 
all temporal moments are already given.  And it allows for the existence of different 
temporal experiences as constitutive of actually different times.  Much of this finds 
companion notions in Aristotle’s theory of time.  It would seem, then, that since Bergson 
was aware of Aristotle, and in particular, since he was aware that Aristotle’s cosmology 
was contrary to the prevailing (spatially centered) cosmology that informed the modern 
age, that Bergson drew inspiration for his theory of duration from Aristotle’s theory of 
time. 
 To demonstrate this, I will divide this chapter into four parts.  In Part I, I will 
discuss Bergson’s Latin dissertation, Aristotle’s Concept of Place.  This will show that 
Bergson knew Aristotle, and that he understood Aristotle to be a qualitatively-minded 
thinker.  In Part II, I will describe Bergson’s theory of duration.  Duration is a purely 
qualitative theory of temporality that relies on the internal understanding and experience 
of motion itself.  This counters (and critiques) the notions of time prevalent during much 
of Bergson’s career:  classical mechanics’ theory of time and Kant’s theory of time.  In 
Part III, I will look at the two prevailing schools of interpretation of Bergson’s notion of 
duration:  the phenomenological and the Deleuzian.  The former holds that Bergson was a 
proto-phenomenologist, and it relies most heavily on Bergson’s text Matter and Memory.  
The latter holds that Bergson was some kind of post-modern Platonist, and seems to draw 
most heavily from Bergson’s texts Creative Evolution and Duration and Simultaneity.  I 
believe neither of these interpretations captures the full spirit of Bergson’s theory, 
though, which is why in Part IV, I show that Bergson’s theory of duration takes its cues 
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from Aristotle’s theory of time, and so therefore, Bergson’s theory of duration is an 
Aristotelian theory at its heart. 
PART I: BERGSON’S LATIN DISSERTATION 
 
 During the late 1880’s, Bergson wrote both his principle dissertation, les Donnees 
immediates de la conscience (Time and Free Will)153, and his Latin dissertation, Quid 
Aristoteles de Loco Senserit (Aristotle’s Concept of Place).154  In Time and Free Will, 
Bergson clearly articulates the problems of the modern notion of space, particularly in 
regard to temporal experience.  These concepts, while in some ways specific to modern 
times, trace their philosophical roots back to the paradoxes of the Eleatics and the notions 
of empty space (also called the ‘void’) held by the Atomists.  Consideration of these 
paradoxes, and the general inadequacy of attempting to describe temporal experience 
through spatial metaphors (and the languages that depend upon those spatial metaphors) 
leads Bergson to develop a theory of temporality that will not be subject to the sorts of 
paradoxes that plague theories of time that are dependent upon spatial notions.  This new 
theory of temporality is Bergson’s theory of duration.  The theory of duration will go on 
to form the foundation for all of Bergson’s other theories throughout the rest of his 
published works. 
 In his Latin dissertation, though, Bergson does not consider time in any obvious 
way.  Instead, he discusses, as his title suggests, Aristotle’s notion of place.  This 
discussion will prove important for understanding Bergson’s theory of duration.  Yet very 
                                                 
153 For some reason, the title of this work in English is Time and Free Will, which is not even necessarily 
the best representation of the actual content of the work, rather than a literal translation of the French, The 
Immediate Knowledge of Consciousness, which would have been slightly more suitable.  Since the work is 
known in English as Time and Free Will, though, that is how I will generally refer to it. 
154 I will generally refer to this work using the English title. 
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little has been said about the connection between Bergson and Aristotle.  Heidegger, of 
course, mentions the connection in several places and in two ways.  First, he connects 
Bergson to Aristotle through the genealogy of the history of the concept of time.  Second, 
there is his claim that Bergson misunderstood Aristotle, even though, “Bergson’s view of 
time too has obviously arisen from an Interpretation of the Aristotelian essay on time.”155  
Most other thinkers who have commented on Bergson in any serious way either do not 
draw the Aristotelian connection out, interpret Bergson in such a way as to suggest he is 
not an Aristotelian, or flat-out deny that he could be an Aristotelian.156  Only Capek 
seems to offer an interpretation of Bergson friendly to the possibility of Bergson’s being 
an Aristotelian or having Aristotelian-inspired theories. 
 I believe the fact that Bergson reads Aristotle as attempting to understand motion 
without using a concept of space is significant.  It shows that Bergson understood 
Aristotle’s theory to be different than the prevailing view of the modern age, that motion 
takes place within space.  How Aristotle understood motion reveals something about the 
way Bergson understood temporality, since Bergson, too, will have a theory where 
motion does not take place within space.  This means that, for Bergson, temporal 
experience will be non-spatial.  Bergson understood Aristotle’s cosmology to support 
something like this.  And this, in turn, connects Bergson to Aristotle, although not quite 
in the manner Heidegger suggests. 
 According to Bergson’s interpretation of Aristotle, place neither exists before 
things nor apart from things (that occupy places).157  This means that place is not 
                                                 
155 Heidegger, Being and Time, note xxx. 
156 Phenomenologists fail to draw the connection out.  Deleuze, by claiming Bergson is a Platonist, implies 
that he is not, nor can he be, an Aristotelian. 
157 Bergson, “Aristotle’s Concept of Place,”, 23-24. 
 103
something into which bodies flow.  Nor can place be conceived as being apart from the 
particular body that occupies it.  If this is the case, though, then Bergson notes the 
following problems arise.  First, can things occupy one place at one time and another 
place at another time?  And if so, how can they do this?  Second, does place move with 
bodies?  And if it did, would that mean that there could be more than one place in a 
place?  And third, if a body moves from one place to another, but its own place moves 
with it in some fashion, what is left where the moved place used to be? 
 Bergson begins his treatment by looking at the last question first.  He claims that 
the most likely answer to the question “what remains where a moved place used to be?” 
would be the concept of the void.  According to Bergson, though, Aristotle did not have a 
concept of the void.  In fact, he maintains that Aristotle believes the void can neither be 
nor be conceived.  So it cannot be the case that something remains where a moved place 
used to be.  And since something cannot remain where a moved place used to be, it 
would seem that place cannot move.  This would also mean that place could not be either 
a body or a quality of bodies.  This would not work either, though, because bodies move, 
which would mean that places move, which would require the concept of a void, or lead 
to the problem of places within places.  Yet Bergson maintains that Aristotle wants to 
stick to the notion that place cannot be conceived of as something that exists apart from 
bodies.  According to Bergson, this would leave Aristotle with only one viable answer:  
place must be the interior surface of the surrounding thing.158 
 If the interior surface of the surrounding thing is not itself a body, though, then 
place would appear to be something like form.  This does not appear to be Aristotle’s 
exact meaning, though, according to Bergson.  Aristotle makes four arguments as to why 
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place can be neither matter, nor a quality of matter, nor form.  First, neither matter nor 
form can be separated from the body in question.  Second, bodies move within place or to 
a place.  They do not move within themselves or to themselves.  All bodies tend toward 
their proper places.  If place were a form, this would not be possible.  Third, if place were 
within a body, and that body moved, then the place would also move.  This would lead 
back to the absurdity of having a place within a place, or a place leaving a place.  Finally, 
when things change elements, or when something undergoes alteration, the place does not 
change, only the contents of the place are said to change.  If place were within the thing, 
though, and the thing underwent alteration, the place would then be changed, too.  In 
particular, the place of one element would be destroyed, on this view, if it were taken 
over by another element.  But it is absurd to say that a place could be destroyed.  
Therefore, as Bergson sums Aristotle’s argument up: 
Place is neither matter or form, since matter and form show themselves to 
be companions and sharers in the fortunes of a body, if I may so express it, 
whereas place is an impassive witness of those fortunes.  If we penetrate 
deeper into Aristotle’s innermost thoughts, we find that a definite and very 
subtle principle underlies all his arguments, namely, that there is such a 
reciprocal connection and continuation of matter and form that you cannot 
say where form begins and where matter ends.  Place, however, is 
something fixed and definite and it cannot be reduced to form without 
being immediately joined to matter and therefore to body itself.159 
 
 So therefore, place can not be either matter or form.  And it cannot be the empty 
interval, or void, either.  The void is the closest thing to the modern notion of empty, 
abstract space that Aristotle had at his disposal.  Aristotle’s arguments against this notion 
appeal to Bergson, who himself argues against using notions of empty space to frame 
temporal (and hence, lived) experience.  The void is something that lacks any and all 
bodies.  But that which lacks any and all bodies is said to be nothing.  And nothingness, 
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according to Aristotle, can neither be nor be conceived.  Nor is it the case that one needs 
empty space in order for something to move or change.  Things undergoing alteration do 
not require a void in order to have something in which to alter.  They alter in the place 
they already happen to occupy.  Nor is empty space necessary for movements such as 
locomotion.  For example, fish swim through water, not the void or empty space.160  And 
finally, even if there were empty space, nothing could move within it, anyway.  
According to Aristotle, things tend toward their natural place due to an inner desire, or 
nature.  They do not move toward their natural places due to external compulsion 
(although they probably move away from their natural places due to external 
compulsion).  Bergson describes Aristotle’s view this way:  “They strive towards their 
proper place as to fulfillment of their form, as if different regions of the world were 
distinguished by different functions and also by different qualities.”161  
 Since this is the case, to attempt to use the void in discussing motion would pose 
the following problem.  In order for the void to be the void, it must be without any 
qualities whatsoever.  If this is the case, then there are no qualities that would compel 
anything to move into it [the void] in the first place.  Nor would there be anything in the 
void that could compel anything to move out of the void (besides the fact that, strictly 
speaking, if the void contained a body, it would no longer be the void).  So bodies would 
move everywhere at once and nowhere at all, which is inherently contradictory.  This 
means bodies would have neither natural motion nor natural rest in empty space.  But all 
bodies have natural motion and natural rest.  Therefore, empty space cannot exist, which 
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certainly makes it unnecessary for motion.162 Bergson says:  “Whichever explanation (of 
the void) you choose, you come back to the same thing:  an impulsive force cannot be 
maintained in the void.”163 
 So the void, or empty space, does not work to explain motion.  What of 
Aristotle’s definition of place as the interior surface of the surrounding body?  If place 
cannot move, and it cannot be contained within another place, then how is the interior 
surface of the surrounding thing different than the void?  And how it is related to the 
things that occupy places?  Is it continuous with the body whose place it marks, or is it 
contiguous?  Something is contiguous with something else if the extremities of the two 
things are conceivable as separate.  Something is continuous with something else if the 
extremities of the two things are the same.  However, according to Bergson’s 
interpretation of Aristotle, continuous things end up being identical.  This would make 
place identical with the things in a particular place, which would make place a body.  But 
Bergson has already shown that Aristotle believes place cannot be a body.  Therefore, 
place must be contiguous with that which is in place.164 
 Place cannot move, nor can one place change with or become another place.  
Things, however, move from place to place.  Bergson says this ends up making place, on 
Aristotle’s definition:  “the reality which contains within itself the movement of other 
things but is itself unmoved.”165  Things which move and contain other things, such as a 
ship carrying men, are only places potentially.  That which contains both the moving 
thing, and the things within the moving thing, is place in actuality.  Therefore, only the 
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immobile can be a place.166  This fits the larger picture of Aristotelian cosmology, since 
Aristotle believed that all things tend toward their proper or natural place.  There are only 
a finite number of places in this cosmology, though.  Nor is it possible, according to 
Aristotle, to imagine an infinite number of places, just as it is not possible to imagine an 
infinite number of things.  All of these finite things are contained within the heavens, 
which act as place, but are themselves not in place.  And each thing seeking its own 
proper place, and therefore moving within the confine of the heavens, leads Bergson to 
offer this view of the Aristotelian universe:  “Therefore from a consideration of natural 
movement it follows that the world is a kind of living thing, and that the simple elements, 
like the parts of a living thing, exercise their proper functions in certain proper places 
which they desire when lost and cling to when found again.”167 This will lead to a 
difficulty, though, since if everything moves towards its proper place, would it not be the 
case that the heavens themselves are either a moving place or a place that contains 
places? 
 Bergson points out that Aristotle seems to “paint himself into a corner” with the 
notion of the heavens as the common place.  Place is supposed to be immobile, but 
Aristotle generally holds that the heavens are in eternal motion.  Furthermore, Bergson 
notes that Aristotle calls the heavens a place, yet says they lack place.168  He sums up 
these difficulties in the following manner: 
We have said that a mobile body is contained within the immobile limit of 
the containing thing as in its primary place, that a simple element is 
contained within the immobile element by which it is surrounded as in its 
proper place, and finally that all things are contained within the unmoved 
surface of the heaven as in their common place.  But note that the heaven 
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moves, that the elements move, and that the surface of each containing 
thing moves.  Therefore, we have not entirely grasped Aristotle’s 
meaning, since to examine these matters more easily we have commanded 
many things that were necessarily in motion to stand still.  Now, if we are 
to restore interrupted movement to the Aristotelian world, it will be worth 
the effort to inquire as to what will become of place.169 
 
Modern physicists and philosophers have tried to substitute the concept of empty or 
absolute space for place.  This view is not self-contradictory to them, as it was for 
Aristotle.  For Aristotle, nothing could be conceived of as devoid of quality.  He was 
aware of the prototype theories of empty space, since he was aware of the atomists, but 
his notion of place, according to Bergson, leads to “a metaphysical principle from which 
Aristotle proceeds to arrive at a denial of space as we describe it.”170 According to 
Bergson’s interpretation, for Aristotle, this attempt seems to fall short, since it ends up in 
the contradictory principle of having the heavens move yet be the common place.   
Bergson’s critique of Aristotle reveals something about Bergson himself, though, and this 
is why his Latin dissertation is important for understanding his theory of duration. 
 Bergson’s Latin dissertation reveals two important things about his understanding 
of Aristotle.  First, it shows that Bergson read Aristotle’s universe as a living universe, 
one where everything moved by some inner force.  This interpretation of the universe as 
vibrant, rather than ultimately inert, provides Bergson with a heritage, so to speak, for his 
theory of duration.  Duration will turn out to be a theory of temporal experience that 
relies, in part, on the notion that moving things are more “alive” than modern thinkers 
usually believe.  Aristotle provides some background for this, and Bergson’s Latin 
dissertation, which interprets Aristotle’s universe in this manner, shows that Bergson was 
intimately aware of this background.  Furthermore, Bergson finds in Aristotle’s living 
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universe a critique of the notion of empty, absolute space.  This provides more 
foundational material for his own theory of duration, which will also critique the notion 
of empty, absolute space – particularly as it applies to temporal experience. 
 The other important thing revealed in Bergson’s Latin dissertation concerns 
Heidegger’s belief that Bergson misinterpreted Aristotle.  Clearly, Bergson does not 
believe Aristotle’s concept of place is equivalent to the modern notion of space.  In fact, 
Bergson sees it as a critique of the modern notion of space.  It may not do all the things 
that Bergson’s critique ultimately will.  But it is a critique nevertheless.  So if Bergson 
did misinterpret Aristotle, it was not by reading Aristotle as a spatial thinker, as 
Heidegger maintains.  This fact will come into place in Chapter IV, where it will be 
useful in demonstrating that Heidegger’s theory of original temporality is actually a 
partial reaction to Bergson’s theory of duration.  Instead of getting Aristotle wrong, 
Bergson uses his theory as a basis for his own primary theory of duration. 
PART II: BERGSON’S THEORY OF DURATION 
 Bergson’s theory of duration stands apart from other modern theories of time.  In 
fact, it stands apart from most theories in the tradition.  This is because Bergson’s theory 
of duration is a purely qualitative theory of time, whereas most theories in the tradition 
are quantitative.  Bergson’s theory centers around our conscious experience of motion as 
such.  It does not view time as a kind of container for motion.  The belief that time, or 
that which contains time (space) is a container for motion enters into the tradition 
primarily through Augustine, and it runs through the theories found in both classical 
mechanics and Kant.  Bergson’s theory challenges this prevailing notion, though.  And it 
challenges it precisely because these theories do not explain temporal experience as we 
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actually experience it.  This helps to solve certain paradoxes that traditional, or what 
Bergson calls spatial, theories of time inevitably have trouble solving. 
 Bergson’s theory of duration shares a number of conceptual traits with Aristotle’s 
theory of time.  I believe that Aristotle’s theory of time lies at the heart of Bergson’s 
theory, although certainly there are some differences.  For example, Bergson was not a 
teleological thinker, whereas Aristotle is, to a certain extent.  In fact, Bergson offers 
several sustained critiques of any attempt to think in a teleological manner in relation to 
time, particularly in Creative Evolution and Creative Mind.  Also, Bergson never 
attempts to enter number directly into this theory of duration, although he does bring in 
the notion of an ordered series.  For the most part, though, the similarities outweigh the 
differences.  Both thinkers make time dependent on perceiving, rational souls.  Both 
thinkers believe different particular times are different.  Both believe that time is held 
together by a unified, continuous medium, such as the ‘now’ in Aristotle or ‘attention’ in 
Bergson.  And both believe all times cannot be reduced to a single time. 
 I will discuss these similarities in more detail in Part IV.  First, I will lay out the 
basic components of Bergson’s theory of duration.  There are five central components to 
this theory.  First, Bergson’s theory offers a critique of the traditional theories of time, 
which he labels ‘spatial’ theories of time.  Second, duration is composed of 
heterogeneous qualities, rather than an homogenous medium.  Third, duration is 
identified with motion in a much stricter sense than even Aristotle identified it.  This 
makes duration a temporal theory that emphasizes becoming over being.  Fourth, duration 
is a theory of temporality that ties temporality directly to the experience of motion within 
consciousness.  And fifth, it rethinks the modes of time, past present and future, by 
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compressing them into an expanding present (which cannot be conflated with an eternal 
presence, such as space in modern theories or God for Augustine).  All of these 
components combine to form a theory of temporality that begins and ends with concrete, 
lived experience. 
 Bergson’s first major published work, Time and Free Will171, provides his first 
detailed account of his theory of duration.  At the time of its publication (1889), spatial 
theories of time were at their zenith.  Classical mechanics ruled the day in the sciences, 
and the sort of homogeneity found in Kant ruled the day in philosophy.  Both of these 
schools of thought held that time was a phenomenon similar to space.  It was thought to 
be homogenous.  It was thought of as being “laid out” like space, with the only real 
difference between space and time being the order of the discrete units (these units were 
generally though of as juxtaposed in space and successive in time).  As I discussed in 
Chapter 1, though, once time is thought of in this manner, even the asymmetry and 
successive nature of time can be seen to disappear.  This was certainly the case with 
Laplace.  But the roots for this are in Augustine, whose theory of time is framed by the 
presence of an eternal being that creates every moment of time.  Once the future and past 
are known with pure, mathematical precision, then they are ‘present’ in the same way that 
space is generally thought to be present.  This is why Bergson says: 
Now, let us notice that when we speak of time, we generally think of a 
homogeneous medium in which our conscious states are ranged alongside 
one another as in space, so as to form a discrete multiplicity…For if time, 
as the reflective consciousness represents it, is a medium in which our 
conscious states form a discrete series so as to admit of being counted, and 
if on the other hand our conception of number ends in spreading out in 
space everything which can be directly counted, it is to be presumed that 
                                                 
171 As I indicated above, I will refer to this work, Les Donnes Immediates de la Conscience, with the title 
given to it by its English translators, Time and Free Will  – even though that title is in no way an accurate 
reflection of the French title. 
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time, understood in the sense of a medium in which we make distinctions 
and count, is nothing but space.172 
 
 By thinking of time as simply another form of space, or at least, as something 
very similar to space, Bergson believed that spatial thinkers lost the essential nature of 
time altogether.  By conceiving of time as something that simply contains motion, time 
can be conceived of as something that can be devoid of content.  This is the view that 
classical mechanics and Kant hold.173  Things happen in time, and time is the same for all 
things, regardless of what those things are, or whether or not any or all things are 
happening at all.  According to Bergson, this homogenous view of time fails to 
adequately distinguish time from space.  When even the successiveness and asymmetry 
of time disappear, as they do in the more advanced version of classical mechanics, for 
example, time simply becomes space.  Yet this is the view that is held by most people, 
both those who are scientists or philosophers, and by the common person as well:  
“Nevertheless it is generally agreed to regard time as an unbounded medium, different 
from space but homogeneous like the latter: the homogeneous is thus supposed to take 
two forms, according as its contents co-exist or follow one another.  It is true that, when 
we make time a homogeneous medium in which conscious states unfold themselves, we 
take it to be given all at once, which amounts to saying that we abstract it from duration.  
This simple consideration ought to warn us that we are thus unwittingly falling back upon 
space, and really giving up time.”174 This conception of time may seem to resemble how 
time works.  In actuality, though, it represents temporal experience in a way that nullifies 
that same experience.  This is because spatial theories of time substitute our reflection on 
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temporal experience for the actual temporal experience itself.  That is, by understanding 
time as an homogenous medium, the content of temporal experience has all of its 
temporal characteristics removed.  Only in this way can one possibly think of time as 
something that can be devoid of content.  This results in a static conception of time that 
cannot come to grips with either they way motion works or the way consciousness 
experiences it.  This in turn leads to the paradoxes of the Eleatics, as well as all the other 
paradoxes, inconsistencies, and even outright contradictions that plague most theories of 
time in the tradition:  “And these difficulties will multiply the greater the efforts it makes 
to overcome them, for all its efforts will only bring into clearer light the absurdity of the 
fundamental hypothesis by which it spreads out time in space and puts succession at the 
very centre of simultaneity.  We shall see that the contradictions implied in the problems 
of causality, freedom, personality, spring from no other source, and that, if we wish to get 
rid of them, we have only to go back to the real and concrete self and give up its 
symbolical substitute.”175 
 According to Bergson, temporal experience cannot be devoid of content.  
Temporal experience always involves some kind of motion or change, whether on the 
part of the moving or changing thing, consciousness, or both.  In fact, it would seem to 
always be both, since consciousness is a necessary ingredient for temporal experience to 
occur.  Since consciousness could have itself as its own object of motion, it would then 
be the movement of consciousness that constitutes temporal experience, on Bergson’s 
view.  The things or objects consciousness experiences when it has temporal experiences 
are qualities, not spatial extensions.  And it is by and through these qualities transforming 
themselves that consciousness is able to experience motion.  This is contrary to the 
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notions held by both Kant and classical mechanics, which held that time was a container 
imposed externally onto motion.  Bergson, however, holds that there is no difference 
between temporal experience and the objects of temporal experience.  This means that 
there can be no such thing as “empty, homogenous time,” according to Bergson.  Capek 
notes this tendency in Bergson’s thought:  “The negation of the homogeneity of time 
implied for Bergson the elimination of the Newtonian time as an empty and inert 
receptacle, additionally filled up by concrete changes and events.  In other words, there is 
no distinction between the duration itself and its content.  Psychological events are not in 
time, since they are in the ceaseless emergence constitute true time itself.  This was one 
of the most far-reaching and boldest of Bergson’s claims.”176 Even though Bergson 
would eventually apply duration to non-conscious phenomena, after a fashion, he never 
altered his belief that temporal experience could not be reduced to spatial understandings, 
such as those generally found in the tradition, without destroying the experience as such.  
This is why he draws the distinction between what he calls “true time,” duration, and 
spatial time.  By returning to our direct experience of duration, rather than substituting a 
reflective understanding for that experience, we regain direct access to temporal 
experience as it concretely occurs. 
 So we encounter duration when we turn our consciousness away from the 
reflective analysis of temporal experience and concentrate instead on lived experience as 
it is concretely lived.  Bergson describes the experience this way:  “Pure duration is the 
form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, 
when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states.”177  This pure 
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duration is the transition of qualities in conscious experience, which constitutes the 
second major component of his theory of duration.  That is, it is consciousness 
experiencing qualities transforming themselves into each other.  Qualities, as such, are 
always only themselves.  They are pure states of consciousness.  They cannot be reduced 
to some neutral homogenous medium.  Nor can they be interpreted in terms of ‘psychic’ 
force, or something like that.  In fact, the very attempt to reduce qualitative states to some 
kind of measured ‘psychic’ intensity is just the sort of mistake that gives rise to spatial 
theories of time in the first place:  “For, if the confusion of quality with quantity were 
confined to each of the phenomena of consciousness taken separately, it would give rise 
to obscurities, as we have just seen, rather than to problems.  But by invading the series 
of our psychic states, by introducing space into our perception of duration, it corrupts at 
its very source our feeling of outer and inner change, of movement, and of freedom.”178 
In duration itself, we return to the pure experience of qualities as qualities in and for 
consciousness.  All qualities are unique, and their experience in and by consciousness is 
unique as well.  Therefore, to attempt to reduce these qualities to homogenous units of 
‘psychic’ force, and then to array these units along side each other in a spatial manner, is 
to miss the point of consciousness and its experience of qualitative transformation. 
 Duration is the experience of qualities changing in and for consciousness.  Each 
quality is something unique.  It can only be expressed as it is in itself for consciousness.  
Yet movement is the transformation of qualities.  This means that, in order for qualities to 
change, they must interpenetrate each other in some way.  This means that each earlier 
quality is retained in each later quality, without either losing itself or being reduced to 
something else:  “In a word, pure duration might well be nothing but a succession of 
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qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, 
without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another, without any 
affiliation with number:  it would be pure heterogeneity.”179 This pure heterogeneity 
forms what Bergson calls an organic or qualitative multiplicity.  This sort of multiplicity 
differs from discrete or quantitative multiplicities because it is not divisible.  Discrete or 
quantitative multiplicities are infinitely divisible.  Qualitative multiplicities are unified 
wholes composed of interpenetrating qualities that, once they are absorbed into the 
multiplicity, cannot be reduced from it in lived experience.  Discrete or quantitative 
multiplicities are those where the items in the multiplicity are represented by numbers, or 
something like numbers, in reflection – but not in lived experience. 
 Bergson understands that representing temporal experience as a series of 
interpenetrating qualities that form a qualitative, indivisible multiplicity is something 
foreign to the tradition, and therefore, something foreign to what people believe to be 
their actual experience of temporality.  The reason for this, he says, is the way language 
constructs temporal experience through the use of spatial metaphors.  Bergson says:  “We 
instinctively tend to solidify our impressions in order to express them in language.  Hence 
we confuse the feeling itself, which is in a perpetual state of becoming, with its 
permanent external object, and especially with the word which expresses this object.”180  
This linguistic need explains the popularity, both philosophically and in the ‘common’ 
understanding, of spatial theories of time.  Reflective consciousness seeks to make sense 
of its experience of changing qualities through references to already understood 
phenomena.  Pure duration, however, is imprecise at best.  This is because each quality is 
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only always itself; and each qualitative multiplicity is likewise always only itself – 
regardless of what qualities are contained within it.  Qualities cannot be repeated, 
reduced, or otherwise explained in terms of anything other than each consciousness’ 
unique experience of it as it concretely and currently experiences it.  What language 
attempts to do, though, is to make what are essentially different things the same, in order 
to make those different things intelligible.  When this is done, though, the essence of the 
original tends to be lost: 
But in reality there are neither identical sensations nor multiple tastes: for 
sensations and tastes seem to me to be objects as soon as I isolate and 
name them, and in the human soul there are only processes.  What I ought 
to say is that every sensation is altered by repetition, and that if it does not 
seem to me to change from day to day, it is because I perceive it through 
the object which is its cause, through the word which translates it.  This 
influence of language on sensation is deeper than is usually thought.  Not 
only does language make us believe in the unchangeableness of our 
sensations, but it will sometimes deceive us as to the nature of the 
sensation felt.181 
 
Instead, Bergson maintains, it would be better to understand our experience in terms of a 
musical symphony.  The notes of the melody are each distinct.  One note cannot be 
reduced to another note.  Yet all the notes of the melody, of the whole symphony, 
interpenetrate each other to form an organic whole.  In this way, each successive note 
contains both itself as itself, and every other note, also as it was in and of itself.  This is 
why a piece of music is a single piece of music from beginning to end.  And this is also 
why we can experience music as music.  If we consider music in terms of the notes 
themselves as reducible quantities of sound, then what we have is a reflective analysis of 
music, not music itself.  A.C. Lacey puts it this way:  “A melody must consist of a 
plurality of notes, but Bergson is surely right in saying that equally the notes must be 
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united into a single whole…the experience of hearing a melody will not be what it is – 
the experience of hearing that melody – unless it is taken all together.”182  This is how 
actual temporal experience works.  The qualities consciousness notes interpenetrate each 
other to form an organic multiplicity, like the notes of symphony interpenetrate each 
other. 
 The third component of Bergson’s theory of duration is the identification of 
temporal experience with motion itself.  Bergson ties temporality to motion more closely 
than any other thinker in the tradition.  For Bergson, temporality is the direct experience 
of motion by consciousness.  It is motion as it is directly experienced, not as it is 
understood after-the-fact by reflection.  Spatial theories of time, according Bergson, tend 
to try to remove motion from time proper.  They seek to define that which is fluid and 
mobile, which is time, by something fixed and immobile, which is space.  This leads to 
the mistake of assuming the motion in question is identical to the space it has just moved 
over.  According to Bergson, though, reality itself is something constantly in motion:  
“This reality is mobility.  There do not exist things made, but only things in the making, 
not states that remain fixed, but only states in process of change.  Rest is never anything 
but apparent, or rather, relative.  The consciousness we have of our own person in its 
continual flowing, introduces us to the interior of a reality on whose model we must 
imagine the others.  All reality is, therefore, tendency, if we agree to call tendency a 
nascent change of direction.”183 In other words, to understand motion in anything but 
mobile terms reduces true temporality to a spatial reflection of that temporality.  This, in 
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turn, led to the paradoxes of the Eleatics, and all the other sorts of paradoxes that tend to 
crop up in standard, spatial interpretations of time. 
 This confusion of motion with the space moved over stems from the same root as 
the confusion of experience with our understanding of and reflection on experience.  
When consciousness tends to experience directly, as Bergson maintains it does when it 
experiences duration itself, it notes that movements do not occur in space.  Space is 
nothing more than a juxtaposition of infinitely divisible points.  Any object in space can 
only occupy one point at a time.  This would make motion impossible.  But clearly we 
experience motion all the time.  Bergson contends, then, that motion itself does not take 
place in space, since that would be impossible, but over space.  The motion itself 
becomes an act of mental synthesis for consciousness: 
We generally say that a movement takes place in space, and when we 
assert that motion is homogeneous and divisible, it is of the space 
traversed that we are thinking, as if it were interchangeable with the 
motion itself.  Now, if we reflect further, we shall see that the successive 
positions of the moving body really do occupy space, but that the process 
by which it passes from one position to the other, a process which 
occupies duration and which has no reality except for a conscious 
spectator, eludes space.  We have to do here not with an object but with a 
progress:  motion, in so far as it is a passage from one point to another, is 
a mental synthesis, a psychic and therefore unextended process.184 
 
And because the organic multiplicity of qualities is itself not extended, understanding 
motion through this medium is not contradictory, as Bergson claims spatial theories are.  
And, since qualitative, organic multiplicities are indivisible, the motion itself is also 
indivisible.  This gives consciousness a pure understanding of motion as it is experienced.  
And this understanding resolves many of the paradoxes that crop up when motion is 
considered an extended process, such as those of the Eleatics. 
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Motion as motion is perpetual becoming.  Traditional, spatial theories of time, by 
describing motion in terms of the space that motion moves over, end up describing 
becoming by reference to fixed, static being.  When this happens, the mobile nature of 
motion is replaced by the immobile juxtaposition of spatial points.  This causes time to 
lose its asymmetry and successiveness, which ends up making time itself disappear.  This 
makes motion disappear as well.  But when we abandon our reflection on motion for our 
experience of motion directly, we notice that all motions are continuous and unending.  
That is, the stopping point of any motion is, in effect, an arbitrarily chosen point that 
consciousness imposes from without.  This is why it is a mistake to confuse our reflection 
of motion with our experience of motion.  Bergson says: 
For I speak of each of my states as if it formed a block and were a separate 
whole.  I say indeed that I change, but the change seems to me to reside in 
the passage from one state to the next:  of each state, taken separately, I 
am apt to think that it remains the same during all the time that it prevails.  
Nevertheless, a slight effort of attention would reveal to me that there is no 
feeling, no idea, no volition which is not undergoing change every 
moment:  if a mental state ceased to vary, its duration would cease to 
flow…The truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state itself 
is nothing but change.185 
 
Language still gets in the way of this understanding, however.  And it gets in the way 
because of its insistence on organizing itself around the intransitive verb ‘to be.’  In 
ordinary language, ‘becoming’ is merely a substitute for being used to avoid temporal 
confusion, such as when we say “The child becomes the man.”  What we generally mean 
by this statement is that this person was a child, is now a man, but he is still the same 
person.  Bergson believes that if we substitute becoming for the person, and make 
childhood and manhood qualitative states of a continuous motion (which would be 
precisely what he would claim is the case), then we can express the motion more 
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accurately.  This is because all motions, including changing from childhood to manhood, 
are continuous examples of becoming.  They are changes of states, where each state is a 
heterogeneous quality contained within the organic multiplicity that constitutes the 
movement as a whole as such: 
The truth is that if language here were molded on reality, we should not 
say “The child becomes the man,” but “There is becoming from the child 
to the man.”  In the first proposition, “becomes” is a verb of indeterminate 
meaning, intended to mask the absurdity into which we fall when we 
attribute the state “man” to the subject “child.”  It behaves in much the 
same way as the movement, always the same, of the cinematographical 
film, a movement hidden in the apparatus and whose function it is to 
superpose the successive pictures on one another in order to imitate the 
movement of the real object.  In the second proposition, “becoming” is a 
subject.  It comes to the front.  It is reality itself; childhood and manhood 
are then only possible stops, mere vies of the mind; we now have to do 
with the objective movement itself, and no longer with its 
cinematographical imitation.  But the first manner of expression is alone 
conformable to our habits of language.  We must, in order to adopt the 
second, escape from the cinematographical mechanism of thought.186 
 
 In order to experience motion as it is in its pure becoming, Bergson claims we 
need to re-evaluate the role of consciousness in temporal experience.  This is the fourth 
component of his theory.  Many spatial theorists wanted to think of time as something 
independent of consciousness.  And even subjective/idealistic thinkers like Kant and 
Heidegger believe that time is something individual temporal beings are subject to, even 
if they are the ones who generate time in the first place.  This causes time to act in the 
same manner that it is thought to act by classical mechanics and other similar theories.  
And both of these groups of views stem from the conflation of our reflection on motion 
with our experience of motion.  If we want to get to the direct experience of motion, then 
we need to attend to the attention of consciousness prior to reflection.  That is, we need to 
understand consciousness during its attention to the movement while the movement is 
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going on, rather than when consciousness has cut the movement off so as to analyze it.  
This attention to motion by consciousness is duration itself. 
 This is what allows consciousness to synthesize the interpenetration of qualities 
into the organic multiplicity that composes each particular movement.  It is the attention 
of consciousness that recognizes and experiences motions as indivisible.  This is why the 
experience of listening to a symphony can be a coherent experience.  Without the 
attention of consciousness, the symphony would be nothing more than a cacophony of 
independent notes.  This is why Bergson says:  “Thus, within our ego, there is succession 
without mutual externality; outside the ego, in pure space, mutual externality without 
succession:  mutual externality, since the present oscillation is radically distinct from the 
previous oscillation, which no longer exists; but no succession, since succession exists 
solely for a conscious spectator who keeps the past in mind and sets the two oscillations 
or their symbols side by side in an auxiliary space.”187 Since motions are not extended, 
according to Bergson, then it would seem to follow that they can only occur in the 
presence of an attentive consciousness.   
 Most spatial theories of time assume that there are three modes of time:  past, 
present and future.  They can make this assumption because, as Bergson points out, on 
spatial theories of time, the past, present and future are regularly conceived of as being 
given all at once.  This is certainly the case in classical mechanics.  And it is certainly the 
case in Augustine’s theory.  It is even the case for Heidegger’s theory of original 
temporality (which I will discuss in the next chapter).  It is not the case for Bergson.  In 
fact, Bergson considers the way time is divided into three modes one of the main factors 
in generating the various paradoxes to which spatial theories of time are subject.   
                                                 
187 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 108-109. 
 123
 According to Begson’s theory of duration, the whole past of a continuing 
movement is carried along all the while that movement continues.  That is, each moment 
of the present, which for Bergson would be a heterogeneous, qualitative experience of 
consciousness, carries all other heterogeneous qualities that have been experienced by 
that consciousness as part of the organic multiplicity that is that movement.  And, since 
motion is indivisible, it would seem fair to say that the past and the present are united in 
the continuing attention given to the movement by consciousness, such as in the 
symphony example.  This explains how the past can be alive for Bergson in way that it 
really cannot be on spatial theories.  And this is the fifth component to his theory of 
duration, the rethinking of the roles of past, present and future. 
 When one listens to a symphony though, particularly a symphony one has heard 
played before, one expects certain notes to follow from the current notes one is hearing.  
When Augustine uses the psalm “Deus Creator Omnium” to illustrate his definition of 
time as an extension of the mind, he claims that he can anticipate the coming syllables, 
and that this anticipation is the future becoming the present.188  For Bergson, though, this 
is not really anticipation of the future.  This is a reflective projection based on past 
experiences that consciousness supposes will happen.  But consciousness has absolutely 
no way of knowing what will happen.  Therefore, according to Bergson, the future, as it 
is normally conceived, does not exist. 
 Bergson’s theory of duration is a theory of continuous motion.  Each continuous 
motion that is experienced/generated by consciousness is a unique motion.  There is no 
real way to predict what will happen to that motion as it continues on.  Bergson does not 
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believe there is a determined course into which this motion flows.  He says:  “Reality is 
global and undivided growth, progressive invention, duration:  it resembles a gradually 
expanding rubber balloon assuming at each moment unexpected forms.”189 To assume 
that the future is already there, waiting to be realized, is a common mistake.  And it is a 
common mistake in two ways.  First, it assumes that time is already laid out after the 
manner of space, which would render the modes of time meaningless in a different way.  
And second, it assumes that the fact that people have expectations means there is 
something out there that could or could not be realized, which ends up being similar to 
the first problem.  This mistake derives from the fact that consciousness has a tendency to 
project reflections on past experiences, combined with hopes, fears, or whatever else 
motivates it, into some nebulous void that lies ahead of itself, shrouded in mist.  On 
closer examination, though, it turns out that this is a mere confusion of what ‘potentiality’ 
and ‘actuality’ actually are.  Things are only potential after they have become actual.  
Potential only means something else could have been done after whatever was done 
actually was done.  There is no more reality to potentiality than that.  Many thinkers in 
the history of the concept of time, however (including Heidegger, in my opinion), 
confuse the notion and place potentiality ahead of the actual action, as if movement and 
change were the realization of some pre-determined program, rather than a continually 
creative process.  This is why Bergson says:  “If we put the possible back into its proper 
place, evolution becomes something quite different from the realization of a program:  
the gates of the future open wide; freedom is offered an unlimited field.”190  
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 Duration is a theory of temporality based entirely on consciousness’ experience of 
motion, both within itself and insofar as it is affected by external objects.  It does not 
substitute spatial metaphors for direct experience, which reveals that motion is the 
interpenetration of heterogeneous qualities into an organic, indivisible multiplicity.  
Ordinary theories in the tradition, such as those I described in Chapter 1, hold that time is 
a homogenous medium that resembles space, and in the end, comes to be another version 
or dimension of space.  This is why most spatial thinkers believed time could exist 
without consciousness.  Bergson points out, though, that things do not move in space, 
they move over it, and only when consciousness turns its attention to them.  Things do 
not have temporal experience, only consciousness does.  This allows consciousness to 
hold the previous qualities of a movement together with the current qualities, which 
makes experience immediately intelligible.  And this also causes Bergson to deny that 
there is such a thing as a future out there, either actually or potentially, since, if it is the 
case that duration is consciousness being attentive to movement, then that movement will 
always be creative, not the realization of something already planned. 
 This theory has been interpreted in several different ways by several different 
groups of thinkers.  Some have seen it as a proto-phenomenological theory.  Others have 
seen it as a kind of post-modern Platonism.  I see it as a kind of contemporary 
Aristotelianism.  In the next part, I will discuss the two prevalent schools of 
interpretation, the phenomenological school and the Deleuzian school.  After examining 
these two positions, I will show that my Aristotelian interpretation better explains the 
concepts in the text, without importing notions into Bergson that he does not seem to 
have held. 
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PART III: TWO STANDARD INTERPRETATIONS OF BERGSON’S THEORY 
OF DURATION 
 
 There are three standard interpretations of Bergson’s theory of duration.  The first 
is a close textual reading of Bergson’s theory.  This is the position held by Capek, and to 
a certain extent by Lacey and Olkowski.  Capek’s interpretation in particular is close to 
the text; and it will be very helpful in developing my Aristotelian account of duration in 
Part IV.  The second interpretation holds that Bergson is a kind of proto-
phenomenologist.  Casey, Mullarkey and Moore hold this view, which seems to be based 
primarily on Matter and Memory.  The third interpretation comes from Deleuze.  
Deleuze’s interpretation also influences Olkowski to some extent.  Both the 
phenomenological interpretation and the Deleuzian interpretations are odds with the 
Aristotelian interpretation I will develop in Part IV.  Examining these interpretations 
should provide a nice point of comparison, then, for my Aristotelian interpretation. 
 Phenomenological interpretations of Bergson’s theory of duration center around 
two elements.  The first is the psychological description of duration, particularly as it is 
expressed in Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory.  The second is Bergson’s use 
of the body as a kind of central image, particularly when it comes to the attention and 
action of consciousness.  These interpretations draw good parallels between Bergson’s 
work and thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty.  In fact, they often claim that Bergson’s work 
lays a foundation for contemporary phenomenology, or at least, for the Merleau-Pontian 
wing of the contemporary phenomenological movement.  Bergson’s theories provide a 
foundation against both idealism and empiricism (also referred to as realism), both of 
which were still quite popular when Bergson was writing.  At the same time, his theories 
were able to attempt a synthesis of these two contrary positions.  This synthesis, 
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particularly as it is expressed in Matter and Memory, provides a theoretical foundation 
for Merleau-Ponty’s early work.  In addition, Bergson’s use of the body, and our 
experience of our own body as a central concept for understanding duration, provides a 
starting point for phenomenological descriptions of the body in Merleau-Ponty and 
others.  Casey notes this influence, saying:  “I have begun with Bergson not just because 
of his proto-phenomenological descriptions (themselves based on the strikingly similar 
sensibilities which he shares with phenomenologists) but mainly because he introduces 
the topic of habit memory in a way that forms an indispensable prelude to Merleau-
Ponty’s treatment of body memory in general.  Not that this is an isolated case:  Bergson 
is often the most effective escort into Merleau-Pontian reflection on many subjects, as 
Merleau-Ponty himself acknowledges…”191 Of course, Bergson did not take these 
notions far enough.  But then, Bergson did not have the rigorous methods, nor the 
advances in science and psychology upon which to draw:  “By situating habit in the body, 
Merleau-Ponty gives to habit a new depth of meaning and function which, though 
adumbrated by Bergson, is never worked out expressly by the author of Matter and 
Memory.”192 
 In Matter and Memory, Bergson represents the experience of duration as a 
pyramid.  The apex of the pyramid is the present ‘moment’ of lived experience.  The 
body of the pyramid is the past, which is alive in memory.  This past has a ‘virtual’ 
presence.  That is, the past is available to consciousness presently, because the past does 
not cease to exist for consciousness as such.  It is bound up with and informs the present 
experience consciousness has.  But this ‘binding up’ of past experience is not available to 
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consciousness the way actual present, currently lived experience is available to 
consciousness.  Bergson wants to avoid thinking of the past in spatial terms, though, so 
he needs a different way to express it.  The cone diagram193 shows that the past is carried 
along with the present in a way that is more real than mere imagination, since the events 
of the past actually happened.  But, since the past and present do not each exist in the 
same way at the same time, the past must have a different kind of existence that allows it 
to be connected to the present experience.  This existence is called ‘virtual’, since it 
mirrors certain elements of current lived experience, and because it gives meaning to the 
present experience by flowing into that experience. 
 These ‘virtual’ realities are bound up with the present because temporality is a 
phenomenon of consciousness.  This experience occurs when consciousness tends to its 
motions directly, rather than reflectively.  Moore notes the similarities between this 
attempt to think experience prior to reflections on experience and the attempt to get 
behind reflective understanding in phenomenological approaches:  “As we shall see, 
Bergson’s main claim is that this discreteness is not real.  It is not that we start from 
discrete items of experience spread out over time but somehow threaded together like 
beads on a string of consciousness.  Rather we start from the experience of temporal 
flow.  Temporal structure is not a matter of putting together given discrete items.  On the 
contrary, so-called discrete elements are only apparent when we have a need to pluck 
them from our continuing experience.”194 On this view, duration would be the 
heterogeneous interpenetration of qualities for consciousness.  Since duration is 
indivisible, those qualities that have already been incorporated into the organic 
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multiplicity would continue on as virtual qualities.  This can only occur in consciousness, 
because only consciousness can hold these various qualities together in the present, lived 
moment of experience.  Things themselves, apart from consciousness, could only have an 
instantaneous kind of existence.  Only consciousness has memory, and only memory can 
hold the virtual reality of past qualitative experiences.  This interplay of the virtual with 
the lived movement in experience centers around the body of the conscious being.  It 
exists ‘virtually’ through the memory of the conscious being.  As Casey puts it: “in the 
embodiment of the past in habits we witness the tip of an enormous pyramid whose total 
bulk is the past itself.  Moreover, the tip is moving in a way the past is not: hence the 
effect of the past’s receding from us.”195 This compares favorably to Merleau-Ponty’s 
own notion of the past in the Phenomenology of Perception, where he says the past is: “a 
mobile setting which moves away from us.”196  The body becomes the central image 
from which all actions derive and to which all actions return.  That is, the intentionality of 
the body is the source of the present experience of duration, and the attention of the body 
is the reason the past remains in virtual memory.   
 As interesting as the relationship between Merleau-Ponty and Bergson might be, 
though,197 no one has done more to revitalize interest in Bergson than Deleuze.  
Deleuze’s interpretation of Bergson agrees with the bulk of the phenomenological 
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interpretation.  What Deleuze does is take this interpretation a step further.  According to 
phenomenological interpretations, duration is entirely a phenomenon of consciousness.  
And this seems to be supported by much of Bergson’s texts.  Deleuze expands this 
notion, however, drawing on some of Bergson’s later works.  In this way, he is able to 
claim that Bergson’s notion of duration is more than a theory of temporality completely 
bound to consciousness.  Instead, duration covers the entirety of the universe, according 
to Deleuze.  Deleuze maintains this gives Bergson a Platonic heritage. 
 Deleuze sees Bergson’s theory of duration as an attempt to eradicate differences 
in kind in temporal thinking, so as to show that true time only ever differs in degree.  To 
accomplish this, Deleuze maintains that Bergson must make a distinction between actual 
multiplicities and virtual multiplicities.  This way, Bergson will be able to reconcile the 
individual durations of individual consciousness with the overall duration of the universe.  
In his earlier works, Bergson maintained that things do not have duration.  Only 
consciousness has duration.  A multiplicity of things would have no duration, then, they 
would just be as they are: things in space.  Therefore, the kind of multiplicity assigned to 
things independent of consciousness is an actual multiplicity.  Qualities are assigned to 
virtual multiplicities, because qualities endure in consciousness.  Deleuze says: 
The important thing here is that the decomposition of the composite 
reveals to us two types of multiplicity.  One is represented by space (or 
rather, if all the nuances are taken into account, by the impure combination 
of homogeneous time): It is a multiplicity of exteriority, of simultaneity, 
of juxtaposition, of order, of quantitative differentiation, of difference in 
degree; it is a numerical multiplicity, discontinuous and actual.  The other 
type of multiplicity appears in pure duration: It is an internal multiplicity 
of succession, of fusion, of organization, of heterogeneity, of qualitative 
discrimination, of difference in kind; it is a virtual and continuous 
multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers.198 
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This leads Deleuze to describe Bergson as a Platonist. 
 At first glance, it seems rather strange to describe Bergson as a Platonist.  Nothing 
could seem farther from Bergson than the static world-view normally attributed to Plato.  
But Deleuze sees in Bergson’s distinction between different types of multiplicities an 
attempt to solve the problem of the one and the many in Platonic terms.  Deleuze says:  
“Once again there is a Platonic tone in Bergson.  Plato was the first to deride those who 
said “the One is multiple and the multiple one – Being is nonbeing,” etc.  In each case he 
asked how, how many, when and where.  “What” unity of the multiple and “what” 
multiple of the one?”199  By acclimating differences in kind into a virtual multiplicity, 
Deleuze believes Bergson is able to solve the problem of the one and the many by 
rendering the distinction between the one and the many meaningless in duration.  But this 
only works if duration applies to the universe as a whole. 
 This is the key point of departure between Deleuze and phenomenological 
interpretations.  According to Deleuze’s reading of Bergson, duration does not reside in 
consciousness alone, but in the universe as a whole.  That is, there must be movement in 
things as well as in the mind in order for duration to work.  Otherwise, Bergson will 
remain a dualist.  He will be a different kind of dualist, one who prioritizes becoming 
over being instead of being over becoming.  But he will still be a dualist.  This is not 
what Bergson does, however, according to Deleuze.  What Bergson does is to naturally 
extend his thinking on duration out to the universe as a whole as he became a more 
mature philosopher, particularly in light of the advance of relativity theory in physics.   
 According to Deleuze, then, there are three fluxes at work in Bergson.  The first is 
the flux of my own consciousness.  The second is the flux of every individual thing in the 
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universe.  And the third is the flux of the universe when the universe is taken as a whole.  
The flux of the individual subject is handled in Time and Free Will.  The flux of things in 
general is taken up in Matter and Memory.  This is done by extending motion to the 
things themselves, rather than saying that motion can only occur when consciousness is 
present.  This is a change from Bergson’s earlier work, where he claimed things only ever 
occupied places, which is why Deleuze gives a lot of credit to Matter and Memory, for 
here “Movement is attributed to things themselves so that the material things partake 
directly of duration, and thereby form a limit case of duration.”200 
 Once Bergson begins to think that things in the universe are capable of motion by 
themselves, the distinction between spatial multiplicities and virtual multiplicities begins 
to diminish.  Eventually, it disappears altogether.  This makes everything virtual, 
according to Deleuze, because everything will now fall under the universal duration.  
That is, by the end of Bergson’s writings, there is a third flux, that of the universe taken 
as a whole.  Everything that occurs within this universal flux will be virtual as far as that 
flux is concerned.  The particular virtual things may still seem to be different in kind.  
And each of these particular things, including consciousness, will still have its own 
duration.  But all of these things, all of these virtual multiplicities that carry their pasts 
with them, each one of these in turn composes the universal, virtual duration.  Deleauze 
says: 
Hence the triplicity of fluxes, our duration (the duration of a spectator) 
being necessary both as flux and as representative of Time in which all 
fluxes are engulfed.  It is in this sense that Bergson’s various texts are 
perfectly reconcilable and contain no contradiction: There is only one time 
(monism), although there is an infinity of actual fluxes (generalized 
pluralism) that necessarily participate in the same virtual whole (limited 
pluralism).  Bergson in no way gives up the idea of difference in kind 
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between actual fluxes; any more than he gives up the idea of differences of 
relaxation or contraction in the virtuality that encompasses them and is 
actualized in them.  But he considers that these two certainties do not 
exclude, but on the contrary imply, a single time.  In short: Not only do 
virtual multiplicities imply a single time, but duration as a virtual 
multiplicity is this single and same Time.201 
 
 This gives us a view of duration that does indeed appear Platonic.  There is one 
overall Time, but that one Time is itself a virtually existing thing.  It is made up of many 
different times, which are all in turn virtual things themselves.  This is why, even though 
it is the case that all particular times are different, they are still all part of the same 
universal time.  So even if they do differ in kind from each other, they only differ in 
degree insofar as they are part of the overall, universal multiplicity. 
PART IV: THE INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF TIME ON 
BERGSON’S THEORY OF DURATION 
 
 Deleuze thinks Bergson is a kind of Platonist because he sees Bergson’s theory of 
duration as something that is universal in scope.  All particular durations would then be 
heterogeneous qualities within the larger, universal duration.  Even if it is true that all 
particular durations are part of a universal duration, though, this does not mean that 
Bergson is a Platonist.  In fact, it would seem that Bergson is nothing like a Platonist at 
all.  To say Bergson’s theory of duration is a Platonic theory would be to imply that the 
particular durations imitate or participate in some kind of essential way in the duration of 
durations, which would be the universal duration.  But this would introduce a spatial 
element back into Bergson’s theory.  In fact, it would nearly seem to make the theory 
homogenous.  This cannot be the case for Bergson, though.  Each particular duration, 
whether it is part of a larger duration or not, is still uniquely and wholly its own.  It 
cannot be reduced to some kind of universal duration, regardless of what anyone means 
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by ‘universal’.  Bergson’s theory as a whole lacks the sort of essentialism necessary for 
describing it as a Platonic theory. 
 Bergson’s theory of duration is similar to Aristotle’s theory of time, though.  In 
fact, I believe that Bergson’s theory of duration was influenced heavily by Aristotle’s 
theory of time.  Both theories are qualitative.  Both theories rely on the presence of some 
kind of agent.  Both theories account for different kinds of temporal experience.  And 
both theories bind time to motion in some way.  When these similarities are combined 
with the fact that Bergson knew Aristotle, and that he saw Aristotle’s universe as a living, 
moving universe, I believe the case can be made for the influence of Aristotle on 
Bergson. 
 I will make this case by looking at six points of comparison/influence.  First, both 
Bergson and Aristotle begin their treatments of time with critiques of the prevailing 
theories.  These prevailing theories behave in similar fashions (both are spatial in the 
sense Bergson uses the term).  And the critique of both is similar.  Second, I will look at 
the similar role motion plays in both theories.  Third, I will discuss the use of 
consciousness in Bergson and the perceiving, rational soul in Aristotle.  Both thinkers use 
these devices in the same way, particularly since both believe time to be dependent upon 
them.  Fourth, I will show Aristotle’s use of number is qualitative, and as such is closer to 
Bergson’s notion of heterogeneous, interpenetrating qualities.  Fifth, I will discuss the 
notion of indivisibility for the ‘now’ in Aristotle and motion in general for Bergson.  And 
finally, I will show the similarities in each thinker’s basic view of the universe as a living, 
moving thing.  All of these combine to show a heavy influence of Aristotle on Bergson. 
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The first point of comparison/influence is the way both thinkers begin with 
critiques of the prevailing notions of time.  These standard theories hold time to be 
composed of ‘nows’ in a manner reminiscent of space or geometrical lines.  Aristotle lays 
out three arguments to show why time cannot be composed of ‘nows’, though.  He says, 
“the ‘now’ is not a part: a part is a measure of the whole, which must be made up of parts.  
Time, on the other hand, is not held to be made up of ‘nows’.”202 Also, if time were 
composed of ‘nows’, then in order for time to flow one ‘now’ would have to be different 
from another ‘now’.  If the ‘now’ were different and different, though, then when would 
one ‘now’ exist and the other ‘now’ come into existence?  “For we may lay it down that 
one ‘now’ cannot be next to another, any more than a point to a point.  If then it died not 
cease to be in the next ‘now’ but in another, it would exist simultaneously with the 
innumerable ‘nows’ between the two – which is impossible.”203 Nor can the ‘now’ 
always be the same, for then, “things which happened ten thousand years ago would be 
simultaneous with what has happened today, and nothing would be before or after 
anything else.”204  Time, therefore, cannot be composed of parts called ‘nows’. 
In a similar fashion, Bergson begins his own treatment of temporality with a 
critique of spatial theories of time.  These theories hold that time is an homogeneous 
medium, like space, where the parts are arranged in an order of succession rather than 
juxtaposition.  If time were such a homogeneous medium, then all the elements of 
temporal experience would be identical in essence to each other.  But according to 
Bergson, temporal experience is of heterogeneous qualities that interpenetrate each other, 
not of a homogeneous medium that remains unchanged regardless of whether or not any 
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motion occurs.  In Aristotle, the attempt to think of time as a medium composed of 
‘nows’ led to the impossibility of time’s existence.  In Bergson, the attempt to think of 
time as an homogeneous medium that behaves more or less like space (a similar 
description to the attempt in Aristotle’s day to think of time geometrically) leads to the 
assimilation of time into space and the loss of temporal experience altogether:  
“Nevertheless it is generally agreed to regard time as an unbounded medium, different 
from space but homogeneous like the latter: the homogeneous is thus supposed to take 
two forms, according as its contents co-exist or follow one another.  It is true that, when 
we make time a homogeneous medium in which conscious states unfold themselves, we 
take it to be given all at once, which amounts to saying that we abstract it from duratin.  
This simple consideration ought to warn us that we are thus unwittingly falling back upon 
space, and really giving up time.”205 This critique is similar to Aristotle’s because it 
notices the impossibility of time as such when the prevailing view is examined in detail.  
If time is an homogeneous medium, it ceases to be time and becomes space.  If time is 
composed of identical ‘nows’ arranged in a geometrical pattern, the functions of time 
become impossible. 
 Having begun in a similar fashion to Aristotle, Bergson follows him in tackling 
the problem of time as it relates to motion.  Both thinkers believe time to be bound up 
with motion in some way.  For Aristotle, it cannot be the same as motion itself, but it 
cannot be found without motion, either.  Aristotle says, “time is neither movement nor 
independent of movement.”206 Bergson says, “if a mental state ceased to vary, its duration 
would cease to flow…The truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state itself 
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is nothing but change.”207 Aristotle sees time as an attribute of motion.  Bergson sees 
duration as the direct experience of motion.  Both of these theories reject the notion that 
time is a kind of container for motion.  This is the view that traditional, spatial theories 
hold.  Aristotle’s theory of time and Bergson’s theory of duration depend upon things 
moving or changing.  The difference between the two lies in the concept of place and 
space each has to work with.  The similarity resides in the way motion is experienced by 
souls or consciousness. 
 Bergson identifies Aristotle’s theory of place as a theory different than modern 
notions of space.  He says Aristotle, “nowhere speaks clearly and in detail of what we 
mean by space.”208 This is because Aristotle could not accept the existence of the void.  
In fact, Aristotle maintained that the void could not even be conceived.  This means that 
there could be no such thing as actually existing homogenous space, on Aristotle’s view.  
When things move, they move in place and from place to place.  They do not, nor could 
they, move in space.  And, since places exist whether any souls notice them or not, and 
since everything is either in its natural place or attempting to move to its natural place, 
motion would exist whether souls noticed motions or not.  Time only exists when the soul 
has been affected by motion, therefore time is not the same as motion. 
 Bergson holds a similar position in some respects.  He is able to replace 
Aristotle’s notion of place with the modern notion of space, though, and clarify the way 
motion itself works.  All things that exist do so in space.  But everything that exists in 
space only ever exists at one particular point in space, according to Bergson.  When 
things move, they do not move in space, they move over space.  In order for this to be the 
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case, the things that move need to have their motion bound together by consciousness.  
This binding together is what causes motion itself in the first place.  And it is the 
experience of this motion that gives us the experience of duration, according to Bergson.  
This is similar to Aristotle, insofar as time is bound up with motion.  It simply goes a bit 
further, by making time and motion one and the same thing, more or less.  For Aristotle, 
motion could happen without soul, since place still exists.  For Bergson, motion cannot 
happen without consciousness, since only consciousness can synthesize the 
transformation of qualities that constitutes motion.   
 Both Bergson and Aristotle tie time to something similar besides motion.  They 
both tie time to a particular kind of observer.  For Aristotle, time exists when a soul that 
can perceive change actually perceives change and is affected by that change in some 
way.  He says:  “When the state of our minds does not change at all, or we have not 
noticed its changing, we do not think that time has elapsed, any more than those who are 
fabled to sleep among the heroes in Sardinia do when they are awakened…we apprehend 
time only when we have marked motion, marking it by before and after; and it is only 
when we have perceived before and after in motion that we say that time has elapsed.”209 
This ties time to the soul in a direct way.  Even if motion could exist without soul, time 
itself, as the enumeration of motion by the soul, could not exist without the soul.  The 
same thing is the case in Bergson, although Bergson’s claim is a bit stronger.  Bergson 
claims that motion itself could not exist without the observations of consciousness.  Since 
duration is the direct experience of motion by consciousness, then it could not exist 
without consciousness, either:  “Outside of me, in space, there is never more than a single 
position of the hand and the pendulum, for nothing is left of the past positions.  Within 
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myself a process of organization or interpenetration of conscious states is going on, 
which constitutes true duration.  It is because I endure in this way that I picture to myself 
what I call the past oscillations of the pendulum at the same time as I perceive the present 
oscillation.”210  This means that the role consciousness plays is even more important for 
Bergson, because one cannot even conceive of time potentially, he claims, without 
consciousness.  Aristotle provides the blueprint here, by suggesting the soul is needed for 
the temporal experience of motion. 
By saying that motion could occur without the soul, though, Aristotle leaves 
himself open for the interpretation that time could still exist in some way without the 
soul’s being present.  This is the view that Simplicius and others hold.211 This view seems 
contrary to the spirit of Aristotle’s definition of time, though.  And it is certainly contrary 
to his specific treatments of soul in relation to time.  It stems from the need to think of 
Aristotle’s theory as a traditional theory.  Bergson, on the other hand, is able to clarify 
Aristotle’s notion of the importance of the soul by introducing the more advanced notion 
of consciousness (in the modern sense).  This allows him to clear up the confusion 
between motion and our experience of motion by differentiating between empty space 
and the motion of objects over empty space.  Without consciousness, then, nothing at all 
can move, let alone be experienced in duration.  This influence must have come from 
Aristotle’s use of the soul in defining time.  And both of these uses run counter to the 
prevailing spatial theories of time, which hold that the conscious spectator (or soul) is 
irrelevant to either time’s existence or operation. 
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Where this argument runs into its greatest problem, though, is with Aristotle’s 
definition of time as a number.  Bergson’s theory of duration is an attempt to think of 
time without resorting to number.  Yet Aristotle defines time as a number, specifically as 
the “number of motion in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’.”212 This is why Aristotle says 
time is not the same as motion itself, but is instead an attribute of motion.  Specifically, it 
is the attribution of motion that makes it possible to number motion.  This is why he says 
“time is not movement, but only movement in so far as it admits of enumeration.”213 
Bergson, on the contrary, defines pure duration as:  “nothing but a succession of 
qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, 
without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another, without any 
affiliation with number.”214 This would seem to limit the amount of influence Aristotle 
could have had on Bergson. 
Upon closer examination, though, Aristotle’s use of number in his theory is not so 
different from Bergson’s use of interpenetrating heterogeneous qualities.  As I discussed 
in Part IV of Chapter 2, Aristotle’s use of number in his theory, and his theory itself, is 
more qualitative than quantitative.  This is the case for two reasons.  First, according to 
Aristotle, number is used in two ways: as the number that counts and as the number of 
things counted.  Time is the number counted.  So therefore, just as there are different 
kinds of things counted by the number that is counted, horses, men, and so on, so, too, 
will there be different times counted for different motions.  Second, things are only 
counted when a rational, perceiving soul is affected by the motion in such a way as to be 
caused to count it.  This makes time more of an affective quality than a quantity.  If it 
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were a quantity, then presumably it would exist whether it was counted or not.  And if it 
were the number that counts, all motions would be reducible to something regular.  
Alterations and other kinds of motions are not regular, however, and cannot be reduced to 
anything else, such as locomotion (although some have tried to claim that this is the case 
in Aristotle, as I discussed in Chapter 2).   
Bergson’s description of duration as the interpenetration of heterogeneous 
qualities is similar to this use of number and irregularity by Aristotle.  The fact that 
irregular motions cannot be reduced to a single unit is similar to the way each quality in 
the organic multiplicity of duration cannot be reduced to any other quality.  Nor can any 
particular experience of duration be reduced to any other particular experience.  Bergson 
says:  “in reality there are neither identical sensations nor multiple tastes: for sensations 
and tastes seem to me to be objects as soon as I isolate and name them, and in the human 
soul there are only processes.”215 So the fact that motions are always irregular for 
Bergson and often irregular for Aristotle, combined with the way Aristotle uses number 
in a more qualitative fashion, demonstrates a pronounced similarity between the two 
thinkers.  When this is combined with Bergson’s interpretation of Aristotle’s universe as 
a living thing, it seems reasonable to say that Aristotle’s qualitative use of number and 
the irregularity he attributes to motions as a result of this could form an influence on 
Bergson’s use of heterogeneous, interpenetrating qualities as the foundation of and raw 
material for the experience of duration. 
 All motions do have one common feature, though.  Each motion or change is 
continuous.  Both Aristotle and Bergson see motion is whole and continuous.  This means 
that the motion, as motion, is not divisible.  And this means the time, as time, is not 
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divisible, since time goes with the motion.  Otherwise, whenever motion occurred, it 
would be broken up into smaller motions, and the time broken up into smaller times, with 
no hope of ever completing either a motion or a time.  This led Aristotle to say:  “But 
what is moved is moved from something to something, and all magnitude is continuous.  
Therefore the movement goes with the magnitude.  Because the magnitude is continuous, 
the movement too is continuous, and if the movement, then the time; for the time that has 
passed is always thought to be as great as the movement.”216 This continuous magnitude 
is bound together by the ‘now’.  The ‘now’ makes the time counted continuous, just as 
the body in motion makes the movement continuous.  This magnitude needs to be 
understood in a qualitative sense, however, since it is the number counted.  This means 
every motion is continuous but unique, for Aristotle, particularly in the case of irregular 
motions such as alteration.  If it were understood in the quantitative sense, as the number 
that counts, then there would be no reason not to artificially break any particular motion 
up into infinitely divisible smaller motions.  This would make motion impossible for 
Aristotle, however, just as a similar action in regards to time would make time 
impossible.  Time must be indivisible in order to be the time of a particular motion. 
 Bergson takes this notion a step further by combining the moving body and the 
‘now’ into one direct experience of consciousness.  Since motion is a qualitative change 
for consciousness over space for Bergson, it will necessarily be continuous.  And since 
duration is the experience of this change by consciousness, it will also necessarily be 
continuous.  This motion, and the experience of duration formed by this motion, is the 
notion of an organic multiplicity composed of heterogeneous qualities.  This notion 
follows Aristotle’s concept of the now as unifying different stages of the experience of a 
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movement into one coherent experience of that movement.  Where Bergson and Aristotle 
differ is in the fact that Aristotle believes the movement could still take place without the 
soul being affected by it, whereas Bergson believes movement is a purely qualitative 
change that could not take place without consciousness.  But Aristotle’s idea of the unity 
of motion comes across in Bergson’s critique of spatial theories of time and the use of his 
melody example to explain the indivisibility of motion:  “Let us listen to the melody, 
allowing ourselves to be lulled by it; do we not have the clear perception of a movement 
which is not attached to a mobile, of a change without anything changing?  This change 
is enough, it is the thing itself.  And even if it takes time, it is still indivisible; if the 
melody stopped sooner it would no longer be the same sonorous whole, it would be 
another, equally indivisible.”217 By collapsing the distinction between the thing that 
changes and the change itself, Bergson is able to take Aristotle’s notion of the continuity 
and indivisibility of motion and time and collapse them into one simpler notion.  Time 
and the movement are the same because they are both one and the same qualitative 
experience of consciousness.  He was able to do this because he had the modern notion of 
space at his disposal, whereas Aristotle, although vaguely aware of an earlier form of that 
notion, did not.  However, Aristotle’s notion of the continuity and indivisibility of motion 
and time, as evidenced by the continuity of the body moving and the ‘now’ that 
constitutes the ‘before’ and ‘after’ provided Bergson with a theoretical starting point 
lacking in modern notions of motion and time, which have both taking place within 
infinitely divisible space independent of consciousness. 
 As Bergson point out in his Latin dissertation, Aristotle’s concept of the universe 
was an organic, vibrant concept.  According to Aristotle, everything in the universe has 
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its natural place.  This is a likely reason why Aristotle thought things moved 
independently of a perceiving soul.  Everything in the universe has a natural place, and 
therefore, everything in the universe moves toward that natural place if it is not there 
already, according to Aristotle.  While Bergson does not seem to hold the view that 
everything has a natural place, he does seem to have been influenced by Aristotle’s view 
of the universe as a kind of living thing.  That is, in Aristotle, Bergson found a source for 
his idea that reality itself is a moving, living thing.  This provides the final point of 
comparison between Bergson and Aristotle.  And I believe it cements my argument that 
Bergson’s theory of duration is an Aristotelian theory. 
 Everything for Aristotle moves in some way.  In particular, things that are not in 
their natural place move toward their natural place.  But even the heavens are in perpetual 
motion.  And since the heavens are the limit of the universe, according to Aristotle, this 
means that the universe itself, as a whole, is constantly in motion.  This description is not 
analogous to the modern concept of space, since there is no possible way to interpret 
modern space as a mobile phenomenon.218 It is not one of inert matter set over and 
against living things.  Instead, Bergson saw in Aristotle that the universe, and all its parts, 
move as each thing’s internal nature dictates:  “Therefore from a consideration of natural 
movement it follows that the world is a kind of living thing, and that the simple elements, 
like the parts of a living thing, exercise their proper functions in certain proper places 
which they desire when lost and cling to when found again.”219 Bergson mirrors this 
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conception of reality with his application of duration to the universe as such:  “This 
reality is mobility.  There do not exist things made, but only things in the making, not 
states that remain fixed, but only states in process of change.  Rest is never anything but 
apparent, or rather, relative.  The consciousness we have of our own person in its 
continual flowing, introduces us to the interior of a reality on whose model we must 
imagine the others.  All reality is, therefore, tendency, if we agree to call tendency a 
nascent change of direction.”220 
This expansion relies on a conception of the universe as a living thing, which 
Bergson clearly found in Aristotle.  It is a modified form of what Bergson finds in 
Aristotle, of course.  But there is certainly nothing Platonic about it, as Deleuze suggests.  
Even if there is a tripartite flux in Bergson, nothing about this flux resembles the static 
conception of the universe one finds in Plato.  The sort of immobile, eternal existence 
attributed to the higher levels of reality in Plato is precisely the sort of thing that 
Bergson’s theory of duration, and the mobile world-view that springs from it, criticizes as 
directly contrary to the experience of consciousness and the world as such. 
This absence of essentialism is what led Moore to say that Bergson could not be 
an Aristotelian, either.  I believe I have shown, though, that Bergson’s understanding of 
Aristotle’s theory of time, and the worldview within which Aristotle situated that theory, 
is a worldview of concrete experience and natural motion.  Even the definitions one finds 
in Aristotle’s worldview are not absolute.  Things tend towards their proper place.  
Things are not fixed in absolute space in a precise, mathematical manner.  Bergson’s 
theory of duration provides a qualitative fulfillment for Aristotle’s theory, since it uses 
the modern notion of the conscious subject to solve the problem of the body that moves 
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and the time it takes to move that body.  Aristotle’s theory, which I have shown was 
already qualitative, gives Bergson a basis for his more coherent and complete qualitative 
theory.  Both thinkers provide a universal definition of temporal experience.  But this 
universal definition is a concrete universal.  Aristotle’s statement “time is present equally 
everywhere and with all things,”221 means that all things that move, and are noticed 
moving by the soul, have time as an attribute, which is an affective quality of the soul.  
Bergson’s belief that the universe has an overall duration does not mean that there is one 
duration that measures all other durations.  Both thinkers hold that individual movements 
have their own individual times or temporal experiences.  These cannot be reduced to 
anything else.  At best, the universal nature of duration means that each individual 
duration is an individual quality in the overall organic multiplicity of the universal 
duration.  As far as this goes, Deleuze would be correct.  As Capek says, though, “This, 
of course, does not mean that Bergson is a Platonist; his duration is a concrete universal 
and as such akin to the Aristotelian or Hegelian View.”222 
Bergson’s theory of duration was influenced by Aristotle’s theory of time.  In 
Aristotle, Bergson found the prototype for a critique of purely mathematical theories of 
time (geometrical theories for Aristotle, abstract spatial theories for Bergson).  He found 
a theory of time that bound time with motion, which went against the prevailing trend in 
the tradition.  He found a theory of time that made time in some way dependent upon a 
conscious presence (although for Aristotle, this was a perceiving being, which is not quite 
the same thing as a conscious subject).  He found a theory of time that accounted for 
difference and irregularity, even though Aristotle claimed time was a kind of number 
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(although Aristotle uses number in a more qualitative sense in his theory).  He found a 
theory of time that was continuous and indivisible, as motion is continuous and 
indivisible.  And he found this theory situated in a worldview that held the universe to be 
organic.  Bergson took this theory, I believe, and through the notion of the modern 
conscious subject and certain advances in the understanding of mathematics and space, 
produced a purely qualitative theory that more adequately described the temporal 
experience of consciousness and temporality as a whole. 
 I believe this also shows why Heidegger attached Bergson to Aristotle in the way 
he did in his early works.  Bergson was clearly influenced by Aristotle.  Bergson’s theory 
is clearly an Aristotelian theory.  It does not seem that Bergson misunderstood Aristotle, 
as Heidegger claims he did (which I will discuss in detail in the following chapter).  So it 
also remains to be seen why Heidegger claims that the rest of the history of the concept 
of time is Aristotelian, when it is clearly not.  I believe Heidegger makes his claims 
concerning the relationship between Bergson and Aristotle, and his concurrent claim 
concerning the history of the concept of time, in order to mask the fact that his 
(Heidegger’s) own theory of original or primordial or true or authentic (or whatever else 
it might be called) temporality is not as radical a departure from the tradition as 
Heidegger believes it to be.  In fact and instead, as I will show in the final chapter, 
Heidegger’s theory of original (etc.) temporality is simply another version of the 
traditional, spatial theories of time that Bergson critiqued.  This means that Heidegger’s 
theory actually falls back into the very tradition he claimed to be subverting. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DASEIN’S SPATIAL TEMPORALITY AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
BERGSON AND HEIDEGGER 
 
 
 I said in the Introduction that this dissertation is an attempt to come to grips with 
Heidegger’s claim that the history of the concept of time is Aristotelian, and that a 
relationship exists between Aristotle and Bergson.  I demonstrated that Heidegger is not 
historically correct in his assertion that the history of the concept of time is Aristotelian.  
Instead, as I argued in Chapter 1, the history of the concept of time is Augustinian.  
Aristotle’s theory is actually at odds with most major theories of time, including those 
found in classical mechanics and Kant.  This is because, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
Aristotle’s theory of time is a qualitative theory of time.  Most theories of time in the 
history of the concept of time are quantitative theories, which Bergson labels spatial 
theories.  Bergson’s theory of duration, though, is also a qualitative theory of time.  In 
Chapter 3, I showed the relationship between Aristotle’s theory of time and Bergson’s 
theory of duration.  This served to establish that Heidegger was right to link Bergson to 
Aristotle.  And he was correct in claiming that Aristotle’s theory of time influenced 
Bergson’s theory of duration.  However, Heidegger was right for the wrong reasons. 
 Heidegger claims that the history of the concept of time is Aristotelian, and that 
Bergson misunderstood Aristotle’s theory, thinking that Aristotle’s theory was a spatial 
theory.  Bergson did critique the history of the concept of time for advancing primarily 
spatial theories.  Aristotle’s theory does not fit with these theories.  Bergson did not 
misunderstand Aristotle.  In fact, as Heidegger himself admits, Bergson knew Aristotle 
quite well.  Why does Heidegger make the claims he makes, then, regarding the 
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relationship between Bergson and Aristotle and concerning the history of the concept of 
time? 
 I believe the key to this answer comes from an examination of Heidegger’s theory 
of original or primordial temporality.223  This examination will show that Heidegger’s 
theory of original temporality is actually a spatial theory of time of just the sort that 
Bergson critiqued.  The only major differences are the centering of temporality on the 
future and the apparent finitude of temporality as a whole.  However, both of these things 
seem to derive from the same common root as both major modern theories of time:  
Augustine.  Heidegger’s theory of original temporality is, in reality, an Augustinian 
theory.  When this is combined with an examination of the ways Heidegger treats 
Bergson in his early writings, I believe the following conclusion emerges.  Heidegger 
claims that the history of the concept of time is Aristotelian, and draws this genealogy 
from Aristotle to Bergson, and claims that Bergson misunderstood Aristotle, even though 
and while he was influenced by him, because Heidegger’s theory of primordial 
temporality arose, in part, as a reaction to Bergson’s theory of duration. 
 To make this case, I will divide this final chapter into three parts.  In Part I, I will 
examine Heidegger’s various references to Bergson in his early works.  There are twelve 
explicit references combined between Being and Time, Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology and the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.  These references show that 
Heidegger knew Bergson.  And the way he interprets Bergson, including passages where 
he attempts to answer hypothetical Bergsonian objections, shows that he anticipated a 
                                                 
223 Heidegger uses the following terms to describe his theory of temporality:  original, primordial, 
authentic, and true.  I will generally use original or primordial to refer to Heidegger’s own theory of 
temporality, as opposed to his understanding of the common theory of time, which he believes his theory 
both explains and counters. 
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critique from the Bergsonian perspective.  In Part II, I will look at Heidegger’s theory of 
primordial temporality.  Here, I will describe the theory in such a way as to bring the 
traditional, spatial qualities of that theory to light.  Finally, in Part III, I will conclude this 
dissertation by demonstrating that Heidegger’s theory of primordial temporality can be 
read, at least in part, as a reaction to Bergson’s theory of duration.  This means that, 
rather than subverting the tradition of metaphysics as he claimed to be doing, Heidegger 
ends up falling back into that tradition as it is actually construed. 
PART I: HEIDEGGER’S READING OF BERGSON 
 
 It is a bit surprising that more has not been said already about the relationship 
between Heidegger and Bergson.  In Being and Time in particular, Bergson is mentioned 
prominently in several important places.  As far as I know, though, only Stephen Crocker 
has explored this relationship in any detail.224  He maintains that Heidegger believed that 
his theory overcame several difficulties in Bergson’s theory of duration.  I will maintain, 
on the contrary, that Heidegger’s theory not only fails to supercede Bergson’s theory, but 
that Heidegger’s theory is subject to the sorts of critiques that Bergson levels against the 
spatial tradition of temporal theories.  I will begin this process by looking at Heidegger’s 
explicit references to Bergson. 
 There are twelve explicit references to Bergson in Heidegger’s three major early 
works:  Being and Time, and The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.225  Five of these 
references are found in Being and Time, two are found in The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology and five are found in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.  Of the 
                                                 
224 Crocker, “The Oscillating Now:  Heidegger on the Failure of Bergsonism,” 405-423. 
225 These are the same texts Crocker concentrates on in reference to the relationship between Heidegger and 
Bergson.  Crocker seems to put more weight on The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.  I put more 
weight on Being and Time. 
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five references found in Being and Time, two are in the Introduction, one is in the first 
chapter of Part I, one is in the third chapter of Part II, and the last comes in endnote xxx.  
Both references to Bergson in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology are in the first 
chapter of Part II.  And all the references to Bergson in The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic are in Part II.  I divide these references into two general categories:  genealogical 
and interpretive.  Genealogical references are those that place Bergson within a group of 
philosophers, in particular, within a group of philosophers who think about time.  They 
do not necessarily say anything about Bergson’s theory per se.  They merely place him in 
a list of names (although the fact that he was so placed generally says something about 
how Heidegger interprets Bergson’s theory).  There are four purely genealogical 
references.  Two are found in Being and Time; and two are found in The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic.  Interpretive references say something about Bergson’s theory of 
duration, its originality, its effectiveness, its misguided nature or something like that.  
The remaining eight references are all interpretive references.  I will examine the 
genealogical references first. 
 Heidegger’s first explicit reference to Bergson comes in the Introduction of Being 
and Time.  Here he claims that there is a common way of understanding time which runs 
from Aristotle to Bergson:  “This ordinary way of understanding it [time] has become 
explicit in an interpretation precipitated in the traditional concept of time, which has 
persisted from Aristotle to Bergson and even later.”226 This ‘ordinary’ way of 
understanding time, this concept that dominates the tradition, is an Aristotelian one.  This 
is why he clarifies his genealogy further, in his second genealogical reference to Bergson 
saying:  “Aristotle’s essay on time is the first detailed Interpretation of this phenomenon 
                                                 
226 Heidegger, Being and Time, 39[18]. 
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which has come down to us.  Every subsequent account of time, including Bergson’s, has 
been essentially determined by it.”227  
The thematic nature of Heidegger’s genealogical references to Bergson 
disappears, however, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.  Here, Bergson appears 
to be just another name among those who have had something to say historically about 
the concept of time.  Thus, the third and fourth genealogical references read as follows: 
But why is the preparatory analysis of Dasein with regard to revealing the 
possibility of the understanding-of-being an exposition of the temporality 
of Dasein?  Why does the metaphysical projection of Dasein move in the 
direction of time and the radical interpretation of time?  Possibly because 
relativity theory treats time or the principle of an objective measurement 
of time?  Or maybe because Bergson and, following him, Spengler deal 
with time?  Or because Husserl worked at the phenomenology of internal 
time consciousness?  Or because Kierkegaard speaks, in the Christian 
sense, of temporality in contradistinction to eternity?  Or maybe because 
Dilthey considers the historicity of Dasein to be central, and historicity is 
connected with time?  Was the analysis of Dasein then projected on the 
backdrop of time because it was believed the result would be good if the 
above-mentioned were fused together?  In short, because one can get the 
idea of mixing together these various treatments of the problem of time 
and, as the phrase has it, “think them out to the end”?  This is all too much 
the simpleton’s notion of philosophy, the one who believes that out of five 
authors you can make a sixth…Furthermore, the so-called thinking out to 
the end has its own special difficulty.  In order to think something out to 
the end, especially taking in Kierkegaard, Husserl, Bergson, and Dilthey, 
one must first be in possession of that end toward which one is supposed 
to think them out; and still the question always remains: Why just these 
particular thinkers mentioned?228 
 
and: 
 
The classical texts on the problem of time are the following: Aristotle’s 
Physics; Plotinus’ Enneades; Augustine’s Confessions; Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason; Hegel’s Encyclopedia and Phenomenology of Spirit; 
Bergson, all his writings; Husserl, Ideas I and The Phenomenology of the 
Consciousness of Internal Time.  (The investigations into time by Aristotle 
and Ausustine are the important ones, and they are decisive for subsequent 
periods.  More unawares than with clear intent, Kant later pushed the 
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228 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 141. 
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problem farthest into the dimension of the truly philosophical 
problematic.)229 
 
 I believe three important questions emerge from these genealogical references to 
Bergson.  First, why is Bergson the penultimate figure in the genealogy instead of 
Husserl?  In fact, why does Husserl receive no mention in the genealogical references in 
Being and Time?  Considering how close Heidegger was to Husserl, particularly at the 
time of Being and Time’s publication, this omission is strange.  Second, why are 
scientific theories, like those found in classical mechanics, left out of the genealogies?  
Surely, if Heidegger was interested in the ‘ordinary’ concept of time, he should have at 
least mentioned these kinds of theories.  And third, why does Heidegger’s view of the 
influence of the two major ancient thinkers, Augustine and Aristotle, change from Being 
and Time to the Metaphysical Foundation of Logic?  I believe that an examination of 
these three questions will shed some light on the relationship between Bergson’s theory 
of duration and Heidegger’s theory of original temporality. 
 Why did Heidegger leave Husserl out of the genealogies of the history of the 
concept of ordinary time in Being and Time?  Heidegger knew Husserl.  He was a student 
of Husserl.  He edited the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time.  This 
means he knew that Husserl’s major work on time began with reference to and tribute to 
Augustine’s theory of time from Book XI of the Confessions.  It would also mean that he 
knew that Husserl’s major work on time made no mention whatsoever of Aristotle’s 
theory of time, even though that theory links time quite strongly with a perceiving, 
rational soul.  Heidegger even dedicated Being and Time to Husserl.  In a work whose 
alleged purpose is to get to the roots of Dasein’s understanding of temporality, and hence 
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to the meaning of Being itself, this omission is significant, particularly since it seems to 
have been corrected (at least, genealogically corrected) a year later in the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic. 
 I believe that Heidegger left Husserl out of Being and Time because Husserl’s 
theory of internal time consciousness was too Kantian.  Had Heidegger confronted 
Husserl’s work more directly, he would have had to have given a more explicit account 
of Dasein’s temporality in light of Husserl’s work.  In particular, because Husserl’s work 
was both more recent than Bergson’s and contrary to Bergson’s, Heidegger would have 
had to go to great lengths to both set his theory in contrast to Bergson’s and to hide the 
fact that his (Heidegger’s) theory shared much in common with German Idealism.  Since 
Heidegger did not want his theory of original temporality, nor his thinking on Dasein 
more generally, to be just another theory of the subject (in either the Kantian or Hegelian 
sense), he would likely have wanted to avoid placing his work too close to the likes of 
Husserl’s theory.  In this way, Heidegger was able to avoid appearing too idealistic, at 
least for a while.  In the end, though, Heidegger’s theory of original temporality does 
seem to fall back into the very sorts of subjectivist/idealistic theories he claims to be 
subverting.  For example, Pierre Keller points out that, for Heidegger, while there may be 
events independent of time, there is not time independent of the way in which these 
events are unfolded for Dasein.230  The “for Dasein” is key, I think, to understanding the 
role of consciousness in the early Heidegger.   It makes Heidegger appear to be more of a 
“spatial thinker”, in the Bergsonian sense.  And this would mean Heidegger remains 
firmly in the very tradition of metaphysics he claims to be supplanting by making the 
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relationship between Dasein and temporality an essential one for both Dasein and for 
temporality itself. 
 This might also provide a clue into Heidegger’s reasoning behind the exclusion of 
classical mechanics from his genealogies.  It is well known that Kant was influenced by 
classical mechanics.  And it seems strange at least for Heidegger to make investigations 
into the ‘ordinary’ concept of time without a treatment of the prevailing scientific 
theories of time, particularly insofar as other thinkers he does name, such as Bergson, had 
seen fit to do this.  Nor is it likely the case that Heidegger felt the problem had already 
been addressed by the likes of Bergson.  Perhaps Heidegger worked himself into a corner 
by claiming an Aristotelian heritage for the history of the concept of time.  This would 
have ruled out classical mechanics, whose temporal theory is decidedly not Aristotelian.  
And it would have left intact Heidegger’s claim that ‘ordinary’ time springs from 
temporality.  But this would seem to paint Heidegger into an idealistic corner, since it 
would make both temporality itself, and the ‘ordinary’ concept of time that springs from 
it, phenomena of something like Dasein.  In particular, it would put Heidegger in the 
position of claiming that temporality is in Dasein, but the things that affect temporal 
experience are not.  This sort of quasi-Kantianism should be at odds with what Heidegger 
is trying to do.  However, this seems to be precisely what he ends up doing.  As Keller 
points out:  “Heidegger insists, somewhat paradoxically, that while being, truth and time 
‘are’ only so long as there are human beings, entities themselves are independent of the 
existence of persons.”231 
 I can think of two likely reasons why Heidegger did not offer an explicit treatment 
of classical mechanics in his early work on original temporality.  This first is that he 
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intended to discuss classical mechanics in a later part of Being and Time, perhaps as part 
of his discussion of Kant.  Of course, this second part was never published, so the explicit 
discussion of classical mechanics that might have been found there never had a chance to 
come to light.  If this were really the case, though, one thinks that at least some clue as to 
Heidegger’s view on the subject should be evident in the parts of Being and Time that did 
get published, as well as the other lectures and early works that dealt with the problem of 
time.  At best, we can extrapolate based on Heidegger’s attitude towards what he calls the 
common understanding of things, the ‘worldliness’ of the world, and so on.  But this 
seems like too much to leave to chance. 
 The second likely reason Heidegger left out an explicit treatment of classical 
mechanics is as follows.  On the one hand, Bergson had made an extensive critique of 
classical mechanics, particularly in Time and Free Will.  And on the other hand, relativity 
theory was emerging right around the time that Heidegger began publishing his early 
works.  In fact, he mentions relativity theory specifically in the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic.  So it could be the case that Heidegger thought the theories of time 
in classical mechanics had already been adequately addressed, and/or they had become 
irrelevant, anyway.   
 I do not believe this is the case, however.  I think Heidegger left out a specific 
treatment of classical mechanics because classical mechanics offered theories of time that 
treated the future as an already existing mode of time.  That is, the theory of time that 
pervades classical mechanics, especially as it was formulated by the likes of Laplace, 
treated the future as something ‘already there’, that is, something that could be known in 
a way at least similar to (and in the case of the Laplace, actually identical to) the way one 
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can know the present (and the past, for that matter).  For classical mechanics, the future 
existed in a spatial sense, as a kind of set of co-ordinates relative to the position of the 
‘present’ of any particular thing at any particular time.  Bergson, of course, found this 
view to be paradoxical at best, and a complete misunderstanding of both how temporality 
works as such and how we experience time in particular.  For if we assume that the future 
already exists in some fashion, and that our present actions are somehow determined by 
it, then time itself ceases to exist as something independent of space; and we run into all 
the various paradoxes this sort of thinking involves.232  Yet (as I shall discuss in Part II 
below), it is precisely in the future that Heidegger locates the essence of original 
temporality.  And while this is not identical to the notion of time devoid of content but 
existing as something into which the present flows, it is not entirely different from it, 
either.  If Dasein ‘throws’ itself towards its own future, then that future must exist in 
some way in order for Dasein to ‘throw’ itself there.  A treatment of classical mechanics 
would have brought the ‘originality’ of Heidegger’s definition of original temporality, 
which revolves around this notion, more easily into question.  Therefore, I believe 
Heidegger avoided a confrontation with classical mechanics. 
 The final noteworthy thing about Heidegger’s genealogical references to Bergson 
is the changing position of Aristotle with reference both to Bergson himself and to the 
genealogy of the concept of time as a whole.  In Being and Time, both genealogical 
references claim that Aristotle’s theory of time is the dominant theory in the tradition; 
and it is the theory that influences all the other theories.  This claim is repeated in several 
places in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, without specific reference to Bergson.  
                                                 
232 For a treatment of Bergson’s critique of spatial theories of time, see Chapter 3, Part II. 
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What is particularly interesting about these references, though, is the position Augustine 
occupies in relation to Aristotle.  Heidegger says:   
The two ancient interpretations of time which thereafter became standard 
– Augustine’, which has already been mentioned, and the first great 
treatise on time by Aristotle – are also by far the most extensive and truly 
thematic investigations of the time phenomenon itself.  Augustine agrees 
with Aristotle also on a series of essential determinations.233 
 
And he adds shortly thereafter:   
We have already stressed that the essentials of what can first of all be said 
about time within the common understanding of it were said in the two 
ancient interpretations of time by Aristotle and Augustine.  Of the two, 
Aristotle’s investigations are conceptually more rigorous and stronger 
while Augustine sees some dimensions of the time phenomenon more 
originally.  No attempt to get behind the riddle of time can permit itself to 
dispense with coming to grips with Aristotle.234 
 
Both of these passages demonstrate the continued belief that Aristotle is the dominant 
and influential figure in the history of the concept of time.   
 In the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, however, a shift seems to occur.  
Rather than claiming Aristotle is the dominant and influential figure in the history of the 
concept of time, Aristotle becomes one of many figures, or a figure that was influential 
primarily on his age, but not necessarily on subsequent ages.  In fact, Heidegger declared 
in the last genealogical references that Augustine was a dominant figure for the age that 
followed him.235 This would not be problematic, if, as Heidegger claimed in the Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, Aristotle’s and Augustine’s theories were similar theories.  
But as I demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 2, Aristotle’s theory and Augustine’s theory are 
not similar to each other at all.  In fact, they are contrary theories at the very least.  
Furthermore, Heidegger seems to be aware that there are important differences, even 
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though he glosses those differences over, since he claimed that Augustine saw some 
aspects of the problem of time more “originally” than Aristotle did (although Heidegger 
never goes into any detail concerning what he believed those “original” insights by 
Augustine were).  Finally, because Heidegger claims in the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic that both thinkers were dominant for their subsequent ages, he must recognize that 
there are important differences between the two.  Otherwise, why include Augustine at 
all, or make these kinds of claims in reference to the history of the concept of time?  And 
what would cause this shift in emphasis from Being and Time and the Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology to the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic? 
I believe there are three possible ways to answer these questions.  The first is that 
Heidegger was after something different in the latter work, so the exactness with which 
he needed to examine ownership of the history of the concept had diminished.  This does 
not seem likely, though, since in all three of these early works, he appears most motivated 
by an attempt to get to original or authentic temporality.  Second, perhaps Heidegger felt 
that he had been unfair to Augustine in the earlier two works, so the ambiguity over who 
influenced whom in the later genealogies could reflect this.  This could also be the case 
because the position of other thinkers, notably Bergson, also changes.  In Being and 
Time, Bergson was an Aristotelian (and not a very good one, apparently).  By the time of 
The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Bergson appears to be standing on his own.  
However, there is nothing explicit in the text to suggest this.  Heidegger never says whom 
Augustine influenced, nor does he say how it might have happened.  Given the great 
details he went into concerning Aristotle’s influence in Being and Time and The Basic 
 160
Problems of Phenomenology, it seems unlikely that he really was correcting a previous 
error. 
I believe Heidegger reconfigures the genealogy of the history of the concept of 
time in order to make that concept and that history more ambiguous.  His earlier 
genealogies were very clear, even if they were inaccurate.  I believe that Heidegger 
became aware of this as his early period progressed.  In particular, the way Bergson is 
tied to both Aristotle directly and to a tradition that includes Kant through this genealogy 
by Heidegger in Being and Time does not work.  I believe Heidegger became aware of 
just how tenuous that connection was, and sought to cover it over by making it appear 
that the history of the concept of time was not as monolithic as he had earlier claimed it 
to be.  Unfortunately, though, all of this remains highly speculative.  Further illumination 
comes, I believe, from examining the eight interpretative references Heidegger makes to 
Bergson. 
 Heidegger’s eight interpretive references to Bergson portray Bergson as a thinker 
bound to what Heidegger describes as the traditional or standard form of metaphysics; a 
form of metaphysics that runs from Aristotle to Kant.  This is one of the main reasons 
why Bergson’s attempt to get beyond what Bergson describes as spatial time, which 
Heidegger seems to think is an equivalent label in Bergson to Heidegger’s designation 
‘ordinary’ time, is doomed to failure.  And it seems to be the case that Bergson is doomed 
to failure because he does not get through to original or primordial temporality.  That is, 
Bergson, and his distinction between spatial time and real duration, is doomed to failure 
because he is not Heidegger.  And the fact that Bergson does not seem to understand this, 
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according to Heidegger, is what renders any possible critique from a Bergsonian 
perspective moot. 
 As I indicated above, three of Heidegger’s interpretive references are in Being 
and Time, two are in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, and three are found in the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.  Of the three references in Being and Time, two 
address Bergson’s theory of duration, and his attempt to make a distinction between 
spatial time and real duration.  Heidegger says: 
We call the temporal attribute of entities within-the-world “within-time-
ness.”  The kind of ‘time’ which is first found ontically in within-time-
ness, becomes the basis on which ordinary traditional conception of time 
takes form.  But time, as within-time-ness, arises from an essential kind of 
temporalizing of primordial temporality.  The fact that this is its source, 
tells us that the time ‘in which’ what is present-at-hand arises and passes 
away, is a genuine phenomenon of time; it is not an externalization of a 
‘qualitative time’ into space, as Bergson’s Interpretation of time – which is 
ontologically quite indefinite and inadequate – would have us believe.236 
 
And he adds at the end of Being and Time: 
 
In its results, Bergson’s view is in accord with Hegel’s thesis that space 
‘is’ time, in spite of the very different reasons they have given.  Bergson 
merely says the reverse: that time (temps) is space.  Bergson’s view of 
time too has obviously arisen from an Interpretation of the Aristotelian 
essay on time.  That a treatise of Bergson with the title Quid Aristoteles de 
loc senserit should have appeared at the same time as his Essai sur les 
donnees immediates de la conscience, where the problem of temps and 
duree is expounded, is not just a superficial literary connection.  Having 
regard to Aristotle’s definition of time as the “measure of motion”237, 
Bergson prefaces his analysis of time with an analysis of number.  Time as 
space is quantitative Succession.  By a counter-orientation to this 
conception of time, duration gets described as qualitative Succession.  
This is not the place for coming to terms critically with Bergson’s 
conception of time or with other Present-day views of it.  So far as 
anything essential has been achieved in to-day’s analyses which will take 
us beyond Aristotle and Kant, it pertains more to the way time is grasped 
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and to our ‘consciousness of time’.  We shall come back to this in the first 
and third divisions of Part Two.238 
 
The other reference claims that Bergson was involved in some kind of philosophical 
anthropology, after the manner of Dilthey:   
The researches of Wilhelm Dilthey were stimulated by the perennial 
question of ‘life’…Its philosophical relevance, however, is not to be 
sought here, but rather in the fact that in all this he was, above all, on his 
way towards the question of ‘life’.  To be sure, we can also see here very 
plainly how limited were both his problematic and the set of concepts with 
which it had to be put into words.  These limitations, however, are found 
not only in Dilthey and Bergson but in all the ‘personalistic’ movements to 
which they have given direction and in every tendency towards a 
philosophical anthropology.239 
 
 The ramifications of labeling Bergson a philosophical anthropologist are not 
directly taken up again by Heidegger in his later interpretive references to Bergson.  
Instead, he focuses in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology on the laudable but failed 
attempt by Bergson to get past the ‘ordinary’ concept of time and get to true temporality, 
which caused Bergson to misinterpret Aristotle’s theory as a spatial theory.  Heidegger 
claims: 
From the most recent period we may cite Bergson’s investigations of the 
time phenomenon.  They are by far the most independent.  He presented 
the essential results of his inquires in his Essi sur less donnees immediates 
de la conscinece (1888).  These investigations were extended and set in a 
wider context in his major work, L’evolution creatrice (1907).  As early as 
his first treatise, Bergson makes the attempt to overcome the Aristotelian 
concept of time and to show its one-sidedness.  He tries to get beyond the 
common concept of time by distinguishing duree, duration, in contrast 
with time as commonly understood, which he calls temps.  In a more 
recent work, Duree et simultaneite (2nd edition, 1923), Bergson provides a 
critical examination of a direct critique of the Aristotelean concept of time.  
The interpretation he gives of time in the common sense rests on a 
misunderstanding of Aristotle’s way of understanding time.  Accordingly, 
his counterconcept to common time, namely duration, is also in this sense 
untenable.  He does not succeed by means of this concept in working his 
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way through to the true phenomenon of time.  Nevertheless, Bergson’s 
investigations are valuable because they manifest a philosophical effort to 
surpass the traditional concept of time.240 
 
And Heidegger adds later: 
Unless the ontological sense of akolouthein [to follow, go after241] has 
been comprehended, the Aristotelian definition of time remains 
unintelligible.  Or else defective interpretations occur, for example that of 
Bergson, who said that time as Aristotle understand is it space.  He was 
misled into adopting this inadequate interpretation because he took 
continuity in the narrower sense of the extensional magnitude of space.  
Aristotle does not reduce time to space nor does he define it merely with 
the aid of space, as though some spatial determination entered into the 
definition of time.  He only wants to show that and how time is something 
connected with motion.  To this end, however, it becomes necessary to 
recognize what is already experienced in and with the experience of 
motion and how time becomes visible in what is thus experienced.242 
 
This view of Bergson as original but misled continues in the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic.  Here Heidegger reaffirms his claim that Bergson’s theory remains 
within the traditional boundaries of metaphysics, as set by the Aristotelian definition of 
time: 
Once the analysis of temporality has first received its direction from the 
basic metaphysical problem, the previous interpretation of time, from 
Aristotle through Augustine to Bergson, can be highlighted in its decisive 
content and appropriated.  And it would be remarkably naïve to reject the 
aid to be found in Aristotle, be it only indirect, for Aristotle defined the 
problematic of time for every subsequent thinker, and not least of all for 
Bergson.243 
 
So even though Bergson attempts to break free from the Aristotelian definition of time, 
he cannot do so.  He cannot see through to the original problem of temporality, and this 
means that his own theory of duration comes up short.  This is why Heidegger says: 
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Recently Bergson tried to conceive the concept of time more originally.  
He made it more clear than any previous philosopher that time is 
interwoven with consciousness.  But the essential thing remained 
unresolved in Bergson, without even becoming a problem.  He developed 
his interpretation of time on the basis of the traditional concept of 
consciousness, of Descartes’ res cogitans.  The basic metaphysical 
problem of the primordial connection between Dasein and temporality he 
does not pose, and even less does he pose the problem of being, for which 
the other problem is only a preparation.244 
 
And he adds in his final interpretive reference to Bergson: 
 
N.B. Bergson first worked out the connection between a derived and an 
original time.  But he did so in a way that went too far and said that time, 
once merged, is space.  Bergson thereby blocked the way to the real 
understanding of derived time, since he, in principle, mistakes the essence 
of emergent time, insofar as he does not view as emergent the time that 
has emerged.  But, conversely, insofar as he stays merely with the time 
that has emerged, he does not really succeed either in clarifying primordial 
and genuine time in its essence.  Bergson’s analyses nonetheless belong to 
the most intense analyses of time that we possess.  It has become a 
commonplace that Bergson (as well as Dilthey) is fuzzy and must be 
therefore re-examined and improved.  But Bergson’s “images” are the 
very expression of his exertions to really grasp the phenomenon within the 
realm he takes for his theme.  The lack does not lie in an alleged fuzziness 
– Bergson is perfectly clear in what he sees.  But it lies in the overly 
narrowed realm of his set of problems.  Nor would this be removed by a 
revision for “greater exactness.”  As everyone knows, there are also exact 
trivialities in philosophy.245 
 
 I find six things particularly noteworthy and relevant about Heidegger’s 
interpretive references to Bergson:  1) Heidegger gives Bergson some respect for 
attempting to get beyond what Heidegger calls ‘ordinary’ time (which Bergson calls 
spatial time) to true temporality.  This gives one the impression that Heidegger felt 
Bergson was something of a kindred spirit.  2) Unfortunately for Bergson, however, he 
failed to get beyond ‘ordinary’ time.  Instead, he simply confused the concept.  After all, 
Bergson was not Heidegger (according to Heidegger).  3) Heidegger connects Bergson to 
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Descartes concept of the conscious subject.  This seems to be an attempt to justify placing 
Bergson in the alleged tradition of thinking on time that runs from Aristotle to Bergson, 
which Heidegger calls the ‘ordinary’ conception of time.  4) Heidegger labels Bergson’s 
theory of time Aristotelian in an essential way.  5) However, Heidegger believes that 
Bergson misunderstood Aristotle’s theory of time.  6) And finally, Heidegger seems to 
have anticipated a likely Bergsonian objection, namely, that Heidegger’s theory of 
primordial or original temporality is a spatial theory of time.   
 Heidegger seems to think Bergson is something of a kindred spirit.  He saw in 
Bergson an attempt to get beyond the ‘ordinary’ concept of time.  He believed Bergson 
was attempting to come to grips with Aristotle’s dominance in the tradition.  He indicates 
that Bergson’s attempts pre-figure Heidegger’s own work in a way.  That is, Bergson 
knew that the ‘ordinary’ theory of time, the theory that springs from Aristotle and runs 
through the tradition, was missing something.  This ‘ordinary’ way of understanding time 
was not adequate to the task of describing our fundamental experience of temporality as 
such.  Bergson calls this failed understanding of time spatial time (temps).  He then 
attempts to set up true time, which he calls duration, in contrast to spatial time (temps).  
He even goes so far as to claim that spatial time derives from a misunderstanding of 
duration.  This move is similar to the move that Heidegger makes, when he claims that 
‘ordinary’ time derives from primordial or original temporality.  So even though 
Bergson’s attempt to get beyond ‘ordinary’ time was not successful, because he does not 
break through to what Heidegger calls original or true temporality, it was still important 
for two reasons.  On the one hand, it showed that the ‘ordinary’ concept of time was 
deficient.  And on the other hand, it provided a point of reference from which Heidegger 
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could proceed.  This also gives some insight into why Heidegger placed Bergson at the 
end of his genealogy of the concept of time.  Bergson knew the Aristotelian dominated 
theories of time that comprise the ‘ordinary’ concept of time were deficient.  He was just 
unable to completely break through the Aristotelian concept itself and get to true 
temporality. 
 Why does Bergson fail to get beyond the Aristotelian concept of time that 
dominates the tradition?  According to Crocker, Bergson failed because he did not 
recognize that time is something that temporalizes (Crocker’s term) itself.  Bergson lacks 
what Crocker claims is Heidegger’s ‘finite transcendence’, which allows Dasein to 
project itself upon its ownmost possibilities for Being.  According to Crocker:  “finite 
being exceeds its intratemporal forms, it is irreducible to actuality and presentness.”246  
What this means is that Bergson did not get beyond the ‘ordinary’ concept of time 
because he was confused about that concept.  And this confusion led him to label the 
‘ordinary’ concept of time ‘spatial’ in a way that sets Bergson up for a counter-concept 
that will necessarily be deficient.  By simply describing time as space, and then 
attempting to reverse this without thinking about the ontological nature of the problem of 
temporality, Bergson ends up with a theory that remains locked within ordinary notions 
of presence and dependence upon the present.  Both of these are hallmarks of the 
‘ordinary’ concept of time.  They do not address Being itself, nor the Being of beings, nor 
the being of Dasein, nor any other primordial considerations that Heidegger believes are 
necessary to the understanding of true or primordial temporality.  This is why Crocker 
claims:  “If Bergson’s distinction between duration and spatial time does not overcome 
the Aristotelian interpretation of time [which, according to Heidegger – and Crocker – it 
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does not], it must be because he thinks the being of time on the basis of being as 
presence.  Even when he reverses the limit-transition opposition, his thought still rests on 
the same unthought relation of time and being as does Aristotle’s.  What is in being now 
is what is in flux.  But the “specific interpretation” of being as being in the present is still 
not placed into question.”247 Or, to put it another way, Bergson’s laudable attempt to get 
beyond the ‘ordinary’ concept of time to true temporality fails because his counter-
concept, duration, is still an Aristotelian concept (albeit not in a way Bergson seems to 
have understood, according to Heidegger).  That is, Bergson seems to fail because 
Bergson is not Heidegger. 
 Bergson’s attempt to get beyond the ‘ordinary’ concept of time was laudable but 
ultimately futile.  It was futile because Bergson’s theory of duration is a theory that 
remains bound to certain modern notions of the subject, which notions find an affinity 
with the Aristotelian theory of time.  In particular, Heidegger notes that Bergson’s theory 
of duration is bound to a Cartesian notion of the ego, which is probably what causes 
Heidegger to place Bergson’s notion of duration into the category of philosophical 
anthropologies, along with Dilthey.  Crocker supports this interpretation of Bergson’s 
theory.  Following Heidegger, he says:  “Bergson describes only our consciousness of 
time – how it appears to us once it is “in being.” Time is thought on the basis of the ego, 
and the subject’s perception of itself, and that in a way, Heidegger claims, that is entirely 
in keeping with the Cartesian subject…Duration is a self-presence, a proximity of the I to 
the I.”248 Here, what Heidegger seems to be doing is attempting to provide reasons for 
saying Bergson’s theory is both Aristotelian and locked within the tradition of 
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metaphysics that includes all such theories as are subject to the ‘ordinary’ notion of time.  
To be sure, Heidegger thinks Bergson did a fine job of describing the relationship of time 
to the conscious subject.  Where Heidegger thinks Bergson failed was in the fact that 
Bergson did not get beyond the conscious subject’s experience of time to temporality 
itself.   
 Heidegger believes Bergson’s theory is bound by the Cartesian notion of the 
subject.  He also believes that it is bound by Aristotle’s theory of time.  Heidegger does 
not place Bergson at the end of the genealogy of the concept of time by accident.  He 
believes Aristotle’s theory of time essentially determines Bergson’s theories of spatial 
time and immediate duration.  This means that Heidegger sees Aristotle as exercising a 
double influence on Bergson.  First, the history of the concept of time is Aristotelian, 
according to Heidegger.  Since Bergson begins Time and Free Will with a long critique of 
spatial theories of time, a critique that runs historically from the paradoxes of the Eleatics 
to the modern theories of time found in Kant and classical mechanics, and Aristotle’s 
theory of time is allegedly the dominant theory in the tradition (although its relationship 
to the theories of the Eleatics and other pre-Socratic thinkers is an interesting topic to 
consider, from a Heideggerian perspective), then it must be the case that Aristotle’s 
theory provides a negative background against which Bergson can react when he 
formulates his criticism of traditional theories of time as being spatial theories.   
 I think Heidegger is making a stronger claim, however.  The fact that he believes 
Aristotle’s theory of time is dominant, and, as he says in the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Logic, “not least of all for Bergson,”249 leads me to believe that Heidegger thinks 
Aristotle’s theory of time exerts a positive influence on Bergson’s theory of duration.  
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However, I do not think Heidegger thinks Bergson’s theory of duration is Aristotelian in 
the same way I believe that it is.250 Heidegger believes that Aristotle’s theory of time, 
which is a theory of time that revolves around the present, or, as Aristotle defines it, the 
‘now’, influences Bergson because Bergson’s theory of time is also a theory of presence 
(as Crocker also indicated).  So even though Bergson tried to get beyond the ‘ordinary’ 
concept of time, he cannot, because the ‘ordinary’ concept of time is a concept of 
presence bound around the present.  Temporality itself (as I shall discuss in Part II 
below), however, is not bound to or around the present.  Instead, it is fundamentally a 
phenomenon of the future.  Bergson, trapped as he is in the Aristotelian influence, cannot 
see this, which is why his concept of duration remains a concept of presence in the 
present, and which is why duration remains an Aristotelian theory. 
 According to Heidegger, though, Bergson believed that he was getting beyond the 
Aristotelian theory and getting to something fundamental about temporality as such.  His 
theory was still too subjective and too bound up with the traditional notion of time as 
influenced by Aristotle’s theory.  From Heidegger’s perspective, this happens because 
Bergson fundamentally misunderstood Aristotle.  He misunderstood Aristotle because 
Aristotle defined time as a number, and according to Heidegger, Bergson took this to 
mean that Aristotle considered the magnitude of space passed over by the motion counted 
to be the same as the time of the motion itself.  This mistake caused Bergson to believe 
that time, on Aristotle’s understanding, was space.  As I discussed in Part III of Chapter 
2, though, Heidegger does not believe the ‘extension’ proper to time, on Aristotle’s 
definition, is the same as extension in the concrete, spatial sense.  Instead, Heidegger 
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reads Aristotle’s use of number and magnitude in reference to time as extension in a 
purely formal sense.  Bergson does not make this distinction, though, which leads to his 
misinterpretation of Aristotle.  And since the history of the concept of time is 
Aristotelian, according to Heidegger, this would mean that Bergson’s critique of spatial 
theories of time in general is based on a faulty premise. 
 For Heidegger, the fact that Bergson misunderstands Aristotle means that 
Bergson’s counter-concept to what he (Bergson) misperceives as spatial theories of time 
is itself faulty, too.  That is, when Bergson tries to present duration as a counter-concept 
to what Heidegger calls ‘ordinary’ theories of time, this presentation does not succeed, 
because it itself is built on the faulty assumption that ‘ordinary’ theories of time are 
necessarily spatial theories of time.  And this misunderstanding derives from Bergson’s 
misunderstanding of Aristotle.  All Bergson does, then, according to Heidegger, is ‘flip’ 
what Heidegger believes to be two interpretations of the same phenomenon, the concept 
of ‘ordinary’ time.  In other words, Bergson’s theory of duration, which is really only a 
theory of the experience of time for conscious subjects in the present, according to 
Heidegger, is only half of the story, so far as the ‘ordinary’ theories of time go.  The other 
half, which Bergson labeled ‘spatial’, is really little more that the beliefs about time that 
we hold independently of our direct experience.  Or, to put it another way, since the 
‘ordinary’ theory of time holds that time exists whether it is perceived or not, yet also 
holds that time exists by and for conscious subjects in their direct experience of present 
temporal events, then all Bergson ends up doing with his theory of duration is concentrate 
on one half of the ‘ordinary’ theory of time while denying the other. 
 171
 This explains why Heidegger thinks Bergson’s theory of duration and his critique 
of spatial time is “ontologically quite indefinite and inadequate,”251 and why he believed 
Bergson blocked himself from breaking through to a true understanding of original or 
primordial temporality.  Had Bergson really understood Aristotle, and been more careful 
not to merely emphasize the experience of ‘ordinary’ time over the definition of and 
analytic understanding of ‘ordinary’ time, then he might have been able to undertake the 
sorts of analyses of original temporality that Heidegger believes he is doing in his early 
works, such as Being and Time.  Bergson’s misunderstanding of Aristotle, though, 
prevents him from escaping that very same Aristotelian influence, which once again 
explains why Heidegger would have placed Bergson at the end of the genealogy of the 
concept of time. 
 I think there is another reason, though, why Heidegger placed Bergson where he 
placed him in regards to the history of the concept of time.  If Heidegger is correct in 
claiming that Bergson misunderstood Aristotle, and therefore ended up with a theory of 
temporality that was interesting and partially original, but ultimately deficient and held 
within the tradition of the ‘ordinary’ concept of time, then it would seem to make sense to 
end the genealogy of the concept of time with Bergson.  Bergson would have been the 
last major thinker to address time in the manner Heidegger has in mind when he talks 
about the concept of ‘ordinary’ time.  But I believe he also places Bergson where he 
places him because he knew that his own theory of primordial or original temporality 
could be construed by Bergson (or a Bergsonian) as another ‘spatial’ theory of time.  By 
trying to tie Bergson to Aristotle, and then claim that:  a) the history of the concept of 
time is Aristotelian; and b) that Bergson is an Aristotelian; but c) he misunderstood 
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Aristotle, which made his concept of duration untenable and unoriginal, Heidegger could 
set up his own theory of primordial or original temporality as both truly original (in terms 
of discussing temporality itself, not derived or ‘ordinary’ time and as distinct both from 
Bergson and any likely Bergsonian critique.  This can be seen in the fact that, in several 
places, Heidegger’s interpretive references to Bergson appear to bring up and answer 
such likely Bergsonian objections. 
 Heidegger must have been aware, then, that his theory of original or primordial 
temporality could be seen as a ‘spatial’ theory of time, in the Bergsonian sense.  This 
helps to explain why Heidegger repeatedly claims that Bergson misunderstood Aristotle, 
erroneously read the history of the concept of time as spatial, when it is only spatial in 
certain respects, and why Heidegger says again and again that Bergson did not succeed in 
breaking through to original temporality.  I do not believe that Heidegger’s assertion that 
his theory of original or primordial temporality is not spatial in the Bergsonian sense is 
sufficient to prove that it is not spatial in the Bergsonian sense.  I think that, by claiming 
Bergson misunderstood Aristotle, without offering more exacting details as to how and 
why this is the case, Heidegger is hoping to obscure two things.  First, he is hoping to 
obscure the fact that Bergson did not misrepresent the history of the concept of time as 
spatial through a misunderstanding of Aristotle, for the simple reason that the history of 
the concept of time is not Aristotelian, but Augustinian.  This does not mean that 
Heidegger is wrong to assert that Bergson was wrong in labeling the history of the 
concept of time as spatial.  It only means his premise is wrong.  I do not believe Bergson 
misread the history of the concept of time, nor do I think he was wrong to label it as 
spatial.  But that is a separate matter.  What is important here is the other thing that I 
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believe Heidegger was hoping to obscure with his claims concerning Bergson’s theory of 
duration, its relationship to the history of the concept of time, and whether or not 
Heidegger’s theory was subject to its criticism.  This other thing is the fact that I believe 
Heidegger’s theory of original or primordial temporality arose, in part, as a reaction to 
Bergson’s theory of duration, and that, if it is read in the context of the Augustinian 
history of the concept of time, it does fall under Bergson’s criticism of spatial theories of 
time, and therefore remains firmly within the tradition of metaphysics Heidegger believed 
he was subverting.  To demonstrate this, I will now turn my attention to Heidegger’s 
theory of original or primordial temporality. 
PART II: HEIDEGGER’S THEORY OF PRIMORDIAL, AUTHENTIC, 
ORIGINAL OR TRUE TEMPORALITY 
 
 Heidegger first works out the concept of original, primordial, authentic or true 
temporality in Division II of Being and Time.  Although he spends a great deal of time 
formulating his theory, this is some dispute as to whether or not Heidegger ever offers a 
clear definition of primordial or authentic temporality.  Mark Okrent holds the view that 
Heidegger’s formulation of original temporality is not clear in the way Heidegger 
believes it is.252  There is also some dispute as to whether or not primordial, original, 
authentic and true temporality are really all just different names for the same thing.  
Daniel Dahlstrom believes that original and authentic temporality are really different 
things, for example.253  And there are those who hold the view that Heidegger’s original 
or authentic (or whatever term one wishes to affix to it) temporality is really a 
temporality of presence, and as such, stays within the tradition of metaphysics that 
Heidegger claimed to be subverting.  This is the view held by Derrida (Okrent also holds 
                                                 
252 Okrent, 191-205. 
253 Dahlstrom, 95-115. 
 174
this view).254 Some of the major commentators on Heidegger, such as Dreyfus and 
Kockelmans, do not seem to have much to say on the matter.  They choose to focus 
primarily on the first Division of Being and Time. 
 I believe that Heidegger does offer a clear account of what he means by original, 
primordial, authentic or true temporality.  I believe that all of these terms refer to the 
same phenomenon (following Okrent, Keller and others).  I believe further that 
Heidegger clarifies some of the aspects of original temporality in both The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology and the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.  And I believe, 
along with Derrida and Okrent, that Heidegger’s theory of primordial or original 
temporality is a theory of temporality based around the concept of the present or 
presence.  However, I believe this for different reasons.  I believe that the nature of 
Heiegger’s theory of true or original temporality is best understood in light of the actual 
history of the concept of time.  That is, I think Heidegger’s theory is clearest when it is 
set within the framework of the Augustinian influence on the history of the concept, and 
against the divergent view of Aristotle’s theory.  When this is done, the 
quantitative/spatial nature of Heidegger’s theory is brought to light.  And when this is 
done, it should be easy to see how Heidegger’s theory of original or primordial 
temporality arises, in part, as a reaction to Bergson’s theory of duration and, rather than 
subverting the tradition of Western metaphysics, actually remains firmly within that 
tradition. 
 To understand Heidegger’s theory of original temporality,255 one needs to 
understand four things.  The first is the definition of temporality as fundamentally a 
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phenomenon of the future, or as primarily ‘futural’ (Heidegger’s term) phenomenon.  
Second, one must see that this future belongs to Dasein.  That is, the future Heidegger has 
in mind when he defines true temporality as a ‘futural’ phenomenon is Dasein’s 
‘ownmost’ potentiality for being.  This means that the future towards which Dasein 
‘throws’ or ‘projects’ itself is already contained within Dasein in some way.  Third, 
because Dasein ‘throws’ itself towards a future that is already there, original temporality 
is a teleological phenomenon.  And finally, because this future exists in, for and through 
Dasein, true temporality must be a phenomenon of consciousness.  This makes 
Heidegger’s concept of original temporality an idealistic concept (in the sense of German 
Idealism).  
 Heidegger claims that he is developing the problem of temporality from a 
different angle than has traditionally been the case.  Most thinkers on time struggle with 
the problem of times three modes:  past, present and future.  Heidegger tries to rework the 
problem from “how can there be three modes of time?” to “how do times three modes 
relate to each other in temporality?”  In other words, Heidegger wants to get behind the 
three modes of time, as they are ordinarily understood, because he wants to get behind or 
beyond the ‘ordinary’ concept of time (which he claims is Aristotelian).  This is 
accomplished, according to Heidegger, when we come to an understanding of temporality 
as it fundamentally and primordially is.  And when we do this, he says, we see that 
temporality is primarily and fundamentally a phenomenon of the future.  Heidegger first 
makes this claim in Being and Time, where he says:  “Primordial and authentic 
temporality temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic future and in such a way that in 
having been futurally, it first of all awakens the Present.  The primary phenomenon of 
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primordial and authentic temporality is the future.”256  And he reiterates and expands 
upon this view in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, where he adds:  “Expecting a 
possibility, I come from this possibility toward that which I myself am.  The Dasein, 
expecting its ability to be, comes toward itself.  In this coming-toward-itself, expectant of 
a possibility, the Dasein is futural in an original sense.”257 
 So the future is the primary mode of authentic or original temporality for 
Heidegger.  The other two modes of time, the past and the present, depend upon the 
future for their being.  Or at the very least, the past and the present are only possible in 
original temporality because of the future towards which original temporality projects 
itself.  Heidegger understands this to be distinct from ‘ordinary’ or inauthentic 
temporality because that phenomenon is based around the present.  As I discussed in Part 
III of Chapter 2, this is one of the meanings Heidegger ascribed to Aristotle’s use of the 
‘now’ in his definition of time.  This ‘ordinary’ conception of time, which descends from 
Aristotle (according to Heidegger) and gives rise to things like ‘clock time’ (also 
according to Heidegger), though, is merely a derivative form of original temporality.  
And original temporality is a phenomenon of the future.  Beginning with Aristotle, and 
descending through to Bergson (presumably), thinkers could not come to grips with true 
temporality because they did not understand the derivative nature of time based on a 
concept of the present.  But even this derivative nature still ultimately finds itself being a 
phenomenon of the future.  This means that both true temporality and ‘ordinary’ time 
must be explained in terms of the future. 
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 Simply saying that true temporality is fundamentally a phenomenon of the future 
is not enough, however.  Generally, when one employs the term ‘future’, one means the 
future of some given thing.  And this given thing generally limits the discussion by 
excluding everything else not related to that given thing.  This would seem to be 
necessary, since to talk about the future in general would be an ambiguous undertaking at 
best.  Heidegger tries to avoid this ambiguity by limiting the scope of the future that 
determines and founds original temporality to Dasein.  That is, the future Heidegger has 
in mind is Dasein’s future.  This is important, because the future of anything other than 
Dasein, which is the being that can have an authentic future, because only Dasein is the 
being for whom its being, and Being in general, is a question, would eventually lead us 
back to ‘ordinary’ conceptions of time.  We would not get to true or original temporality 
that way, so the future cannot be a generalized phenomenon.  It must be the specific 
future of a specific being, and that being is Dasein.  Other things, things in the world, 
things outside of the world, or any other kind of thing in general that is not Dasein, would 
presumably not have their being as questions for them.  And because of this, only Dasein 
is capable of understanding itself as something defined by temporality.  And because of 
this, only Dasein can seek the meaning of Being in original temporality by coming to 
grips with its (Dasein’s) future.  As Okrent sees it: 
We soon discover how Heidegger is using these words (past, present and 
future).  ‘Future’ refers to the act in which Dasein expects, anticipates, or 
intends a possible future being for itself.  Heidegger takes this future to be 
more ‘original’ then the ordinary future because it is a necessary condition 
for the possibility both of being aware of a possible future state of any 
being other than Dasein and of intending the moment at which that state is 
intended as being.  That is, only because Dasein projects a possible future 
for itself, as the for-the-sake-of of its action, is it capable of intending 
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what a being other than itself is capable of, or when it is to realize that 
possibility.258 
 
 This helps to explain how Heidegger can conceive of the past and present as 
phenomena that depend upon the future.  The past and the present depend upon the future 
because they depend upon Dasein’s future.  They depend upon the future because Dasein 
is a being whose meaning becomes revealed to it by its encounter with its own future.  
This transfers the meaning to the present and the past of Dasein, which is why they must 
be dependent upon that future.  Okrent describes the manner in which the past and the 
present rely on the future this way.  Of the past, he says: 
Similarly, when Heidegger uses the term ‘past’, or ‘having been’ in his 
definition of ‘temporality’, he is referring to the way in which any project 
of Dasein’s is an ongoing enterprise that presupposes a set of initial 
conditions and activities already carried out: something is done for the 
sake of x only if it is a stage in a process that has determined Dasein as 
having done, and thus been, such and such.  Any act is the act it is, and is 
done for the sake of some determinate end, only insofar as it is a stage in a 
process of purposive activity that has already been underway when the act 
is performed.259 
 
And concerning the present, he adds: 
 
Finally, the present is just a particular aspect of the act in which Dasein 
acts toward a possible future for itself: namely, that to act for-the-sake-f is 
also in the same act to make present that with which one is a present 
working as that which is worked with an on.  To count as acting toward a 
particular possibility of itself, a Dasein must also count as understanding 
that with which and on which it is working as having some definite 
determination.  It must ‘make present’ those things as such and such if it is 
to exist: that is, it must be a being that acts purposively toward a future.  
Thus the present in Heidegger’s ‘original’ sense, is the making-present of 
what is present, just as the future is the act of coming toward one’s own 
future, and the past is the way in which any project always involves 
continuing projects already underway.260 
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 Heidegger attempts to clarify the nature of temporality as a phenomenon of the 
future by describing the future as a potentiality for being that Dasein already contains 
within itself.  That is, Dasein’s authentic future is something Dasein already possesses in 
some way.  It is simply a matter of Dasein choosing to come towards its authentic future, 
as opposed to choosing to do something else.  That is, how Dasein relates to its future 
will help to determine whether or not Dasein finds itself in a relation with true 
temporality or derivative, ‘ordinary’ time.  If it ‘throws’ itself towards its future, then it 
will be involved with original temporality.  But even if it does something else, and 
regardless of the derivative, inauthentic nature that this other course of action would 
possess, Dasein is still locked into the fact of its own future.  And in this way, the past 
and the present, whether viewed authentically or not, still depend upon Dasein’s future, 
both for their existence and their meaning.  This is what Heidegger means when he says: 
This sort of thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed come towards 
itself in its ownmost possibility, and that it can put up with this possibility 
as a possibility in thus letting itself comes towards itself – in other words, 
that it exists.  This letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive 
possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the 
future as coming towards.  If either authentic or inauthentic Being-
towards-death belongs to Dasein’s Being, then such Being-towards-death 
is possible only as something futural, in the sense which we have now 
indicated, and which we have still to define more closely.  By the term 
‘futural’, we do not here have in view a “now” which has not yet become 
‘actual’ and which sometime will be for the first time.  We have in view 
the coming in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes 
towards itself.  Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural, and in 
such a way that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, 
as being, is always coming towards itself – that is to say, in so far as it is 
futural in its Being in general.261 
 
The past and the present depend upon the future, because it is in throwing itself towards 
its future that Dasein reveals the meaning of temporality, which will eventually lead it to 
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the meaning of its being and Being itself.  When Dasein does this authentically, when it 
realizes that the past and the present depend upon the ‘temporalization’ of temporality, 
the past and the present are seen as dependent upon Dasein’s various possibilities, which 
are what make up the future. 
 This future is not something that is ‘out there’ for Dasein to discover.  It exists 
within Dasein as the meaning of Dasein’s being.  Dasein contains the future within itself 
as its ‘ownmost’ potentiality for being.  Hediegger says:  “Only in so far as Dasein is as 
an “I-am-as-having-been”, can Dasein come towards itself futurally in such a way that it 
comes back.  As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as “having been”.  
Anticipation of one’s uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly 
to one’s ownmost “been”.  Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as 
having been.  The character of “having been” arises, in a certain way, from the future.”262 
This means that the past and the present for Dasein have their meaning through Dasein 
and its relationship to its own future.  So the past and the present are also not ‘out there’, 
but are contained within Dasein in the same way as the future.  In fact, because the future 
is only what it is through Dasein, because even the ‘ordinary’ way of understanding time 
derives from temporality, which derives from Dasein’s own authentic future (whether 
Dasein is comporting itself authentically or not), then the past and the present can only be 
what they are through Dasein.  Heidegger sums it up this way: 
Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself into the Situation 
by making present.  The character of “having been” arises from the future, 
and in such a way that the future which “has been” (or better, which “is in 
the process of having been”) releases from itself the Present.  This 
phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process 
of having been; we designate it as “temporality”.  Only in so far as Daein 
has the definite character of temporality, is the authentic potentiality-for-
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Being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness, as we have described it, made 
possible for Dasein itself.  Temorality reveals itself as the meaning of 
authentic care.263 
 
This reveals something else about Dasein and its relationship to original temporality.  
And it also says something about temporality itself.  If everything about temporality, the 
past and present included, is geared towards Dasein’s future, and Dasein comes towards 
this future, then Heidegger’s theory of original temporality is a teleological theory. 
 Dasein already contains its future within itself.  It is by realizing this future that 
Dasein experience true or authentic temporality, which in turn is what makes a particular 
Dasein authentic.  Since the future is what makes authentic temporality authentic, and 
this future is the same as the realization of Dasein’s ‘ownmost’ potential, then 
Heidegger’s theory of original or authentic temporality is a teleological theory.  By 
making the future known to Dasein as its own future, its own potential, Heidegger is 
claiming that true temporality is directed toward something.  When something is directed 
toward something, then that thing that serves as the final destination, the goal, generates 
the meaning of that thing.  This is what Aristotle means by final cause, for example.  The 
goal of a pen is to be an instrument of writing, therefore writing is what defines a pen.  
The goal of Dasein is to throw itself towards its ‘ownmost’ potentiality for being.  
Therefore this potentiality of Dasein is what defines Dasein.  And since it is the process 
of doing this that constitutes temporality, then this goal defines temporality as well.  This 
is why the future, according to Heidegger’s theory, cannot be a vague thing, or even a set 
of random possibilities.  At least, the authentic future that describes true temporality 
cannot be these things.  Instead, the authentic future can only be what Dasein already has 
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as its possibility, what it ‘throws’ itself towards when it behaves authentically.  This is 
why he says: 
The “ahead-of-itself” is grounded in the future.  In the “Being-already-
in…”, the character of “having been” is made known.  “Being-
alongside…”becomes possible in making present.  While the “ahead” 
includes the notion of a “before”, neither the ‘before’ in the ‘ahead’ nor 
the ‘already’ is to be taken in terms of the way time is ordinarily 
understood; this has been automatically ruled out by what has been said 
above.  With this ‘before’ we do not have in mind ‘in advance of 
something’ in the sense of ‘not yet now – but later’; the ‘already’ is just as 
far from signifying ‘no longer now – but earlier’.264 
 
All of this serves to indicate that the future, as a conceptual goal for Dasein, is already 
present to Dasein in some way.  Otherwise, how could it serve as the meaning for Dasein 
and for temporality as such? 
 Given that this is the case, it would seem difficult to make the case that 
Heidegger’s theory of original temporality is not teleological.  After all, Heidegger says:  
“The ‘before’ and the ‘ahead’ indicate the future as of a sort which would make it 
possible for Dasein to be such that its potentiality-for-Being is an issue.  Self-projection 
upon the ‘for-the-sake-of-oneself’ is grounded in the future and is an essential 
characteristic of existentiality.  The primary meaning of existentiality is the future.”265 
And this future seems to actually exist in the present in some fashion.  In fact, Heidegger 
claims that the present itself is defined by the authentic future of temporality, which is the 
authentic potentiality-for-being of Dasein.  If the past and the present are defined by the 
future, what else could this theory be, other than teleological?  This is particularly the 
case when one considers the ‘fallen’ state of Dasein.  If Dasein ‘fell’ from somewhere, 
and is trying to recover that from which it fell, and this ‘pre-fallen’ state is a state found 
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only in Dasein’s authentic future anyway, then not only is Heidegger’s theory of original 
temporality teleological, but it is teleological in a decidedly traditional way.  That is, it 
incorporates all the ordinary notions of beginnings and ends, arche and teloi, it just 
happens to do so in an archaic fashion.266 
 Original or authentic temporality is a phenomenon based on the future.  The past 
and the present are bound up with this future, and are given meaning by this future.  
Since the future is already contained within Dasein as Dasein’s authentic potential-for-
being, then the future is Dasein’s own goal towards which it works.  This makes original 
temporality teleological.  All of these things center around one phenomenon:  Dasein.  
This makes original temporality a phenomenon of Dasein.  And this makes Dasein a 
theory of the modern conscious subject.  Of course, I do not think either Heidegger or 
Heideggerians would agree with this claim.  And to be fair, Heidegger never explicitly 
restricts Dasein to human form (although one wonders what else he would think it could 
be?).  But even if Dasein could be something other than human, that does not mean it is 
not a conscious subject in the Kantian or even Hegelian sense.  Nor does it allow 
Heidegger’s treatment of Dasein, and its role in creating true temporality, or its 
relationship to true temporality, to escape these kinds of analyses.  When one looks at the 
way Dasein is used in conjunction with true temporality in his early works, then, it 
becomes apparent that Dasein is, in fact, a theory of the subject. 
 For example, when Heidegger describes original or authentic temporality, it is 
only through Dasein that this examination can take place.  Things in the world may be 
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caught up in ‘ordinary’ time.  But they are neither caught up in ‘ordinary’ time for 
themselves, nor can they experience authentic temporality for themselves.  Things are 
only things.  Both true temporality and ‘ordinary’ time encounter things only when and 
how Dasein encounters things.  Even the totality of things Dasein experiences, what 
Heidegger calls the ‘world’, takes its form, authentic in true temporality, inauthentic in 
‘ordinary’ time, from the way Dasein comports itself to this ‘world’ and the things it 
contains.  Neither ‘ordinary’ time nor true temporality can exist independently of 
Dasein’s comportment to this ‘world’ and its things.  Keller describes this relationship 
this way:  “Heidegger affirms the existence of physical occurrences that are independent 
of time, but not the existence of a physical time that is independent of the way in which 
such occurrences are disculosed to us.  Were he to assume an ultimate ontological 
difference between time and events or things with changing states that holds 
independently of human understanding, he would be committed to an absolute theory of 
time.  Because he identifies time with the basic condition under which entities exist for 
us, he is led to deny an independent reality to time.”267 Not only does this comportment 
by Dasein give the ‘world’ meaning.  In a very real sense, it seems that Heidegger’s 
theory must lead us to believe that Dasein actually creates the ‘world’ in the first place.  
This is because the world is always encountered as something in Dasein’s ‘fallen’ state.  
Presumably, Dasein must ‘fall’ first, then create the ‘world’ through this ‘fallen’ state, 
and then, perhaps, re-encounter the ‘world’ again once Dasein regains its lost 
authenticity.  This is why Heidegger says: 
Just as the Present arises in the unity of the temporalizing of temporality 
out of the future and having been, the horizon of a Present temporalizes 
itself equiprimordially with those of the future and of having been.  In so 
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far as Dasein temporalizes itself, a world is too.  In temporalizing itself 
with regard to is Being as temporality, Dasein is essentially ‘in a world’, 
by reason of the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of that temporality.  The 
world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, but temporalizes itself 
in temporality.  It ‘is’, with the “outside-of-itself” of the ecstases, ‘there’.  
If no Dasein exists, no world is ‘there’ either.268 
 
 Now if it is the case that the ‘world’ depends on Daein for its existence, then how 
can Dasein not be the subject in either the Hegelian or the Kantian sense?  Heidegger at 
least suspected that his treatment of Dasein resembled Hegel’s subject, because he 
devoted the end of Being and Time to a quick analysis of Hegel.  He even thought Hegel 
was on the correct path, although still confined to the Aristotelian tradition, and hence, 
still outside of the problem of true temporality.  This is why he says:  “The priority which 
Hegel hs given to the “now” which has been levelled off, makes it plain that in defining 
the concept of time he is under the say of manner in which time is ordinarily  understood; 
and this means that he is likewise under the sway of the traditional conception of it.  It 
can even be shown that his conception of time has been drawn directly from the ‘physics’ 
of Aristotle.”269 Perhaps the difference lies in the fact that Heidegger definitively says 
that Dasein is finite.  And Dasein is finite because of its inevitable death.   
 Dasein dies, and the fact that it will die, its ‘being-towards-death’, is important to 
it.  Since Dasein experiences true temporality as the projecting of itself towards its 
‘ownmost-potentiality-for-being’, which lies in its future, which future is contained 
within itself already, then it must be the case that true temporality is also finite.  
‘Ordinary’ time, however, is generally understood to be infinite.  This is because 
‘ordinary’ time arises out of, or rather, derives from, Dasein’s experience, and even 
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rejection of, the authentic, finite temporality that it experiences as and through itself.  
Heidegger says: 
The problem is not one of how the ‘derived’ infinite time, ‘in which’ the 
ready-to-hand arises and passes away, becomes primordial finite 
temporality; the problem is rather that of how inauthentic temporality 
arises out of finite authentic temporality, and how inauthentic temporality, 
as inauthentic, temporalizes an in-finite time out of the finite.  Only 
because primordial time is finite can the ‘derived’ time temporalize itself 
as infinite.  In the order in which we get things into our grasp through the 
understanding, the finitude of time does not become fully visible until we 
have exhibited ‘endless time’ so that these may be contrasted.270 
 
And he adds a little later:  “Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and as 
such it makes possible the Constitution of the structure of care.  Temporality is 
essentially ecstatical.  Temporality temporalizes itself primordially our of the future.  
Primordial time is finite.”271 
 So it is clearly the case that authentic or original temporality can only be 
something that is bound up essentially with Dasein.  If it were not, then it would have to 
be bound up with things in the ‘world’, which it is clearly not, or it would have to be a 
phenomenon of Being itself.  It does not appear to be the latter, either, though, because it 
is through true temporality that Dasein gets to the meaning of Being.  Being itself does 
not appear to be temporal, at least not in the sense that Heidegger has been using true 
temporality (and certainly not as something derived like ‘ordinary’ time).  Nor is it 
proper, from a Heideggerian perspective, to say that Being itself is finite, and true 
temporality is definitely finite.  Therefore, true, original, authentic or primordial 
temporality is a phenomenon of Dasein.  And this, as far as I can tell, makes it a 
phenomenon of consciousness, which makes the theory a theory of the subject.  And it is 
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a theory of the subject that is clearly teleological in nature, since the temporality that 
Dasein encounters when it experiences true temporality found in the future, and this 
future is, and can only be, Dasein’s future.  And it is this future that gives meaning to 
both the past and the present, which is why true temporality is centered around the future 
that Dasein throws itself toward. 
 All of this describes a theory of temporality that is not quite as original as 
Heidegger claims it to be.  Rather, it seems to share a lot with Augustine’s theory of time.  
Both theories locate the real understanding of time in the mind (although Heidegger’s 
conception is certainly more advanced than Augustine’s).  Both use one mode of time to 
explain and give reality to the other two, with the difference being the mode they choose 
to center time around.  However, as I shall discuss in the concluding part to this chapter 
and this dissertation, the way Heidegger uses the future ends up treating the future as the 
present, which makes his theory of temporality really a theory of the present.  And this 
further binds him to the Augustinian tradition.  All of this serves to make Heidegger’s 
theory of time a ‘spatial’ theory of time, in the manner Bergson describes spatial theories.  
And this, I believe, means that Heidegger’s theory of original, true, authentic or 
primordial temporality a theory that arose, in part, as a reaction to Bergson’s theory of 
duration. 
PART III: READING HEIDEGGER’S THEORY OF ORIGINAL TEMPORALITY 
AS A REACTION TO BERGSON’S THEORY OF DURATION. 
 
 There are three key passages that lead me to believe that Heidegger’s theory of 
original temporality is at least a partial reaction to Bergson’s theory of duration.  Two of 
these passages have already been discussed in Part I of this chapter.  The first is the 
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passage from Being and Time where Heidegger claims that he is not introducing a 
‘spatial’ concept of time, as he thought Bergson might claim: 
But time, as within-time-ness, arises from an essential kind of 
temporalizing of primordial temporality.  The fact that this is its source, 
tells us that the time ‘in which’ what is present-at-hand arises and passes 
away, is a genuine phenomenon of time; it is not an externalization of a 
‘qualitative time’ into space, as Bergson’s Interpretation of time – which is 
ontologically quite indefinite and inadequate – would have us believe.272 
 
The second comes in the long endnote on Hegel.  Here Heidegger links Bergson to 
Aristotle, but postpones a direct discussion of Bergson until later: 
Having regard to Aristotle’s definition of time as the “measure of 
motion”273, Bergson prefaces his analysis of time with an analysis of 
number.  Time as space is quantitative Succession.  By a counter-
orientation to this conception of time, duration gets described as 
qualitative Succession.  This is not the place for coming to terms critically 
with Bergson’s conception of time or with other Present-day views of it.  
So far as anything essential has been achieved in to-day’s analyses which 
will take us beyond Aristotle and Kant, it pertains more to the way time is 
grasped and to our ‘consciousness of time’.  We shall come back to this in 
the first and third divisions of Part Two.274 
 
And the third passage comes in the Introduction to Being and Time.  I believe that this 
passage is the most revealing of the three.  This passage is Heidegger’s famous statement:  
“Higher than actuality stands possibility.”275 
 I find this last passage to be the most revealing because it contradicts Bergson’s 
reversal of the traditional understanding of actuality and possibility.  That is, Bergson, in 
the Creative Mind, had claimed that possibility or potentiality is not prior to actuality or 
reality – either temporally or any other way other than as an act of speculative 
imagination.  In other words, it is often thought, based on a common misunderstanding of 
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Aristotle’s Metaphysics, that first a number of possibilities exist for a given action.  One 
of those possibilities then becomes reality (or actuality).  But regardless of which 
possibility becomes reality, all the other possibilities are still said to have existed before 
the particular reality became that particular reality.  According to Bergson, though, this 
cannot be the case.  The possibilities can only be said to exist after the particular reality 
comes into being, and only then as speculative operations of consciousness projected 
back into the past.  Bergson says: 
As reality is created as something unforeseeable and new, its image is 
reflected behind it into the indefinite past; thus it finds that it has from all 
time been possible, but it is at this precise moment that it begins to have 
been always possible, and that is why I said that its possibility, which does 
not precede its reality, will have preceded it once the reality has appeared.  
The possible is therefore the mirage of the present in the past; and as we 
know the future will finally constitute a present and the mirage effect is 
continually being produced, we are convinced that the image of tomorrow 
is already contained in our actual present, which will be the past of 
tomorrow, although we did not manage to grasp it.  That is precisely the 
illusion.276 
 
Consciousness can make assumptions based on past experiences.  But these assumptions 
have nothing more than an imaginative/speculative bearing on reality.  They do not exist 
as something ‘out there’, independent of consciousness. 
 Heidegger’s entire theory of original temporality, however, relies on possibility or 
potentiality, as that which Dasein throws itself towards.  This is the primary phenomenon 
of original or authentic temporality, this possibility which exists only as the future for 
Dasein.  It is from this that both Dasein’s own potentiality for being authentic and the 
‘ordinary’ conception of time that Heidegger draws from Aristotle to Bergson spring.  
But by conceiving of Dasein, and original temporality in this manner, I think Heidegger 
ends up doing two things.  First, he creates a ‘space’ for Dasein.  This space might seem 
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to be mobile, or relative, or something else other than the absolute, infinite space of 
classical mechanics or Kant that Bergson has in mind when he critiques ‘spatial’ theories 
of time in Time and Free Will.  But it is still a space.  And, since it is within this space 
that Dasein has its meaning and the meaning of Being itself disclosed to it, and since 
Being itself frames all possible temporal experiences whatsoever, then a form of absolute 
space does creep back into Heidegger’s theory.  Second, by conceiving of temporality in 
this way, and by making ‘ordinary’ or ‘clock’ time derivative of it, Heidegger ends up 
with a rather Augustinian theory of temporality.  This is because Heidegger thinks of 
original temporality as something within Dasein which carries a teleological component 
for each Dasein, while still revealing the deeper meaning of that from which each Dasein 
springs (Being itself).  This ends up placing Heidegger’s theory back into the tradition of 
metaphysics that Heidegger claimed he was subverting.  And this makes it subject to the 
Bergsonian critique of such theores. 
 This is a new claim about Heidegger’s theory of original temporality, so far as I 
know.  Few others have even discussed the relationship between Bergson and Heidegger, 
and then not in much detail.  Only Crocker discussed it at any length, as I noted in Part I 
of this chapter; and he thought Heidegger’s theory of original temporality overcame 
certain inadequacies in Bergson’s theory of duration.  Other thinkers, however, have 
noted the spatial nature of Heidegger’s theory, or have placed his theory within the 
purview of traditional metaphysics.  Sallis, for example, discusses the spatial nature of 
Heidegger’s theory of original temporality.  But he does not make any connections to 
Bergson.  Derrida points out the traditional metaphysical nature of Heidegger’s theory, 
 191
but he also declines to make the connection to Bergson.  Nevertheless, I believe the 
connection is there, and both of these thinkers will be helpful in drawing it out. 
 Heidegger’s theory of original temporality is a ‘spatial’ theory of time, according 
to the Bergsonian criteria.  These criteria include the existence of the future as something 
‘present’ to the present, teleological thinking, and time’s reliance on something non-
temporal that ‘frames’ time.  Heidegger’s theory of original temporality satisfies these 
criteria.  This does not mean that Heidegger himself thought his theory was ‘spatial’.  He 
believed that it either of the following was the case.  Either space was free of time, or 
space depended upon time (rather than the other way around, which is what Bergson 
found lacking in ‘spatial’ theories of time).  As Maria Villela-Petit points out: 
According to Sein und Zeit, nevertheless, the foundation of spatiality upon 
temporality not only serves to secure the independence of space with 
reference to time but also makes it possible to understand the dependence 
of Dasein with regard to space and, in this way, ‘the well known fact 
concerning the abundance of “spatial images” in language’.  This ‘fact’, 
let us recall, had been thematized by H. Bergson in Time and Free Will 
where space and language are found to be intricately interconnected.  As 
for Heidegger, he claims to be able to explain it with reference to 
temporality itself.  Does he not see in it, after all, the sign of a dominance 
of the present as the temporal dimension of concern, which is the mode of 
being of Dasein delivered over to its concernful everydayness, by way of 
which, for him, its spatiality is also made manifest?277 
 
But this passage also demonstrates that Heidegger was not quite able to divorce space 
from time.  Space creeps back into temporal thinking because of the prominence of the 
present.  Nor does the claim that it is the future that is the primary phenomenon of 
temporality overcome the effect of the present and its pull on language – and the ‘spatial’ 
thinking associated with that language.  In fact, the opposite would seem to be the case.  
By claiming that the future is primary, rather than the present, Heidegger’s theory 
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becomes more ‘spatialized’ than most of the ‘ordinary’ theories of time Heidegger claims 
he is attempting to overcome. 
 This can be seen most clearly by examining the role of death in terms of Dasein’s 
future.  Death is the end of Dasein.  At the same time, death is not part of Dasein’s 
temporality, strictly speaking, since death is the temporal event that ends Dasein as 
Dasein.  Once Dasein is no longer Dasein, then it cannot experience itself temporally (or 
any other way, one would imagine).  Yet death is the foremost possibility Dasein faces, 
particularly because Death is the only certainty of Dasein’s future.  To be authentic, then, 
Dasein must throw itself towards its own death, even though this death, which forms the 
limit of all possible temporality for Dasein, means the end of Dasein as Dasein.  This 
makes death both unthinkable and the limit of thought.  So, since temporality is how 
Dasein discloses Being itself, and death is the ultimate limit of temporality and outside of 
temporality, then temporality is determined, in some way, by the non-temporal.  This sort 
of double-speak is not foreign to definitions of time, to be sure.  Both Aristotle and 
Augustine note the difficulties that ordinary language imposes on understanding time.  
Heidegger himself noted this, and discussed the problem himself.  But Heidegger’s 
discussion keyed off of Aristotle, rather than Augustine, even though Augustine treated 
the problem in more detail – detail which turns out to be similar to Heidegger’s theories, 
since it involves a non-temporal presence framing time, and so on.  Now Heidegger 
claimed that Augustine followed Aristotle on most major points.  I have already claimed 
that this claim is dubious at best, if not outright misleading.  Patrick Bigelow notes this 
oddity as well, saying:  “We find this [the problem of language and reference in regards 
to time] more explicitly embodied in Augustine than in Aristotle, for in the former 
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language is called to greater sophistication by virtue of the disclosure of its allegorical 
character when called upon to reflect its own origin.  And the problem of language is for 
Augustine one with the problem of time.  Precisely this is the difference between 
Aristotle and Augustine278, a difference early Heidegger failed to note – a remarkably 
puzzling failure.”279 Death, as the limit of time, is also hindered by the problems 
language has in defining time, particularly since death, too, is both the limit and beyond 
the limit of temporal thinking. 
 This makes death both the limit and goal of temporality in Heidegger, which is 
how Sallis sees it: 
Death is the end, the final possibility, the most extreme possibility, the 
possibility beyond which one cannot cast oneself, das Verbei.  It is, one 
may say, the suspending of time, of the time as which I am myself.  It is a 
future that will never be present, that will never have become present: “As 
the authentic future, das Vorbei can never become present” (Z 21).  With 
death my time will have stopped, come to a standstill; death is as much 
out(side) of my time as is eternity.  And yet, it is precisely from, out of das 
Vorbei that authentic time is formed, that is, proper time, time itself, or, 
rather, the time that I myself am.  Death, das Vorbei, suspends time and 
yet grants time, lets it unfold.  It is not something other than time but is, 
rather, something that one might almost call a time out of time; it is the 
limit of time, itself neither time nor not time, the limit too of the itself, as 
well as of my own self.  It is a limit that delimits without being simply 
delimitable, an elusive and self-effacing limit – impending with certainty 
and complete indefiniteness.280 
 
I do not see how this limit could possibly be anything other than spatial.  Dasein’s death 
is already given by Dasein as the ultimate future event.  It is the future that determines 
temporality for Dasein.  Dasein cannot be conceived at all apart from its own death.  
Therefore, the even that serves as the ultimate definition of temporality for Dasein, which 
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is what Heidegger considers to be original temporality, is already given as an a priori 
condition for Dasein.  And transcendental conditions are ‘spatial’ conditions, according 
to the Bergsonian understanding. 
 This is further evidenced by the following consideration.  Death is a 
transcendental condition of Dasein.  As such, it must be non-temporal.  Yet death is also 
the limit that defines temporality for Dasein, because every Dasein faces its own death as 
the ultimate future event that defines all other future events towards which Dasein can 
‘throw’ itself.  So even though Heidegger claimed that temporality is supposed to arise 
out of the ‘temporalization’ of temporality, it ends up arising out of something more akin 
to the eternal.  This is because death is outside of temporal experience as such, which is 
precisely what it means for something to be eternal.  If the temporal is defined by the 
eternal, then the eternal acts as a frame for the temporal, particularly when that eternal 
thing defines the temporal as such.  This brings space returns to Heidegger’s concept of 
original temporality, since death, as something non-temporal, must end up as a spatial 
concept.  This is why Sallis declares:  “And yet, space, long since subordinated to world 
and hence even more rigorously to temporality, does in fact return at the very heart of 
Being and Time; it does in fact return in metaphorized form as the very point where it is a 
matter of expressing the constitution of temporality.”281  This space is finite, instead of 
infinite.  But that only serves to make a slight distinction of degree between Heidegger 
and classical mechanics.  It does not lesson the comparison between Heidegger and 
Augustine, or between Heidegger and Kant, for that matter.  Both of these thinkers had to 
have a finite limit on temporal experience, since they located that experience within finite 
beings.  Heidegger does something similar with both time and space; but this does not 
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make his theory any less spatial.  This is because the space forged by Dasein’s ‘hurtling’ 
towards its own death is forced back into all of Dasein’s temporal experiences, whether 
Dasein is authentically aware of them or not. 
 By re-introducing the notion of space into his account of original temporality, 
Heidegger ends up staying within the confines of the Bergsonian critique of spatial 
theories of time, despite what Heidegger himself thought.  Even though Heidegger’s 
theory of space, and how it relates to Dasein and Dasein’s experience of original 
temporality, is different than the theories of space found in classical mechanics, it still 
only addresses one side of Bergson’s critique.  Heidegger seems to have thought that 
Bergson’s critique of spatial theories of time only applied to those theories Heidegger 
claimed were ‘ordinary’ theories of time descended from Aristotle.  This is probably why 
Heidegger says in the introduction to Being and Time:  “Here we must make clear that 
this conception of time and, in general, the ordinary way of understanding it, have sprung 
from temporality, and we must show how this has come about.  We shall thereby restore 
to the ordinary conception the autonomy which is its rightful due, as against Bergson’s 
thesis that the time one has in mind in this conception is space.”282 Presumably, 
Heidegger’s notion of finite space, which derives from the inevitability of Dasein’s death, 
does not fall under Bergson’s concept.  But Bergson’s critique was directed as much 
against Kantian idealism as it was against the ‘realism’ of classical mechanics.  So even 
though Kant could conceive of time without specific content, he could not conceive of it 
without the conscious subject.  This makes Kant’s notion of time ontologically finite.  
And it leaves space intact as the defining characteristic of temporal thought.  So, despite 
the attempt to get by with only a metaphor of space, Hediegger’s theory must become 
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caught up in the necessity of spatial thinking, or it becomes unthinkable.  This is why 
Sallis says:  “And yet, will space – even if metaphorized – ever cease to return in 
Heidegger’s analysis?  Will it not already have returned in the very designation 
Innerzeitigkeit?  Can the within be though without space?”283  I think it cannot be. 
 By re-introducing space into his theory of original temporality, Heidegger ends up 
with a theory of time that remains within the dominant metaphysical tradition.  That is, 
whether intentional, metaphorical, or not, the presence of space and spatial kinds of 
thinking in Heidegger’s theory holds his theory within the tradition of metaphysics 
Heidegger claimed to be subverting/escaping.  This happens because Dasein is a being 
oriented towards death.  This makes Dasein a teleological being; and it makes 
Heidegger’s theory of original temporality a teleological theory.  The fact that Dasein is 
thought of as a ‘fallen’ being trying to ‘project itself back’ upon some authentic set of 
possibilities only serves to set up a space within which temporality operates.  And 
because this is a transcendental condition for Dasein, the fact of Dasein’s death serves as 
both a beginning and an end for Dasein’s temporality:  an archeology to go with the 
teleology.  Heidegger’s combination of the two into one concept may be unique in some 
ways, but only insofar as it is a new twist on an old tradition.  This is why Derrida claims: 
The extraordinary trembling to which classical ontology is subjected in 
Sein und Zeit still remains within the grammar and lexicon of metaphysics.  
And all the conceptual pairs of opposites which serve the destruction of 
ontology are ordered around one fundamental axis: that which separates 
the authentic from the inauthentic and, in the very last analysis, primordial 
from fallen temporality…Now, is not the opposition of the primordial to 
the derivative still metaphysical?  Is not the quest for an archia in general, 
no matter with what precautions one surrounds the concept, still the 
“essential” operation of metaphysics?  Supposing, despite powerful 
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presumptions, that one may eliminate it from any other provenance, is 
there not at least some Platonism in the Verfallen?284 
 
And this is precisely how Augustine understood time:  a synthesis of past and future, 
bound to the present, and all in the mind.  All Heidegger seems to be doing, then, 
particularly according to Derrida’s analysis, is changing which mode of time is the 
dominant mode.  Rather than the past of the present, the present of the present, and the 
future of the present, Heidegger asserts that original or authentic temporality is the past of 
the future, the present of the future and the future of the future.  This is what Dasein 
realizes when it engages itself in authentic temporality, particularly when it realizes that 
the ultimate future of the future is its own death. 
 So Heidegger’s theory of original temporality is a spatial theory that remains 
within the tradition of metaphysics.  This tradition, however, is not Aristotelian, as he 
claimed it was, but Augustinian, as I demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 2, and again in the 
above discussion.  This sets the stage for an examination of Heidegger’s remarks 
concerning the positioning of possibility and actuality.  To say that possibility stands 
higher than actuality could mean several things.  It could mean that there are many 
possibilities, but only one that is correct.  It could mean that all possibilities are equally 
probable at a given time, which means collectively they have a higher standing than the 
one that becomes actual.  But in the context of Heidegger’s early works, particularly in 
Being and Time, it seems to me that his claim means the following.  The possibility that 
Heidegger refers to is the future of Dasein.  Specifically, this future is the future that 
Dasein throws itself towards when Dasein is acting authentically and engaged in original 
temporality.  In fact, original temporality itself is based on this very possibility.  
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Actuality, then, is the present circumstance in which Dasein finds itself (which tends to 
be a fallen circumstance, according to Heidegger).  But this actuality, this present, is less 
important, both temporally and ontologically, than the future that Dasein ‘throws’ itself 
toward.  And, since the present as such is only authentic if it is authentically the present 
of Dasein’s future, then it must be, in some sense, less real than the future towards which 
it is aimed.  This makes Dasein’s authentic future the foundational concept of 
Heidegger’s theory of original temporality. 
 The fact that Heidegger’s theory of original temporality is a foundational theory 
means two things, I believe.  First, as I have already demonstrated, it means that 
Heidegger’s theory is, in fact, a traditional theory of time.  And it is a traditional theory of 
time under the criteria Bergson assigns to ‘spatial’ theories of time.  These criteria tend to 
spring from Augustine, and Heidegger’s theory certainly has an Augustinian flavor to it.  
Since it is a foundational theory in this way, than the foundational concept of the 
foundational theory must have at least as much reality as any other concept in that theory.  
If it did not, the theory would implode from the beginning.  Heidegger’s theory does not 
do this, even if it also does not seem to do the things Heidegger thought it did, such as 
subvert the history of metaphysics.  The future must be real, for Heidegger, in the way 
that it is real for Augustine – and for every other spatial theory of time.  It is real because 
it is already there, present to consciousness (or Dasein, in Heidegger’s case), just like 
space is all already there.  And second, by taking what Bergson had identified as a 
traditional mistake in the order of the possible and the actual, and constructing a theory of 
temporality based precisely on this mistaken order, and claiming that he was not doing 
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what Bergson would say he was doing, it must have been the case that Heidegger had 
Bergson at least partially in mind when he constructed his theory of original temporality. 
 If Heidegger did not have Bergson in mind, then why would he go to all the 
trouble of pointing out that what he was doing was not what Bergson would have said he 
was doing?  And for that matter, why claim a concept as ‘primordial’ or ‘original’ if one 
is not engaged in some kind of foundationalism?  As I discussed above, Derrida pointed 
out that discussions of originals and derivatives are themselves necessarily traditionally 
metaphysical.  And Sallis showed that space worked its way back into Heidegger’s theory 
of original temporality.  But Heidegger claims, emphatically, even, that what he is doing 
is not spatial in the sense Bergson would have claimed.  He even goes so far as to say that 
the ordinary way of understanding time itself, which Heidegger claims derives from 
authentic or primordial temporality, does not come about in the way Bergson suggested: 
We call the temporal attribute of entities within-the-world “within-time-
ness.”  The kind of ‘time’ which is first found ontically in within-time-
ness, becomes the basis on which ordinary traditional conception of time 
takes form.  But time, as within-time-ness, arises from an essential kind of 
temporalizing of primordial temporality.  The fact that this is its source, 
tells us that the time ‘in which’ what is present-at-hand arises and passes 
away, is a genuine phenomenon of time; it is not an externalization of a 
‘qualitative time’ into space, as Bergson’s Interpretation of time – which is 
ontologically quite indefinite and inadequate – would have us believe.285 
 
But what these factors combine to reveal is the fact that Heidegger was aware that 
Bergson’s thinking could level a critique against Heidegger’s theory of original 
temporality. 
 Heidegger claims he is trying to “restore” the ‘ordinary’ conception of time is 
rightful place.  Even if this claim seems strange, considering the fact that he believes 
‘ordinary’ time to be derivative of original temporality, anyway, he clearly asserts that he 
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is doing this to counter a claim made explicitly by Bergson:  ‘ordinary’ time is, in 
actuality, space.  And he claims that Bergson tried to do something similar to Heidegger, 
insofar as Bergson tried to get beyond the ‘ordinary’ concept of time, which was 
admirable.  But because Bergson did not understand ‘ordinary’ time properly, he really 
could not get beyond it, which is why Heidegger claims that Bergson’s concept of 
duration ends up being inadequate.  Both Heidegger’s conception of ‘ordinary’ time and 
original temporality, then, can be seen as reactions to concepts at play in Bergson’s 
critique of spatial time and Bergson’s theory of duration.  This clearly indicates that 
Heidegger was reacting to Bergson, at least in part, when he developed his theory of 
original, primordial, true or authentic temporality. 
 This explains why Heidegger claimed in his early works that the history of the 
concept of time was Aristotelian.  Bergson was an Aristotelian, as I showed in Chapter 3.  
But the rest of the history of the concept was not, as I showed in Chapters 1 and 2.  
Heidegger’s theory of original temporality, though, as I discussed in Part II of this 
chapter, and above in this concluding part, falls within the tradition dominated by 
Augustine. 
 I think several important questions follow from this.  First, if Heidegger was 
reacting to Bergson, did he succeed in overcoming Bergson’s theory?  Second, if 
Heidegger remains in the tradition of metaphysics, what other implications abound 
concerning Heidegger’s theory of primordial temporality?  And third, does this make 
Bergson the more original thinker, and perhaps more worthy of study in terms of future 
metaphysical, epistemological, and even ethical projects? 
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 As far as the first question goes, I do not believe that Heidegger succeeds in 
overcoming Bergson’s critique of spatial theories of time.  Because his theory is 
teleological and subjective, it really only succeeds, I think, in confusing the ordinary 
concept of time found in thinkers such as Kant.  This is done, it seems to me, by 
importing some of the latent and explicit theological notions from Augustine into what is 
supposed to be a theology-free theory of original temporality.  By making this theory 
dependent upon both Dasein’s future, and the death of Dasein as the ultimate defining 
characteristic of that future, Heidegger ends up with a spatial theory that does even less 
than the two major spatial theories of time prior (Kant and classical mechanics) do.  On 
the one hand, it cannot get beyond the subject, and on the other hand, it has a tendency 
towards the purely morbid.  It does nothing to open the future up, as Bergson theory of 
duration does.  It does nothing to aid evolution, as Bergson’s theory of duration does.  In 
fact, it reduces Dasein to its death, which would seem to put a halt to concepts such as 
freedom – concepts that are very much alive and at play in Bergson.  This leads 
Heidegger back into the paradoxes that spatial theories of time generally exhibit, 
particularly insofar as Heidegger’s theory relies so heavily on Dasein’s future as death. 
 Second, because Heidegger’s theory is a traditional metaphysical theory after all, 
I believe the criticisms of such divergent thinkers as Derrida, Adorno and the like are 
made more effective.  Because temporality is a function of Dasein projecting itself 
towards its death, temporality is contained within the subject.  This means that 
Heidegger’s theory displays many of the inadequacies evident in purely subjective 
theories, but with a new and even more limiting twist.  For thinkers such as Hegel, who 
are also critiqued as being subjective, there is at least the potential for growth in and by 
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the subject.  Concepts such as Absolute Knowing, though, would seem unreachable, a 
priori, by a being completely pre-occupied with its own death.  This means, I think, that 
not only is it the case that Heidegger’s theory of original temporality is subjective, but it 
is subjective in a purely solipsistic manner. 
 Since both of these things are the case, I believe that Bergson provides a more 
fertile ground for continuing research and speculation.  Although Bergson’s theory is 
subjective in a sense, it is in more of an open-ended Hegelian sense.  That is, there is 
plenty of room and opportunity for the subject to grow, according to Bergson’s theories, 
than there is according to Heidegger’s theories.  Furthermore, the future is not something 
set in stone, as it seems to be for Heidegger.  Rather, as Bergson claims in “The Possible 
and the Real,” the “gates of the future open wide; freedom is offered an unlimited 
field.”286 Since Bergson is not morbidly occupied with the subject’s impending death, his 
theories open the door for the subject to grow, and the universe along with it.  This holds 
out much more promise in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, and even ethics than 
Heidegger’s theories ever could. 
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